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INTRODUCTION

Welfare reform in 1996 occurred at the intersection of two
narratives: a substantive debate on the systematic restructuring of a
failed welfare agenda and a tactical discussion on the means of
implementation. By most accounts, scholars have treated these two
narratives—and the reform legislation they propagated—as internally
consistent, if not altogether harmonious. The chosen process-based
theories of devolution of social service provision (through local
governments, private corporations, and churches) have been viewed
as inseparably linked with the substantive objectives of the antidependency, pro-work agenda. After all, as conventional wisdom
goes, we need to harness the dynamism and flexibility of state and
local government in order to end dependency and promote work.
The intuition that often follows is that devolution is our panacea. But
this intuition is wrong.
Our almost blithe acceptance of the marriage between means
(devolution) and ends (reducing dependency) has limited occasions
to evaluate critically the compatibility between procedural devolution
1
2
and substantive welfare reform. Yet such an evaluation is needed.
Despite the assumed political and ideological connection between
3
devolution and substantive reform, this purportedly natural alliance
1

Among the major contributions to the understanding of welfare reform and
policy since the 1996 reform, some of the most insightful analyses tend to posit
holistic critiques and, accordingly, devote comparatively less attention to the separate
and separable conceptions of welfare reform as system (i.e., substantive reform) and
as process (i.e., means and loci of implementation). See, e.g., Matthew Diller, The New
Localism in Welfare Advocacy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413 (2000) [hereinafter
Diller, Localism]; Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) [hereinafter
Diller, Revolution]; David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 471 (1997); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the
End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493 (1999); Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing
Bill Clinton Had Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43.
2
See, e.g., Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1126 (“Observers of the welfare
system long have recognized the central importance of administration in the
operation of assistance programs.
The structure of the bureaucracy and
administrators’ conceptions of their missions have a vital impact on the accessibility
of benefits and on the social messages that are communicated by benefit programs. .
. . Many states explicitly have targeted the organization and culture of welfare offices
for reform.”).
3
Professor Cashin has recognized that a number of welfare reform’s
supporters in Congress believed that federalism “would enhance the likelihood of
meeting the Act’s core substantive goals. They believed that states were best suited to
design programs that would end welfare dependency.” Sheryll Cashin, Federalism,
Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 554 (1999); see also id. at
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spawns unnatural and unintended side effects that threaten the longterm success of welfare reform. In truth, significant problems
emerge when the federal government, ostensibly insistent on meeting
certain objective goals, nevertheless abdicates its authority and
responsibility for overseeing the implementation and for securing the
success of the biggest restructuring of American welfare policy in
4
generations.
Simply put, in abdicating this responsibility, Congress has
actually allowed one narrative to dominate the other. It has
privileged the aims of devolution and privatization—at the expense
of ensuring fidelity to the policy aims and objectives of welfare reform
and, importantly, at the expense of ensuring fidelity to the concept of
federalism itself. This capitulation to the forces of devolution, I need
5
not add, may be politically expedient, but otherwise incongruous
6
from the perspective of prudent policymaking. State and local
governments, as well as private and faith-based providers, could be
quite effective partners in designing and implementing welfare
reform. But left to their own devices, they lack the institutional
capacity and, oftentimes, the proper incentives to bear primary
553 (“One major strain of political rhetoric animating the passage of the [Welfare
Reform] Act was that of political federalism—an a priori presumption that . . . states
are the natural situs of all policy authority.”).
4
See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Poor Relief, Welfare Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 1, 11 (describing PRWORA as representing a “substantial change in
locus for poor relief from AFDC and related programs, the pattern for which began
in the 1960s”); Christopher Ogden, Clinton and Congress Agree To End Six Decades of
New Deal Protections, TIME (Int’l Ed.), Aug. 12, 1996, at 17; Robert Pear, Clinton To
Sign Welfare Bill that Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives States Broad Power, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1996, at A1; The Roosevelt Legacy, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 38 (describing
the “repeal of the 60-year-old federal guarantee of welfare for the poor” as heralding
the “unraveling of the New Deal”).
5
See, e.g., William Claiborne, Governors Push for Greater Power, WASH. POST, Aug.
29, 1994, at A19 (describing a bipartisan movement among some of America’s
governors to draft constitutional amendments aimed at promoting states’ rights and
to press for the need for a constitutional convention); Roger Pilon, Editorial, A
Matter for the States, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at A13 (describing candidate Bob
Dole as having “put the 10th Amendment and a call for returning power to the states
and the people at the center of his presidential campaign”); see also Richard L. Berke,
A Conservative Sure His Time Has Come, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1995, at A1 (describing
presidential candidate Pat Buchanan’s self-proclaimed successes in shifting the mood
toward greater state autonomy: “I’ve won that battle. . . . Jack Kemp’s talking about
shutting down HUD. Richard Lugar is talking about abolishing the I.R.S. Pete
Wilson is talking about illegal immigration.”); Keith Bradsher, States’ Rights Lose Some
of Their High, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at D6 (describing advocates’ efforts to devolve
affirmative action policy and drug policy and quoting them as comparing federal
control in those realms to “Soviet repression”).
6
See John D. Donahue, The Devil in Devolution, AM. PROSPECT, May/June 1997,
at 42.
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responsibility for ensuring the successful transition of America’s
dependent, welfare population to the world of work and personal
responsibility.
The shrinking of the federal government’s
responsibilities over social welfare, moreover, creates civic harms as
7
well. To abandon our national commitment to assist some of the
most vulnerable among us, is to rend the very fabric of our collective
identity.
For Congress to conflate welfare reform with devolved welfare
8
reform is to ensure that it left itself without the necessary tools to
make that fabric whole again. At stake in this inquiry, therefore, is an
understanding that the substantive objectives of 1996 welfare reform
may be all but overridden or subverted by the very process by which
that reform has been implemented. This Article’s ambition is threefold. First, I identify the existence of discordant narratives embedded
in the story of welfare reform. Then, I detail the distortions and
unintended harms that are engendered in the process of
implementing welfare reform. And, finally, I propose a rough
blueprint for reform.
***
Accordingly, this Article begins in Part II by seeking to
7

See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (2003) (“The new versions of privatization . . .
jeopardize public purposes by pressing for market-style competition, by sidestepping
norms that apply to public programs, and by eradicating the public identity of social
efforts to meet human needs.”); see also Matthew Diller, Redefining the Public Sector:
Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization: Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1307 (2001) (characterizing concerns with privatization, including how greater
privatization leads to less public accountability and how privatization leads to a
shrinking of opportunities for meaningful public engagement).
8
Indeed, critics of devolved welfare tend to see the process as intimately and
intuitively linked to the substantive agenda. They see PRWORA as an effort to make
cash assistance less generous and less accessible, and they see the states as effective
agents in furthering those aims. For example, Professor Cashin has recently argued
that states are more frugal with respect to social welfare spending and more likely to
succumb to racial biases in policymaking and appropriations spending than is the
federal government. See Cashin, supra note 3. Prior to 1996, economic arguments
concerning the dangers of devolving social welfare programs were raised by, among
others, Paul Kantor and Paul Peterson. See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY
REVISITED 5-14, 95-99 (1988) (arguing that municipalities have limited control over
their political economies and thus aggressively compete with one another to entice
business development, often at the expense of social welfare spending); PAUL E.
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 69-72 (1981) (suggesting state and local governments must
expend on economic development projects and are reluctant to redistribute any
incoming wealth); Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111,
114-21 (1995) (cataloguing the secular decline in state allocations for welfare
benefits from the early 1970s to the early 1990s). In other words, many observers
believe that the substantive (understood as harsher) revisions that are part of welfare
reform are furthered via devolution.
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disaggregate the “intuitive” connection between the aims of ending
dependency and the means of accomplishing those aims. Part II
further seeks to describe how Congress distorted and undermined its
own, stated policy aims by acceding to the forces of devolution and
privatization. For the most part, scholars’ critiques of welfare reform
have voiced concerns that the legislation is too harsh, does not
sufficiently preserve legal avenues for redress, grants states too much
control, and gives too much power to private and sectarian providers.
And, because many of the scholars critical of welfare reform believe it
to be uniformly or holistically misguided—or, worse, mean-spirited—
they have not focused their energy on examining the legislation’s
9
internal inconsistencies. Thus, few have systematically undertaken
9

Notable works in the field have begun this conversation by challenging the
assumptions underlying this allegedly natural alliance between welfare reform and
devolution, contending that there is no a priori fit between local governance and
effective social welfare provision. See Cashin, supra note 3, at 583-86 (describing, in
fact, the opposite trend that states are inherently averse to generous social welfare
spending and subject to greater political pressure to be fiscally conservative than the
federal government would otherwise be); see also Matthew Diller, Form and Substance
in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002) (describing how
privatization of welfare administration weakens government oversight and limits
public control and contending that privatization initiatives may, counterintuitively,
not even be efficient).
Scholars have, moreover, decried the lack of due process protections that
accompany the shift to devolution and have focused their criticism on the
discretionary powers that flow from the termination of the federal entitlement,
discretion that leaves the client population of welfare recipients susceptible to the
(potentially arbitrary) vagaries of the administrative system. See Diller, Revolution,
supra note 1, at 1127-28 (describing the change in implementation strategy that flows
from the abandonment of a federal entitlement to welfare); id. at 1180 (“[T]he
principles reflected in the APA have created a framework that is in effect throughout
our legal system and has become the dominant means of ensuring administrative
accountability.”); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 231.
Other scholars, of course, have raised similar concerns. See, e.g., Barbara L.
Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local
Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1564
(2001) (“It is not obvious which new mechanisms will permit citizens to hold state
and local governments accountable in their performance of these new roles and
responsibilities.”). Professor Bezdek complicates the analysis of welfare reform by
inquiring into the procedural limitations of contracting with private vendors in a way
that marks an effort to bridge the many components of welfare reform: devolution,
privatization, its substantive aims, and its procedural tools. Her study richly conveys
the attenuated control over the programmatic agenda of corporate providers. See
generally id. at 1603 (“[P]rivatization of government service delivery presents a
paradox: it is said repeatedly that citizens believe government should contract out for
services, and yet, government must be very competent to design, let, and monitor
effective service contracts.”).
R. Kent Weaver, moreover, mentions the federalism trap: granting states
additional discretion will lead them to do things the politicians do not like. See R.
KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 123 (2000). But even Weaver, who
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an internal analysis of how welfare reform is itself undermined by its
own methods of implementation. Part II aims to commence just such
an exploration.
Next, in the middle parts of the Article, I turn to the
10
implementation of welfare reform at devolved and sub-devolved
levels of authority and administration. I argue that these new loci of
devolved welfare policy inevitably and inescapably distort the
substantive aims of the federal wave of reform; these distortions,
which occur in varying degrees of severity at each level of devolved
administration, take three forms. There are (1) institutional harms
that occur because the (devolved) institutional actor in charge of
welfare policy lacks the requisite tools, jurisdictional reach, and
overall capabilities to meet the objective policy aims of federal welfare
reform. These mismatches between aims and capacity create macroinefficiencies in the overall implementation of welfare policy.
Moreover, there are (2) managerial or bureaucratic harms that limit the
effective design and dispersal of social service welfare provisions
because the welfare providers themselves possess sets of incentives
that may lead them to stray from the federal welfare reform agenda.
Finally, there are (3) civic-citizenship harms. The devolved and
privatized loci of welfare administration may prove particularly illequipped or ill-disposed to promote public accountability,
democratic transparency, and due process remediation. These harms
may engender greater senses of alienation and social exclusion from
public governance in ways that directly undermine the ideals of social
integration implicit in the federal welfare agenda.
Thus, in Parts III, IV, and V, I examine how states, for-profit
corporations, and sectarian faith-based organizations, respectively,
are all authorized to act as the providers of choice, responsible for
implementing the federal legislation. I assess the degree to which
these providers are able (and willing) to meet the stated substantive
aims set forth in the federal mandate. And, I ultimately conclude
that America’s poor may be ill-served, not necessarily by the objective
ambitions of Congress’s welfare reform per se, but by the structural
points to this possibility only in passing, fails to suggest that devolved welfare reform
is internally inconsistent; instead, he simply posits that tinkering with the system
becomes increasingly difficult as states define themselves in opposition to Congress.
See id. at 123.
10
See Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Reform Ends in 2002: What’s Ahead for LowIncome and No-Income Families, 61 MD. L. REV. 246, 250-51 (2002) (describing the
practice of states instituting “second-order devolution” to counties); see also Thomas
L. Gais & Cathy M. Johnson, The Implication of Welfare Reform for Children, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1327, 1346 (1999) (describing state practice of sub-delegating administrative and
policymaking authority over welfare services).
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design of the legislation; the legislation opens the door to
policymaking by devolved and privatized providers while closing the
door to effective federal participation, coordination, and stewardship.
Finally, in Part VI, I propose an alternative architectural
framework that might better meet the dual goals of effective and
decentralized welfare reform. I thus attempt to reconcile the
currently discordant narratives (and the inconsistencies between
means and ends) by positing a vision of a reconceptualized welfare
agenda that acknowledges the imperatives for more local and flexible
authority but respects the substantive aims of federal welfare reform.
By forging multiple socioeconomic development partnerships
centering on federal-state, federal-municipality, and federal-private
cooperatives, welfare reform presents an opportunity not only to
promote the day-to-day needs of America’s poor, but also to harness
the forces of federalism constructively to design the
intergovernmental and public-private partnerships that are necessary
to tackle the massive responsibility of combating poverty. It is these
partnerships that could both reaffirm the federal government’s
relevance and dynamism with respect to solving socio-economic ills
and re-connect Washington with local governments and community
organizations, breeding greater civic consciousness and public
engagement.
Simply put, federalism is not devolution per se, and thus I need
to dust off a more authentic understanding of federalism and return
it to its rightful place at the center of American legal architecture. I
reject the wholesale “farming out” of social services and see the need
and opportunity instead to promote new communitarian
connections, to draw Washington and Peoria closer together as well
as to foster ties between Peoria and, say, Indianapolis. Multiple layers
of civic partnerships will help communities seize upon the
appropriate economies of scale, encourage greater public
engagement and discourse on the proper relations of the actors, and
allow the federal government an opportunity not only to monitor
what goes on with county social services, private vendors, and faithbased organizations, but also to develop and construct policy along
side of them. One way to attack Washington for being out-of-touch is
to shut it out of the process entirely. Another way to register the
same complaint more constructively is to invite Washington to
participate in the decentralized process at the ground level. It is, after
all, the difference between devolution and federalism.
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II. A TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES:
THE BUILDUP TO WELFARE REFORM
Welfare reform is not devolution; nor is it privatization. Yet in
the mêlée to overhaul American welfare policy in 1996, these
obviously discrete and different concepts tended to lose their
distinctiveness. Conflating systems with processes, substantive aims
with logistical means, the architects of welfare reform designed
legislation in response to the wishes of the public. Substantively, the
American people demanded welfare recipients get their lives
together and go out and find work (like everyone else); Congress
accordingly ended the long-standing, means-tested federal
entitlement to cash assistance and, instead, conditioned temporary,
transitional cash assistance on proof that recipients were actively
11
seeking work.
Procedurally, the American people signaled their
preference for more locally devised social service provision over
federal management and administration; Congress accordingly—but
perhaps paradoxically—devolved to the states nearly complete
12
authority and discretion in implementing the federal objectives.
This Article challenges the neatness and coherence of these two
narratives that were made to converge into one story. The instant
inquiry is not simply my pointing out an interesting “quirk” in the
legislative design—namely, that states, churches, and corporations
may not follow the federal directives to a tee. Rather, I argue these
ersatz agents are institutionally incapable of satisfying the federal
aims. Accordingly, the forces of devolution and privatization, distinct
from any criticisms of the substantive aims of welfare reform per se,
may actually constitute a serious threat to the long-term success of
welfare reform. And, perhaps most importantly, this Article suggests
Congress’s understanding of federalism as devolution may signal a
drastic shift in federal-state relations (as well as in public-private
sphere relations) that will influence not only how resources are
allocated to America’s poor, but also how we as a community
collectively embrace (or shed) the responsibility of promoting the
13
common welfare. Thus bluntly, I challenge Congress’s desiccated
11

See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000) (ending the federal entitlement to AFDC
assistance and replacing it with discretionary, temporary assistance grants); Christine
N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
89 (2002); Jason DeParle, U.S. Welfare System Dies as State Programs Emerge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1997, at A1.
12
See 42 U.S.C.§§ 601-02, 604 (2000) (ending the federal entitlement to AFDC
assistance and replacing it with discretionary, temporary assistance grants); DeParle,
supra note 11.
13
See Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1565 (“[N]ational governments are [ostensibly]
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view of federalism qua devolution and offer a more faithful
understanding of this delicate federal-state balance that could vastly
improve welfare reform. Once it becomes clear that the substantive
aims of welfare reform may not be best met through the procedural
means established in 1996, it will become imperative for us to rethink
this seemingly natural connection. This imperative begins to take
shape presently.
A. Clamoring for Reform
In this Section, I briefly describe the two sets of converging
narratives that ultimately gave the Personal Responsibility and Work
14
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), its distinctive
characteristics. I discuss the rising influence in the 1980s and early
1990s of conservative thinkers and activists who challenged and
15
ultimately helped de-legitimize the extant AFDC welfare system,
trying to reduce their roles, lower public spending, trim the direct provision of
services, and rely more on private markets. The anti-big government movement is a
general retreat from collectivism [that] emphasizes private property and freedom of
contract. Although often cast in economic terms of costs, benefits, efficiency, and
program management, this is really a watershed about governance, the uses of power
in society, and the boundaries between public action and private concerns.”)
(footnote omitted). Solomon and Vlissides characterize this transformation in
attitudes by comparing Franklin Roosevelt’s rhetoric during the New Deal with
President Clinton’s at the signing of PRWORA. Clinton called for “all of us—States
and cities, the Federal Government, businesses and ordinary citizens—to work
together to make the promise of this new day real.” By contrast, Roosevelt, in
conveying the newfound sense of community empowerment via government, had
proclaimed: “where heretofore men had turned to neighbors for help and advice,
they now turned to Government.” Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr.,
Faith-Based Charities and the Quest to Solve America’s Social Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis,
10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 271 (2001). For a discussion of constitutional
(and congressional) imperatives to take seriously the responsibility of providing for
the general welfare, see Jon D. Michaels, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican
Imperative To Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457 (2002).
14
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
Titles 7, 8, 26, and 42 of the United States Code).
15
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”), or its predecessor, Aid to
Families with Children (“AFC”), was the foundational cash welfare assistance
program in the United States from the New Deal through 1996. See, e.g., WEAVER,
supra note 9, at 16, 28, 244-45; Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the
Cooperative Federalism of America’s Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
123, 143-44 (1996); Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of
Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 266-69 (1998). The cornerstone of this program
was the federal guarantee of cash assistance, which was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). There, the Court reversed the governing
presumption that states were free to change and modify any eligibility rules unless
they were expressly forbidden. After King, the states were not permitted unilaterally
to change the standards of eligibility if they were to frustrate the federal aims of cash
assistance. See Zasloff, supra, at 269-70.
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which they considered morally bankrupt and programmatically
ineffective. I also describe—again, quite briefly—the revitalized
challenge to federal hegemony in the realm of domestic
policymaking writ large. Advocates for greater states’ rights and/or
greater privatization gained considerable momentum at the same
time these welfare critics were demanding substantive reform. These
“smaller government” advocates championed wholesale devolution
and deregulation in the name of greater democracy, authenticity,
choice, and efficiency; and, they succeeded in making devolution and
privatization priorities in policymaking circles, the courts, and on the
campaign trail. I will show, later, that both this chronological overlap
and the political alliance between these two movements actually belie
a real tension: that devolution serves to undermine the substantive
aims of welfare reform.
1.

Substantive Reform: Combating Dependency

Some policymakers in the 1980s, fed up with the unsuccessfully
waged War on Poverty, began rethinking America’s anti-poverty
policy and challenging some sacred tenets of the modern welfare
16
state. Among them was Ronald Reagan, whose rhetorical attack on
17
welfare helped drastically to shift the terms of the debate. Reagan
directed his indignation at the poor, whose benefits, he argued,
16

See Jason DeParle, Debris of Past Failures Impedes Poverty Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 1993, at D3 (describing the saliency of President Reagan’s quip “we fought a war
on poverty and poverty won”); see also GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981);
MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF
POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1993); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND (1984).
17
Among the most memorable rhetorical attacks with sustained resonance is
the conservative attack on the alleged “welfare queen.” See, e.g., Editorial, And Now,
Ronald Reagan, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1979, at A18 (depicting Reagan as campaigning
against welfare provisions in California because of flagrant abuses by welfare queens
who wear “designer jeans”); Paul Krugman, Editorial, Wag the Dog, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2000, at D15 (describing Ronald Reagan’s constant attack against Cadillac-driving
welfare queens as “mean-spirited”); Herbert Mitgang, The Problem that Won’t Go Away,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at C19 (discussing Reagan’s insistence on the existence of
Cadillac-driving welfare queens as a way of diverting middle-class concerns away from
the plight of the underclass); Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamps Program, How It Grew and
How Reagan Wants to Cut It Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1981, at A1 (describing the
saliency of the conservative “legend of the so-called ‘welfare queen,’ a heavy woman
driving a big white Cadillac and paying for thick steaks with wads of food stamps,
became a rhetorical staple for conservative politicians, including Ronald Reagan”);
see also KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME 230 (2000) (recalling Reagan
holding up the want-ad section of the Washington Post to suggest jobs are available
and that the dependent poor must be lazy); Steven V. Roberts, Editorial, Reagan and
His “Golden Oldies,” N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1987, at A24 (recalling President Reagan’s
frequent attacks on “welfare queens”).

584

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:573

drained needed resources away from the market economy and from
otherwise more productive enterprises. Reagan’s attack on what he
memorably referred to as the “welfare queen” took on an
iconography that had an effect domestically akin to what his
depiction of the Soviet Union as an Evil Empire had on international
18
relations. At the Reagan Revolution’s zenith, the very existence of
19
the modern welfare state seemed threatened.
Though little by way of actual policy transformations occurred
20
during the 1980s, attitudes did take on a new hue. Conservatives,
ranging from Margaret Thatcher to Charles Murray, continually
pressed their case against government support for “undeserving”
21
(non-working) poor.
They lamented the declining significance
18

See Richard Cohen, Editorial, Evil, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1983, at C1
(describing the “I-told-you-so” quality of Reagan’s “Evil Empire” appellation as
particularly resonant in light of the Soviet downing of a Korean airplane); Hendrik
Hertzberg, Grinding Axis, NEW YORKER, Feb. 11, 2002, at 23 (suggesting that “Ronald
Reagan’s most famous phrase[,] ‘[e]vil empire[,]’ is now chiselled on history’s wall
next to ‘iron curtain’ as an example of prescient moral clarity”); Stephen S.
Rosenfeld, Editorial, The Moral Edge, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1984, at A17
(characterizing the moral force of Reagan’s declaration).
19
See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 120 (1987) (describing
how the New Deal Coalition “collapsed when Reagan was elected” and how this
Republican resurgence represented a particular attack on means-tested social
services, such as welfare, rather than a general attack, say, on Social Security). The
sentiments of Senator William Armstrong in the early 1980s resonated with those of
the White House. Armstrong argued that “[p]eople on welfare ought to work, work,
work because it is good for the soul, because it is fair to the taxpayers, because it
rankles people who are paying taxes to support these programs to see people who
are recipients not get out and work.” MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
POORHOUSE 306 (1996); see also id. at 295 (describing the central role the Reagan
administration played as “[t]he [f]ederal [g]overnment [w]ages [w]ar on
[w]elfare”).
20
See KATZ, supra note 19, at 300 (describing how little impact the rhetoric of
reform had on welfare policy under Reagan and George H.W. Bush). But see Family
Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 666
(2000)). For discussions of the Family Support Act, see KATZ, supra note 19, at 30709; WEAVER, supra note 9, at 70-76; Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1577; Joel F. Handler, The
Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in
Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (1987-1988); and Zasloff,
supra note 15, at 289-94.
21
Though America never had a “full welfare state” akin to what European
nations had (both in terms of coverage and generosity), see Joel F. Handler, Questions
About Social Europe by an American Observer, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 437 (2000), as early as
the mid-1960s welfare benefits in the United States were quite substantial. See, e.g.,
KATZ, supra note 19, at 259-82; JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST
POVERTY, 1900-1994, at 157-84 (1994); see also FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR (1993) (describing dissatisfaction with degrading
policies leading up to and during the 1960s); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED (1994); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND (1991) (describing the
expansive Great Society policies); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE
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(and resonance) of the Anglo-American ideals of the Protestant Work
Ethic and rugged individualism. Instead, as Thatcher famously put it,
we have abandoned self-reliance and are instead left with a “Nanny
22
State.” Charles Murray, for his part, argued persuasively that the
welfare state infrastructure, built to alleviate poverty, has only
reinforced the social pathologies that placed families in this
23
precarious position in the first place. Murray
insisted that handouts had demoralized the urban ghettos,
leading young blacks to cling to welfare rather than work for a
living. His view of these people reflected an ironic departure
from nineteenth-century visions of the downtrodden in the slums.
Then conservatives had often depicted slum dwellers as
intemperate, shiftless, and immoral. To Murray these poor
people were crassly rational calculators of their own self-interest:
the benefits of welfare, Murray thought, induced them to quit
24
work and live off the public trough.

And, while cogent liberal and moderate responses were
25
forthcoming, the conservative attack ultimately carried the day.
Conservatives successfully shifted the entire discourse away from
fighting poverty and toward combating dependency. For them, the
evil to be eradicated was not poverty per se; rather, it took both the
form of a willingness to accept government support indefinitely and
the form of a behavioral pathology acutely felt by the
26
intergenerational underclass.
STATE 304-31 (1999) (describing the expansion of welfare policies and the increase
in welfare spending); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare
Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985) (describing the legal-procedural underpinnings of
the modern welfare state).
22
See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 213; see also Jo Thomas, Britain Proposes Broad
Overhaul of Almost All Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1985, at A1; Mortimer B.
Zuckerman, Editorial, The Nanny State of the Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 3,
1995, at 72; The Immortal Remains of Margaret Thatcher, ECONOMIST (U.K. Ed.), Oct. 2,
1993, at 37.
23
See MURRAY, supra note 16.
24
PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 213.
25
See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW, & PHILIP L. HARVEY,
AMERICA’S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES
104-14 (1990); WILSON, supra note 19, at 93-95; see also MARY JO BANE & DAVID T.
ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994); CHRISTOPHER
JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 70-91 (1992).
26
See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 213-19 (describing such underclass “lifestyle
choices” to include out-of-wedlock children and joblessness). For early formulations
of this cultural phenomenon, see Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON
UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (Daniel P.
Moynihan ed., 1968); Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National
Action, reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
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What was devastating about the conservative attack was that it
was bilingual: It spoke the language of morality and the language of
economics. If you were someone concerned with culture of poverty
arguments, the conservatives could tell you why welfare policy was
contributing to the social deviancy of the underclass by subsidizing
dependency and promoting unstable family patterns; if you were
someone more persuaded by rational-actor models, then the
conservatives had an answer there, too: Under AFDC, it actually made
more economic sense to remain dependent than it did to find a low27
end job.
Thus, entering the 1990s, ending dependency was the central
28
theme in social policy—and not just among conservatives.
Both
major political parties were operating, for the first time in a long
while, under the same assumptions about federal welfare policy goals:
Anti-poverty programs that support the dependent class are
ineffective, and temporary assistance coupled with greater workforce
participation should replace the status quo. President Clinton’s 1992
campaign platform focused heavily on reforming welfare in this
29
direction. And, with only minor differences in levels and degrees of
support, both parties during the Clinton years wanted desperately to
condition welfare benefits on participation in the job market. Hence,
there existed considerable bipartisan support for many of the
30
substantive aims of 1996 welfare reform.
2.

Procedural Reform:
The Devolution and Privatization Revolution

This period of backlash against guaranteed welfare provisions
and federal entitlements under the New Deal and Great Society
REPORT 40-125 (1967) [hereinafter Moynihan, The Negro Family].
27
See MURRAY, supra note 16, at 154-77 (illustrating this point by using his
seminal hypothetical working couple, Harold and Phyllis).
28
See, e.g., BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 25, at 144-54 (describing the “make
work pay” agenda of changing the relative reservation wage for current welfare
recipients to enter the labor market); Mickey Kaus, The Work Ethic State, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 7, 1986, at 22 (describing the civic virtues of work that underlie full
citizenship and social engagement).
29
See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 9, at 223-27; Richard L. Berke, Clinton: Getting
People off Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at A20; Gwen Ifill, Clinton Presses Welfare
Overhaul, Stressing Job Training and Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at A1.
30
It is beyond the scope and interest of this Article to describe and compare the
different welfare bills proposed during Clinton’s first term. Though the Clinton
proposals, which were never enacted, had greater safeguards in terms of
guaranteeing jobs to those transitioning into the world of work, the substantive aims
of those bills were relatively similar to PRWORA’s. See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 9, at
316-27.

2004

DEFORMING WELFARE

587

coincided, chronologically, with an across-the-board revolt against the
federal government’s alleged dominance in domestic policymaking.
In spite of the fact that welfare was actually administered in
31
accordance with models of cooperative federalism since its creation,
critics nevertheless wanted to circumscribe further the size, scope,
32
and authority of the federal government.
Their broad calls for
greater transfers of authority to state and local governments were
33
well-received. Underlying this movement was a theory of better,
more responsive government. As Justice O’Connor noted in Gregory
v. Ashcroft, federalism in the direction of devolution (1) enhances
citizenship participation, (2) stimulates innovation, and (3) increases
34
administrative efficiency. Indeed, proponents of devolution have
championed the “bottom-up tradition that celebrates interlocal
variation and emphasizes local decision-making autonomy, local
responsibility for services delivered locally, and local political
35
accountability to the electorate.”
Among the most vocal and
effective of the lobbyists promoting devolution in the 1980s and
1990s has been the National Governors Association, which has
successfully secured for the states greater responsibility in, inter alia,
36
37
the areas of environmental and social service policymaking.
31

See Joel F. Handler, ”Constructing the Political Spectacle”: Interpretation of
Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
899, 949-50 (1990) (describing state and local government as policymaking loci for
welfare services); Sugarman, supra note 15, at 144-46 (same); see also infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
32
See Sugarman, supra note 15, at 143-46 (noting the federal guarantees that
were in place prior to passage of PRWORA and identifying places where rolling back
federal protections would be possible under devolved welfare reform).
33
See supra note 5.
34
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
35
Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1607; see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (arguing that the “genius” of federalism is its
ability to generate competition among states); John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not
Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74
(1997); Richard Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987). Moreover, some suggest the structural design of our
constitutional system makes a commitment to federalism an institutional imperative.
See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the
Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 217 (1997).
36
See, e.g., Editorial, Environmental Defiance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at A38
(describing the strong support in Congress and state capitols for giving states greater
autonomy on environmental regulation policy). The efforts by the National
Governors Association to gain control over low-level radioactive waste provide an
excellent example of states wresting power from Washington. See William F.
Newberry, The Rise and Fall and Rise and Fall of American Public Policy on Disposal of LowLevel Radioactive Waste, 3 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 56 (1993); see also Low-Level Radioactive
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38

This devolution revolution, which ushered in a processoriented movement for locating legislative and regulatory authority at
lower levels of government regardless of the substantive content of
the policies in question, was complemented by calls for greater
privatization—at every level of government. What, the argument
went, would be more efficient than harnessing the productive
capacities of the private sector? Tired and dissatisfied with a large,
39
unwieldy, and inefficient bureaucracy, privatization advocates have
Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (describing state efforts to manage and share the burden of lowlevel waste disposal).
37
The National Governors Association was critical in putting devolution at the
forefront of the welfare reform agenda. See WEAVER, supra note 9, at 207-21. Under
the pre-existing AFDC framework, states in the mid 1990s liberally used their
regulatory right to experiment with and restructure the design of welfare policy
within their jurisdictional boundaries; and, they did so in creative and commendable
ways. See Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and
Welfare “Reform,” 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741 (1993) (describing a system in which
waivers were summarily granted and states were given wide latitude to experiment in
the crafting of welfare packages); Cimini, supra note 11, at 96. Under President
Clinton, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services granted nearly seventy
waivers to forty states experimenting with welfare reform. Todd S. Purdham, Clinton
in a Box as Welfare Bill Edges Closer, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1996, at A1; see also Cashin,
supra note 3, at 620-21.
Of note, however, it must be remembered that welfare policy in America has
never really been programmatically centralized. For most of the history of AFDC,
states have had considerable flexibility in determining eligibility and shaping the size
and scope of welfare packages. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. As will
be discussed below, however, see infra Section III.B-V.C, the 1996 reforms permit a
seismic shift toward qualitatively greater state autonomy and away from federal
guideposts and oversight.
38
See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Editorial, The Devolution Revolution, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1995, at D15 (describing devolution as the “next stage in the long, alternative
history of federalism”); see also Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of
Federalism—An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J.
ON REG. 227, 228 (1996) (describing Senator Bob Dole’s declaration that “America’s
historical detour into bureaucracy and centralization is over”); Peter H. Schuck, Some
Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5 (1996) (“The pressure to
devolve power from the center to the periphery is a nearly universal phenomenon in
contemporary society.”); Richard L. Berke, Forget Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1997, at D5 (describing the consensus supporting devolution); Charles Murray,
Editorial, Welfare Hysteria, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at A25 (“The heart of the
American project was that government’s powers should be limited and exercised as
close to home as possible. The federalization of American life in the last halfcentury, not the prospect of devolution in 1995, is the historical aberration.”).
39
For instance, current leaders in government have embraced the
management style of businesses over the governance structures of bureaucracy. See
John Solomon, Bush, Harvard Business School and the Makings of a President, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2000, at C17 (describing how the management styles of business are only
now being recognized as applicable in government settings); see also Bradley Graham,
White-Rumsfeld Dispute, Round 2, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at A23 (“[The]
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sought to slash the federal workforce, circumvent the procedural red
tape characteristic of the modern administrative state, and embrace
competitive market dynamics that lead to lower operating and
40
management costs. Indeed, America’s current wholesale embrace
of privatization as the cornerstone of good government as efficient
41
government is a relatively new, but significant phenomenon that has
42
garnered bipartisan attention and support. The massive movement
appointment [of former Enron executive Thomas White] as Army secretary in 2001
reflected a broad push by Rumsfeld to place corporate executives at the top of the
military services. James G. Roche, a Northrop Grumman vice president, was tapped
to head the Air Force, and Gordon R. England, a General Dynamics executive vice
president, took charge of the Navy. Together, the three were to form a kind of
board of directors with Rumsfeld as chairman . . . .”); Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Thom
Shanker, Army Secretary Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A17 (characterizing
the appointment of Secretary White as “a way to bring business efficiency to the
Pentagon’s sometimes bureaucratic culture”).
40
Proponents of privatization think private actors and agencies perform more
efficiently than government in providing social services, in (self-)regulating and
monitoring industrial health and environmental standards, and in building
consensus on proposed rules and regulations. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:
Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988).
Besides market-based efficiencies, privatization tends to lower costs due to lower
labor expenses. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1523-24 (2001) (describing savings costs associated with
hiring private employees who lack the job security and civil service status that
government employees enjoy); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of
Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 602-03 (2001) (characterizing some of the
savings costs associated with privatization in terms of enlarging the proportion of
unionized, unprotected labor).
Moreover, many bureaucratic agencies are perceived as being “captured” by
special interests; this knowledge makes the leap to privatization increasingly sensible
and attractive. Thomas Merrill describes the public choice theorists’ concerns with
political institutions. Public choice theorists, he argues, suggest that the “public
interest will best be served by transferring decisional authority away from the political
institutions altogether.” Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts, 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1054 (1997); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, &
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23-24 (1997).
41
For general discussions on the rise in privatization in America, see JOHN D.
DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM
BUREAUCRACY (1996); PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (Shelia B. Kamerman &
Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1982); John J.
DiIulio, Jr., Response Government by Proxy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2003); and Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships, Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1229 (2003). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (1996) (characterizing
the 104th Congress as “signal[ing] the transformation of America into a genuinely
post-New Deal regulatory state” intent of rethinking the regulatory state and the
problems of overregulation and centralization).
42
See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1292-94 (2003); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a
Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 27 (2001).
The two Presidents Bush as well as President Clinton have all suggested that
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to allow the private sector to perform traditional government services,
43
44
including prison management, environmental enforcement, and,
45
increasingly, even military and national security functions suggests
downsizing and privatization are key features of their efforts to reinvent government.
The first President Bush assigned Dan Quayle primary responsibility over the Council
on Competitiveness, a task force dedicated to deregulating and privatizing
governmental responsibilities. Ann Devroy, Quayle Panel Takes First Step with Murky
Mandate, WASH. POST, June 21, 1989, at A21 (describing the Quayle council as
promoting an agenda of smaller government through deregulation); Philip J. Hilts,
Questions on the Role of Quayle Council, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at B12
(characterizing the council as promoting deregulation). More recently, Vice
President Al Gore adopted a comparable role as he stewarded the Clinton
administration’s efforts to “reinvent government.” See Gwen Ifill, Gore Jumps into the
Job of Cutting U.S. Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A20; see also E.S. SAVAS,
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 222 (2000). Gore also touted his
exploits in this area when he ran for president. See Kevin Sack, For Limited
Government? That’s Me, Gore Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at A23 (describing the
presidential candidate’s avowed commitment to smaller federal government). And,
most recently, President George W. Bush has promised to slash the federal workforce
in half, contracting out to private entities many governmental responsibilities. See
Richard Stevenson, Government May Make Private Nearly Half of Its Civilian Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A1; see also Peter Finn, With Lawrenceville Facility, Va. Enters
World of Privately Run Prisons, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at B1; William J. Henderson,
Editorial, I Ran the Postal Service; It Should Be Privatized, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at
B1.
43
See Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 267 (2001); E.S.
Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 895 (1987) (describing in the
early years of prison outsourcing that many scholars viewed the introduction of
privatization into the world of prisons as a “natural and inevitable development”); see
also Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359 (1996); Anne
Larason Schneider, Public-Private Partnerships in the U.S. Prison System, in PUBLICPRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 199 (Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000);
Developments in the Law, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in
Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (2002).
44
See 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000) (leaving to
the states the authority for creating plans for “implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement” of the Clean Air Act); see also David A. Dana, Innovations in
Environmental Policy: The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (describing how policymakers avoid the administrative
and political burdens of traditional forms of governance by revising legislation and
regulations and striking deals with the regulated community in which “regulators
contractually commit not to enforce some requirements that are formally applicable
to the regulated entities in return for the regulated [corporate] entities’ contractual
commitments to take measures not required under existing formal law”). Professor
Dana further describes how private regulation has been a response to the common
understanding that market-based decisions promote efficiency and compliance in
ways that often-inflexible government regulations do not. See id. at 37. For broader
efforts aimed at de-emphasizing command-and-control type regulations, see Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (2000). See
also Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000)).
45
Recent reports indicate an alarming new trend in privatization of traditional
armed service functions. See, e.g., P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF
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that core policymaking functions do not necessarily have to come
from state capitols or from Washington.
B. Coalescing Around Welfare Reform: Systems and Processes
Since the New Deal and up until 1996, the federal government
46
had been increasingly serving as the guarantor of poor relief.
Though welfare has always been a federal-state partnership, the
“procedural revolution” of the late 1960s and early 1970s curtailed
state agencies’ ability to reject classes of applicants and terminate
47
individuals for “improper” behavior.
But, in 1996, Congress
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003); James Dao, U.S. Company to Take Over
Karzai Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A24; Jonathan D. Tepperman, Out of
Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 2002, at 10; Leslie Wayne, America’s For-Profit Secret
Army, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at C1; see also Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Perle’s
Plunder Blunder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at D13 (describing how a key member of
private board of advisors to Secretary Rumsfeld was being compensated by
technology firms with a financial interest in U.S. national security policy); Stephen
Labaton, Pentagon Adviser Is also Advising Global Crossing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at
C1 (same). For analysis of military privatization’s normative and legal departures
from conventional, domestic privatization, see Jon D. Michaels, Privatizing War: Big
Government’s Last Stand and the Rise of a New Privatization Paradigm, work in progress,
(on file with author).
46
See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 15, at 125 (describing the pre-New Deal state
programs of assistance for the aged poor and for poor widows with children).
47
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring states to continue
paying welfare benefits to those terminated from the rolls until after a proper
hearing is conducted); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (rejecting state man-ofthe-house midnight inspections by state caseworkers as inconsistent with federal
welfare laws); see also Cimini, supra note 10, at 249 (noting that since the late 1960s
under AFDC, “the statutory criteria and absence of caseworker discretion created a
legitimate expectation in the receipt of benefits for qualified applicants”); Simon,
supra note 21.
Indeed, Professor Zasloff has argued that class action lawsuits of the late 1960s
and early 1970s
fundamentally transformed the nature of the AFDC program . . . [and]
changed the previous presumption of the Social Security Act, viz. that
states were free to adopt any eligibility rules unless they were expressly
forbidden. In King v. Smith, the Court unanimously struck down
Alabama’s “substitute father” rule as violative of the statute. Broadly
speaking, that rule denied AFDC benefits to children in otherwiseeligible households if a man “cohabited” with the children’s mother—
regardless of whether the man was obligated to support the children or
whether he in fact did so. The definition of “cohabit” was intentionally
vague, and states often used it to deny benefits to African-Americans.
Overturning several decades of deference to federal administrative
constructions that supported such rules, the Court relied heavily upon
the notion that “protection of children is the paramount goal of
AFDC,” and interpreted the statute in light of this overarching
background rule. . . . “[F]ederal public welfare policy,” [the Court]
stated, “now rests on a basis considerably more sophisticated and
enlightened than the ‘worthy-person’ concept of earlier times.” In
THE
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changed America’s bargain with the poor. Welfare, understood as
cash assistance, would no longer be considered an entitlement;
rather, cash assistance for individuals could now be conditioned on
meeting work (or job-seeking) requirements and adhering to
48
personal responsibility codes or contracts. Indeed, federal moneys
would no longer have to go to cash assistance; states would have
49
greater discretion to use federal dollars as they see fit.
More broadly, PRWORA was a declaratory manifesto describing
both Congress’s abdication of its commitment to welfare as an
entitlement and its refusal to subsidize the nonworking
50
(undeserving) poor.
Its intentions and goals were quite clear:
keeping with this belief, the Court moved ahead with sharply curtailing
states’ control over the program: by 1971, it could state matter-of-factly
that “in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion
clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a
state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance
under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is
therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” Lower courts followed
suit throughout the late 60’s and early 70’s, and invalidated a host of
state regulations, greatly expanding the program and leaving it
unrecognizable from the small state-driven scheme that had existed ten
years before.
Finally, federal officials cowed by previous Congressional antipathy
now felt emboldened to pressure states to serve more clients. In 1966
the . . . central administrator for AFDC in 1962, ordered that state
plans for eligibility “respect the rights of individuals . . . and not result
in practices that violate the individual’s privacy or personal dignity, or
harass him, or violate his constitutional rights.” In the wake of the Civil
Rights movement, and protected by a liberal administration, the
federal bureaucracy set states on notice that it now had the upper
hand. States that wanted to get critical federal matching funds had
little choice but to comply.
Zasloff, supra note 15 at 269-71 (footnotes omitted).
48
See, e.g., Cimini, supra note 10, at 257-58 (detailing the contractual symbolism
of welfare reform); Zasloff, supra note 15, at 228 (“[PRWORA] destroyed the
previous welfare law’s formal guarantee of child-care subsidies that enabled
recipients to maintain employment.”).
49
See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Gretchen Caspary, Welfare Dynamics and the 1996
Welfare Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 609-10 (1997)
(describing how PRWORA permits states to lower their total spending on the poor
and to reallocate that reduced spending away from cash assistance); Martha C.
Nguyen, Note, Welfare Reauthorization: President Bush’s Agenda, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 489, 489-90 (2002) (describing the loose federal guidelines imposed on
states vis-à-vis how states use welfare block grant money); Robert Pear, Welfare
Spending Shows Huge Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at A1 (describing the dramatic
reallocation of welfare money away from cash assistance and toward transportation
subsidies, substance abuse programs, and child care and noting that much of this
reallocated money is not targeted at those families “who do not receive welfare in the
traditional sense”).
50
See Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO.
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replace AFDC with a temporary, time-limited assistance program
(TANF) and insist those receiving transitional benefits begin the
51
process of finding work.
In passing PRWORA, Congress’s substantive anti-dependency
narrative would be eclipsed (and ultimately undermined) by the
seemingly complementary narrative of devolution. Congress not only
changed the substantive content of welfare policy, but also
revolutionized the means of design and delivery; indeed, as suggested
above, it relinquished unprecedented programmatic responsibility
over welfare to the states, which in turn, have been authorized to
contract out their administration of welfare to, inter alia, for-profit
corporations and sectarian religious organizations. Thus, among the
inheritors of the federal responsibility for public assistance are
Lockheed Martin and Catholic Charities.
Given the dominant systematic and process-oriented narratives
of the 1980s and 1990s, it is not shocking that they would converge as
52
they did in PRWORA. The ambitions of budget hawks, opponents
of a soft welfare state, and states’ rights advocates aligned in their
53
antagonism toward big, central government. Antagonism toward
big, central government does accommodate these two narratives
quite well; and, though these narratives have been incorporated into
54
one widely supported legislative agenda, it does not necessarily
follow that we should equate this apparent “coherence” with any type
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 167, 184 (2000) (contending that privatization and
Charitable Choice “justifies and facilitates the federal government’s abdication of
responsibility for the poor”).
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (2000); see also Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1150
(describing time limits as a significant change in formal welfare policy); Joel F.
Handler, “Ending Welfare As We Know It”: The Win/Win Spin or the Stench of Victory, 5 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 132 (2001) (“The most significant change introduced by
PRWORA are the time limits.”).
52
See Cashin, supra note 3, at 554 (emphasizing the recent prioritization of
devolutionary trends and the influence of this devolution agenda on public policy
decisionmaking); Garry Wills, Editorial, Washington Is Not Where It’s At, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1998, at G26 (describing the confluence of welfare reform and devolution).
53
See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1565. It is worth noting that states have had
considerable influence in their efforts to tie welfare reform to greater state authority.
The waiver efforts of the 1990s, in which HHS granted states the opportunity to
experiment with AFDC programs, illustrate the already strong linkages between
welfare reform and devolution. See supra note 37.
54
Robert Pear, Many Subtleties Shaped Members’ Welfare Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1996, at A22 (characterizing a number of liberal Democrats who were running for reelection in 1996 as feeling compelled to support PRWORA and indicating that the
Clinton White House was divided, with policy staffers recommending a veto and the
political advisors insisting the president support the bill). The public in general also
favored welfare reform. See Richard L. Berke, Public Favors the Democrats, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1996, at A1.
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of internal harmony or consistency once we move past the criticism
stage and embrace the responsibilities of affirmative, constructive
policymaking.
Consider, for instance, the waiver movement that represented a
recent, pre-PRWORA attempt at reform. Throughout the early and
mid 1990s, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) allowed states to propose experimental reforms
within the framework of the existing AFDC system. Most state
requests for waivers were summarily granted, which gave governors
55
relatively broad discretion to modify the substance of AFDC. For
example, quite a large number of states began experimenting with
56
family caps and more stringent work requirements.
But in these instances, it was very clear that welfare qua process
was the very means by which welfare qua system was being subverted.
These narratives converged in a moment of destructive policymaking.
Trapped within the AFDC paradigm, the HHS decision to transfer
greater discretion to the states was a way for reform to be undertaken
in the shadow of true legislative reform. Given that the relative
support to dismantle AFDC was always much greater than any
coalition rallying behind any one particular affirmative vision of
constructive reform, the waiver system allowed for substantive reform
57
under the rubric of process-based changes. The ostensible federal
purpose for granting waivers liberally was to stimulate (or simulate)
substantive legal and policy reforms—to put band-aids on a broken
system.

55

Weaver provides a helpful, succinct summary. He notes that though waivers
were statutorily allowable under section 1115 of the Social Security Act of 1962, they
were seldom applied for by states even during the Reagan-New Federalism years.
WEAVER, supra note 9, at 131. “Before the late 1980s, waiver provisions were narrowly
interpreted and seldom used. By 1995, however, most states had obtained waivers
from Washington . . . .” Id; see also supra note 37; infra notes 56, 57, 80 and
accompanying text.
56
See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 56-62 (1995)
(describing state waiver programs generally); PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 239-40
(describing waiver programs in Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
Wisconsin); WEAVER, supra note 9, at 131 (characterizing states as experimenting with
family caps and time limits); Law, supra note 1, at 479-80 (describing the pre-1996
workfare program in Riverside, California, as a “model for federal reform”).
57
See WEAVER, supra note 9, at 131 (describing the waivers as allowing states to
“test dramatic reforms . . . without any legislative change at all by Congress”) (emphasis
added); see also The Fickle Finger of Welfare Policy; Why the Governors Can’t Decide What
Reforms They Really Want, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1995, at C5 (describing the lack of
consensus within the context of the waiver system).
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C. The Nuts and Bolts of PRWORA
But PRWORA, for better or worse, represented the fulfillment of
just such a galvanizing legislative moment so sorely lacking in the
58
years of dissatisfaction with the old welfare system. By 1996, HHS
and the states no longer had to conspire to circumvent a failed
program; instead, the country was ready to tear down the legal and
substantive foundation of that system—AFDC entitlements—and
institute a new welfare policy regime. As suggested earlier, at no time
in recent memory has there been as strong a national, bipartisan
commitment to transforming welfare policy as the one that coalesced
59
around PRWORA. In the years since the legislation’s enactment,
60
that consensus has only grown broader and deeper. Specifically, the
widespread support for this programmatic change speaks to a
national commitment to ending dependency through emphasizing
work and family values—to shift the terms of public assistance away
from a rights-oriented entitlement to a more social contractarian
model insisting on duties and obligations as a condition of
61
assistance.
58

But see Zasloff, supra note 15, at 227 (chronicling the reform measures that
have been enacted over the last thirty years).
59
Fifty-three Republicans and twenty-five Democrats, including Senators
Feingold, Kerry, Kohl, Biden, and Lieberman, all supported the legislation. See How
Senate Voted on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, at A10; see also Joe Klein, The End of
the Tide: If Even Clinton Says the Era of Big Government Is Over, What Do the Republicans Do
Next?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1996, at 51 (describing the national consensus
surrounding the welfare legislation); Joseph I. Lieberman, Editorial, Welfare As We
Know It, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1996, at A23 (offering a Democratic defense of the 1996
rendition of welfare reform).
60
Indeed, in the 2000 Democratic presidential primary season, former Senator
Bill Bradley was considered vulnerable if he were to run as the nominee in the
general election because he voted against welfare reform. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus,
Editorial, Who’s the Real Beltway Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000, at A25
(recognizing that Bradley’s opposition to welfare reform in 1996 would hurt his
chances in the Democratic primaries); Martin Peretz, War of Words, NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 46 (calling Bill Bradley’s vote against the 1996 welfare reform
proposal “wildly out of step with public opinion”).
61
Lawrence Mead, who characterizes this shift in policy as an ushering in of an
era of “New Paternalism,” explicitly describes the previous, traditional programs as
largely “compensatory.” He sees the new programs as emphasizing duties and
obligations. See Lawrence M. Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, in THE NEW PATERNALISM
1-38 (1997) [hereinafter Mead, The Rise of Paternalism]; Lawrence M. Mead, Telling the
Poor What to Do, PUB. INT., June 22, 1998, at 97; see also Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1560
(describing 1996 welfare reform as establishing a new contractual regime: the
“Contractual Welfare State”); Cimini, supra note 10, at 254-58 (discussing obligations
and responsibilities under TANF); Judith Havemann, New York’s Workfare Picks Up City
and Lifts Mayor’s Image, WASH. POST., Aug. 13, 1997, at A1 (quoting a senior advisor to
Mayor Giuliani as saying that “if the government is going to provide a benefit, it has
the right and obligation to ask for something in return”).
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62

In PRWORA, Congress ended the federal entitlement to
63
welfare. Federal cash assistance (TANF) is now capped at five years
64
over a recipient’s lifetime, and those time-limited benefits would
further be conditioned on meeting work requirements and/or on
65
adhering to a particular set of moral and family values. Congress
required states to move one-half of its recipient families into work66
related activities by 2002.
67
While retaining these limited goal-setting powers, Congress also
gave the states unprecedented discretion over policymaking and
68
administration. States are not only afforded great latitude in how
62

Throughout this discussion, I deliberately oversimplify. There are select
loopholes that allow states to make exceptions and other loopholes that states have
themselves found to further skirt the federal imperatives. Thus, some of the
statements proffered may seem to lack some nuance, which I readily concede and
accept for the purposes of describing clearly the broader contours of the new law
without getting bogged down in the intricacies. For a handy summary of PRWORA,
see WEAVER, supra note 9, at 330-34.
63
See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
64
See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).
65
See id.
66
See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000). In 2002, the Bush administration and the House
of Representatives proposed raising the minimum work requirements for state
recipients of public assistance. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Bloomberg Steps Up to the Plate
on Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002 (describing local administrators’
dissatisfaction with congressional mandates regarding the level of work
requirements); Editorial, Reforming Welfare Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at A18
(describing the mismatch between federal goals and the limitation of state policies).
67
Professor Law provides a succinct summary of how Congress’s statutory
guidelines explicitly promoted a substantive vision of welfare reform. Specifically:
TANF funds . . . must be used for enumerated TANF purposes:
providing cash assistance to needy families with children, promoting
work, preventing nonmarital births, and promoting the formation and
maintenance of two-parent families. . . . Federal TANF funds may not
be used to provide cash assistance to a family that “includes an adult
who has received [TANF] assistance . . . for 60 months.” States must
require all parents or caretakers receiving assistance to engage in work
“once the State determines the parent or caretaker is ready to engage
in work, or once the parent or caretaker has received assistance under
the program for 24 months (whether or not consecutive), whichever is
earlier.” Parents who are not working must participate in community
service within two months of receiving aid. Strict limits prevent states
from counting as “working” people who are attending school or
vocational education programs. Federal grants to the state will be
reduced if the state fails to meet the mandatory job participation rates
set in the federal statute.
Law, supra note 1, at 488-89 (footnotes omitted); see Candice Hoke, State Discretion
Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based
Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 118-20 (1998) (describing the
“burdensome and expensive” federal requirements that PRWORA contains).
68
See Law, supra note 1; Minow, supra note 1; Jonathan Alter et al., Washington
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they themselves design welfare policy, but they are also allowed to
sub-devolve that authority and responsibility to municipalities, private
corporations, and faith-based organizations. Thus, the coherent
69
message from Washington is, I argue, undermined, since PRWORA
is not just aimed at prioritizing personal responsibility and antidependency: Along with the substantive objectives of welfare reform
is the process-oriented goal of increased devolution and privatization.
Congress drafted legislation that not only aimed at fighting
dependency, but that also reduced federal oversight, maximized
opportunities for state and local experimentation, and permitted
states and localities to rely on churches and corporations in carrying
70
out their social service responsibilities.
In contending that Congress did not foresee the distortions that
devolution and privatization may bring about, I do not have to decide
whether Congress was misguided or myopic. The conventional story
is that, politically speaking, Congress either intended or had no
choice but to cede considerable power to the states. Judith
Havemann and Barbara Vobejda of the Washington Post have weighed
in on the myopia side of the debate. They have described some state
proposals to sub-devolve welfare policy as being “hardly envisioned by
many of the federal lawmakers who voted for revolutionary welfare
71
changes.” In either event, the point remains: Whether Congress
knew it would be undermining its own substantive vision or not, the
dominant narrative of devolution and privatization has compromised
Washes Its Hands, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1996, at 42; see also Michele L. Wiggeren,
Experimenting with Block Grants and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt To Transform
Welfare by Altering Federal-State Relations and Recipients’ Due Process Rights, 46 EMORY L.J.
1327, 1340, 1342 (1997) (describing Congress’s significantly greater power under the
AFDC system of “cooperative federalism”).
69
See Cashin, supra note 3, at 558-59 (“The legislation does not abandon those
Americans who truly need a helping hand. It retains protections for those who
experience genuine and intractable hardship.
Above all, it recognizes the
vulnerability of America’s children. It guarantees that they will continue to receive
the support they need.”) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 261 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2649). But see MARMOR ET AL., supra note 25, at
222 (cautioning against any naïve belief that legislators’ reasons for endorsing
particular pieces of legislation are unitary). Marmor and his co-authors “chasti[ze]
critics for the mistaken assumption that social welfare programs are designed to
pursue a single purpose and are ‘failures’ to the degree they fail to achieve that
purpose.” Id.
70
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 604(f) (2000). While PRWORA does not explicitly and
affirmatively authorize privatization, § 604(f) does so in a limited respect. More
directly, PRWORA effectively repeals the old AFDC legislation that specifically
prohibited privatization. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(6) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(4)
(2000).
71
Judith Havemann & Barbara Vobejda, After Getting Responsibility for Welfare,
States May Pass It Down, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1997, at A1.
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the effective realization of the federal objectives of welfare reform.
III. WELFARE REFORM AS WE (NOW) KNOW IT:
AN INQUIRY INTO IMPLEMENTATION
These next three parts evaluate how devolution and
privatization—welfare reform’s procedural imperatives—compromise
72
the substantive and rhetorical aims of PRWORA. I argue that state,
church, and private welfare vendors may exploit their discretionary
authority and under-provide services in ways that leave hundreds of
thousands of individuals materially far worse off than even a fiscally
conservative Congress might have intended. Moreover, the federal
government’s willingness to throw its (the nation’s) hands up and
73
concede defeat engenders significant psychic harms as well. This
federal abandonment, magnified by a hot-potato phenomenon of
states themselves (1) passing down responsibility to cities and
counties by way of second-order devolution and (2) passing along
responsibility to sister states through diversionary tactics and races-tothe-bottom, reveals to the recipients and to the general body of
citizens alike that the plight of America’s poor is either beyond the
technical and economic grasp of the world’s superpower or—more
74
plausibly—simply not that important.
I begin my analysis in Section A at the simplest and least
problematic level of devolution: state autonomy and discretion over
welfare policy. I start from the generous premise, that devolution
completely comports with—rather than undermines—the substantive
and rhetorical aims momentously outlined in 1996. Within the
context of this counterfactual, I suggest that the states are dedicated
to the same vision of welfare reform as Congress, and thus there is
perfect-mapping such that discretion is confined within the bounded
contours of the federal agenda and distortions are minimized.
In Section B, I hold the counterfactual presumptions of the
72

See Wills, supra note 52 (describing lone voices of concern that devolution will
limit the federal government’s ability to tackle dependency and quoting William
Bennett as saying that devolution “has often meant reducing the Federal
Government’s capacity to monitor and correct”).
73
See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1578 (describing the enactment of 1996
welfare reform as a return to the pre-New Deal conception of the poor as personally
weak, lazy, or morally deficient).
74
Cf. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE
UNSTEADY MARCH (1999). Dudziak as well as Klinkner and Smith focus on how the
Soviet criticism of American race relations during the Cold War challenged the
United States to propel the civil rights agenda forward. Their scholarship reveals the
American ability to progress and transform society in the face of external criticism.
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previous section up to the light and offer a more critical account of
how states really do differ individually and collectively from the
federal government in the design and implementation of welfare
policy. I argue that states may possess structural incentives that
dampen their eagerness to implement the federal aims of welfare
reform, and that states in general may be limited institutionally in
their ability to promote and coordinate the work opportunities that
ostensibly make it possible for the dependent poor to leave welfare
en masse. Aspects of these arguments have been ably made
75
elsewhere by others; but those studies have stopped short of
articulating what is fully at stake when states not only administer
welfare reform themselves, but also when they farm it out, engaging
in second-order or sub-devolution to for-profit corporations and
faith-based organizations. The reconciliation of dual sovereignty with
welfare privatization has, from my vantage point, yet to be fully
explained.
Accordingly, in the next two parts, I identify how this connection
between federal policy goals and the realities of devolution cum
privatization as implemented becomes even more attenuated once
the states decide to outsource welfare services, leaving the
responsibility for policy development and administration in the
hands of for-profit and religious providers. As detailed below in Part
IV and Part V, respectively, these providers may lack public
accountability, may possess competing (economic, fiduciary, and/or
theological) incentives, and may readily acknowledge and concede
they do not and cannot represent the will and interests of the
American people writ large.
***
76
Devolution’s harms at any and all of these levels of
administration can be categorized along three axes: institutional,
managerial, and civic-citizenship. Institutional harms, as I define
them, arise out of structural mismatches. Specifically, the institution
in which authority and discretion is vested is ill-equipped, either in
terms of resources or disposition, to carry out the core functions and
imperatives of federal welfare reform. In such instances, devolution
proves to be counterproductive, if not affirmatively harmful.
Managerial, or bureaucratic harms arise as devolved agents of
75

See supra notes 1, 2, 9, 10.
More precisely, I should say “distortions” rather than “harms” because states,
cities, or private actors, in truth, could improve upon the federal agenda. Because
this inquiry principally concerns itself with the adverse effects of such distortions, I
employ the term “harm” as shorthand.
76
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welfare provision have incentives to distort federal welfare policy, or
simply under-provide for the client population. Many of these
managerial harms are extensions of the institutional mismatch, and
examples of these kinds of harms abound. State administrators
forced to meet federal work requirements may simply deter
beneficiaries from remaining on welfare, a poor substitute for
actually helping individuals find meaningful work and otherwise
77
easing the transition into the labor market. Corporate providers
may contractually be permitted to keep, as profits, all of the allocated
funding that is not dispersed to the citizenry; accordingly, they too
might be tempted to dissuade and divert clients, approaches which
are much less expensive than having to provide job-training and
child-care services. And, sectarian providers may interject and
impose an ethos of faith into the otherwise neutral provision of social
services and may focus too many resources on moral or spiritual
uplift at the expense of education and skills-training programs.
Finally, the civic-citizenship harms are visited on recipients (and
sometimes even members of the civic community broadly defined)
when devolution and privatization undermine democratic
responsiveness and accountability, core values of American public
and political engagement. Whether in the form of localities’ highly
parochial governments, corporations’ lack of due process and APAlike obligations, or faith-based organizations’ exclusionary (and thus
potentially alienating) religious messages, devolution and
privatization may make individuals feel less empowered and less
connected to the organs of government.
In what follows, mapping these categories of harm onto the
different levels of devolved and privatized governance will help
illustrate the nature and severity of the distortions currently
undermining and threatening to undo PRWORA.
A. Perfect Mapping: Non-distorting State Implementation of
Federal Policy
Let us commence by assuming the best-case scenario: The
substantive and rhetorical federal objectives of welfare reform can be
met through state implementation. Essentially most states and
78
municipalities support the aims of federal welfare reform, and, after
77

See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
78
In 1996, the National Governors Association endorsed PRWORA. See National
Governors Association Welfare Reform Bulletin, available at http://nga.org/nga/
lobbyIssues/1,1169,D_4940,00.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2003). New York City, once
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decades of jointly administering AFDC with the federal government,
these states will craft their welfare policies in ways quite congruous
79
with Congress’s intentions.
States, we must remember, helped
transform the world of welfare through their extensive use of waivers
in the early 1990s as well as through their advocacy for passage of
PRWORA. And, before that, states under the AFDC model of
cooperative federalism, have long occupied a pivotal role in welfare
80
policy and administration. Having invested a good deal of political
considered a hotbed of liberal social policy and welfare advocacy, is a great case
study. Lawyers from Columbia’s Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law brought
the landmark case, Goldberg v. Kelly, against New York. The named plaintiff, John
Kelly, did not even have children and was not receiving AFDC benefits. Instead, he
was receiving more expansive, generous “Home Relief” benefits offered to New York
residents. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
21, at 373. For general discussions on the strength of the welfare rights movement at
that time, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED 10-21 (1993); FRANCES FOX PIVEN &
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 264-359 (1977); JACK KATZ, POOR
PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 79-81 (1982); and Edward V. Sparer, The Right to
Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65, 71-72 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971).
The attitude among political elites in New York during the PRWORA revolution
is much changed. New York City was on the forefront of “workfare,” a means of
helping reduce dependency and facilitate work even before the passage of the
federal reform bill. See, e.g., Douglas Martin, New York Workfare Expansion Fuels Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at A1 (discussing the growth of the program from
essentially a pilot program in the early 1990s to a major initiative by the mid 1990s).
But see Betsy Gotbaum, Editorial, When Workfare Is Just Make-Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1993, at A19 (describing the program as a fruitless endeavor that does not prepare
individuals for work). Indeed, Mayor Giuliani hired Jason Turner, Wisconsin’s
architect of many of the welfare reform waiver-initiatives under Governor Tommy
Thompson.
Journalist Jason DeParle describes how the city administration
introduced an anti-dependency welfare initiative to its caseworkers in Harlem. In
response to a caseworker’s question regarding the city’s harsh termination policies
under PRWORA, Commissioner Turner responded that the real way to end
dependency is: “live on what you get, and if you run out, figure out what to do until
your next paycheck.” Jason DeParle, What Welfare-to-Work Really Means, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1998, at F11. DeParle sums up the scene as follows:
The city’s new Welfare Commissioner—this Ivy-League-educated,
Republican white man—had just traveled to the heart of Harlem and
proclaimed it morally instructive for the poor to face empty cupboards.
Once upon a time, there might have been a riot. In the end-welfare age, the
stunned silence [instead] leads to applause.
Id. (emphasis added).
79
For some general discussions of cooperative federalism in the post-War era
and into the more recent period marked by greater devolutionary trends, see
TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION (1998); JON C. TEAFORD,
THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT (2002); and
Scheiber, supra note 38.
80
As described above, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, even before
the 1996 legislation, state and federal administrators were actively experimenting
with workfare reforms. Between 1993 and 1996 alone, Clinton’s HHS approved
seventy waivers in over forty states. Many of these waivers sought to condition
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capital in the design (and success) of this brand of welfare reform,
81
states moreover have incentives to fulfill its mandate accordingly.
The explicit substantive federal goals of reducing dependency
and increasing personal responsibility can hardly be disregarded by
states implementing PRWORA; political, legal, and economic
expediency converge to limit the horizon of possible variations or
distortions within the paradigm of federal welfare reform. Simply
put, states must begin the process of facilitating the transition from
welfare to work and take steps to root out long-term dependency by
preparing individuals, both materially and psychologically, for the
onset of TANF’s stringent time limits. Thus, ostensibly there is little
room and incentive for states to undertake any frolics or detours
when they are hard at work complying with and thus furthering the
federal aims.
Discretion, under this scenario, is limited to ways that comport
with popular impressions of cooperative federalism: States are given
leeway and flexibility to determine how best to carry out these federal
82
imperatives.
Indeed, under what I consider to be these idealized
circumstances, the dual narratives of anti-dependency and greater
local responsibility and authority can actually be reconciled. To
reduce dependency, states can experiment with policies to address
particular needs; they can, for instance, institute family caps, require
drug testing and counseling, promote marriage, and/or offer childcare allowances. States can tailor the relative mix of carrots and sticks
to suit the local needs (and treat pathologies) that prevail in
83
particular communities.
Given welfare reform’s imminent time
84
85
limits,
strict work requirements,
and conditional benefit
benefits on participation in the workforce. See The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, HHS Fact Sheet (U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs.), Aug. 22, 1996, at 5 [hereinafter HHS Fact Sheet]; see also Bennett &
Sullivan, supra note 37; Purdham, supra note 37.
81
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
82
There are a good number of ways in which PRWORA allows states significant
maneuvering room to circumvent the direct federal aims. I will briefly refer to those
“loopholes” in subsequent sections; for now, however, I will adhere to a more stylized
set of facts, in keeping with the counterfactual nature of the present discussion.
83
Havemann, supra note 61; see also Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 61.
There can be greater variance here with regard to what types of services and
obligations are mandatory. They can involve any combination of parenting/
fatherhood classes, money management classes, and drug rehabilitation, job training,
or workfare programs, and may have to make themselves available to intrusive home
visits. This of course does make the programs quite distinct. See, e.g., id.; DeParle,
supra note 78.
84
See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000).
85
See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000) (requiring that a state insist that fifty percent of its
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86

structures, all welfare agencies have little choice but to become
87
more demanding and intrusive. Thus, an argument can easily be
made that the federal goal that caseworkers closely monitor
recipients of public assistance to ensure they attend training
workshops and actively seek work will be achieved through local
88
administration.
Additionally, besides the failure-to-comply sanctions imposed on
states, Congress gave states other incentives to reduce dependency.
For example, states are allowed to keep the unspent money ostensibly
earmarked for welfare and dedicate it to other needs of their own
89
choosing. Moreover, there is the self-evident political windfall for
recipient families include an adult working at least thirty hours a week by 2002).
86
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 815-19, 824, 829, 110 Stat. 2105, 2315-20, 2323, 2327
(imposing a host of behavioral requirements and sanctions).
87
See Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 61. The anti-dependency federal
imperative—coupled with the statutory time limits—relies, in part, on more
aggressive monitoring (and counseling). The investigative work will not only help
reduce fraud and encourage work, but it will also help agencies determine how best
to allocate resources—and to which recipients. The investigative power allows states
to experiment more creatively and place different recipients on different tracks
toward self-sufficiency.
This transformation in our conception of welfare has changed, again ostensibly
uniformly, the complexion of the welfare worker: “[e]ligibility specialists whose jobs
[under AFDC] were viewed as clerical, are being replaced by case managers with
broad authority to advise, assist, and supervise clients. . . . [T]he case manager is
intended to serve as a ‘teacher, preacher, friend, and cop—an all-purpose partner to
guide poor parents into jobs.’” Diller, Localism, supra note 1, at 421 (quoting Jason
DeParle, For Caseworker, Helping Is a Frustrating Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at
A1). Indeed, “the imposition of work requirements and time limits, the creation of
diversion programs, the strengthening of sanctions, and the reorganization of staff
functions all have one consequence in common: They increase the authority and
discretion of caseworkers.” Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1164; see also William H.
Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-04,
1214-18 (1983) (describing the advent of detached, clerical welfare administrators in
the late 1960s as a response to the intrusive social workers who were a hallmark of
the older welfare system believed to be fraught with arbitrary and discriminatory case
management).
88
PRWORA, however, permits caseload reduction credits that can, if properly
leveraged by state agencies, reduce workforce participation requirements to
negligible numbers. The credits are given in a 1 to 1 ratio; thus, for every one
recipient who is turned off the welfare rolls, the state agency actually has to help find
two fewer jobs: the one who was pushed off the rolls, and an additional individual,
who benefits from the caseload reduction credit. Again, this will be presented more
fully below in how reform can be distorted. Here, this Article assumes that workforce
participation is unquestionably in line with the interests of the state and local
administrators.
89
42 U.S.C. § 604 (2000); see Law, supra note 1 (describing how states could use
up to twenty percent of the entire welfare block grant for any other purpose they so
choose); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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governors who can proudly claim major reductions in caseloads—in
line with federal aims. Under this stylized scenario, states’ political,
legal, and economic incentives to reduce dependency, create work
opportunities, and promote personal responsibility, directly align
under the federal architecture of reform.
B. Inevitable State Distortions of the Federal Agenda
Unfortunately, this stylized “perfect mapping” in Section A is
overly sanguine. However rigidly constrained they are by political
and budgetary concerns and however closely in-sync they are with the
ambitions of federal welfare reform, state governments (1) have
considerable institutional trouble meeting Congress’s substantive
policy objectives; (2) have competing incentives that may steer them
off course; and finally, (3) may engender civic harms insofar as they
act in a discriminatory or unjust manner. At times, state “distortions”
of policy aims will be deliberate, and at others, they will be
90
inadvertent, if not completely unavoidable. These “distortions,” it
should be noted at the outset, are understood as policy deviations
outside the bounded discretion explicitly given to states as laboratories of
91
democracy to tinker with welfare reform.
Focusing on harms stemming from the unbounded discretion,
this Section proceeds in three steps. Below, I suggest why the states
may not be reliable partners (of the federal government) as agents
implementing the “national” reforms. This discussion does not
prove, of course, that the federal government, acting unilaterally,
would be infallible in implementing welfare reform. Rather, my aim
is simply to describe the harms that arise given the inescapable
structural differences between the federal government and its
constituent states, differences that hinder national efforts to use states
to serve federal aims and that undermine efforts to retain a truly
national commitment to reform.

90

As suggested earlier, these distortions may not compromise the federal goal
of reducing welfare dependency, but may cause unintended adverse consequences in
the process of reducing the rolls.
91
While it is often difficult to disaggregate the substantive (anti-dependency)
and procedural (via devolution) aims of federal welfare reform, it is important to
distinguish in the course of this inquiry the category of authorized discretion
understood as consistent with federal welfare reform from the type of (undesirable
and possibly arbitrary) discretion that threatens to distort welfare reform. While the
former category enhances the aims of welfare reform by way of more refined
tailoring of programs, the latter should be carefully monitored.
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Institutional Harms

Implicit in the aims of federal welfare legislation is a
commitment on the part of government to promote economic
development and create jobs. Though Congress did not explicitly
identify these goals in the text of PRWORA, it was only able to enact
the welfare reform agenda with an understanding that it has the
ability (and responsibility) to draft additional, complementary
legislation that, if need be, can soften the shock of the transition to
92
work. Indeed President Clinton, ostensibly, only signed PRWORA
93
Most notably, the federal
with this understanding in mind.
government can change and recalibrate macro and microeconomic
fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate growth and lower
unemployment, and it can create jobs and design tax incentives to
finance the retraining and retooling of the American workforce. The
states, when implementing the federal government’s welfare policies,
lack many of these collateral tools of economic growth and expansion
that the federal government uniquely possesses. Although states can
promote work opportunities by stimulating the supply side (via
training and child care), they individually have far less control over
the aggregate demand side (job creation) than the federal

92

Linda McClain has written:
As legislators, executives, and policy analysts take stock of welfare
reform thus far and articulate the next steps . . . many articulate a
model of “mutual responsibility”—or of personal responsibility and
governmental provision of opportunity. This was, of course, a central theme
in the Clinton-Gore administration’s pledge to “end welfare as we know
it”; and it was the gloss put by that administration on the
implementation of PRWORA. . . .
This model assumes that
government should play a role in supporting work . . . .
Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1675-76 (2001) (emphasis added).
93
Almost immediately after signing PRWORA, President Clinton began
campaigning for ways to soften some of the harsher elements of the welfare bill and
to work to accommodate those about to be forced to transition from welfare to work.
See Peter T. Kilborn & Sam Howe Verhovek, Clinton’s Welfare Shift Ends Tortuous
Journey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A1; Robert Pear, Clinton To Sign Welfare Bill that
Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives States Broad Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A1;
Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Recalls His Promise, Weighs History, and Decides, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1996, at A1; The Roosevelt Legacy, supra note 4; The Text of President Clinton’s
Announcement on Welfare Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A24; Barbara Vobejda
& Dan Balz, President Seeks Balm for Anger over Welfare Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1996,
at A1; see also James Bennet, Clinton Seeks Business Help on Proposal over Welfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1997, at A8; James Bennet, Clinton Urges More Companies To Hire People
on Welfare Roll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A21; Irvin Molotsky, President Says the
Government Will Hire 10,000 Off Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at A26; Editorial,
Tax Credits for Welfare Hires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at A20.
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94

government does.
Thus, the state is an incomplete engine of
95
welfare reform.
In fact, the institutional mismatch is greater now than under
AFDC’s cooperative federalism, not simply because the states enjoy
even greater discretion than before, but also because the imperatives
of welfare reform require more active engagement on the part of
96
social service administrators. Today’s statutory insistence on time
limits and work requirements and today’s political and rhetorical
intolerance toward dependency place unprecedented burdens on
states to act more proactively and innovatively, burdens which
underscore the fact that states have only a limited ability to stimulate
97
the economy.
Taking a step back, we might suppose there are three categories
of hurdles to work. The first is motivational—the recipient feels no
pressure or obligation to work. Part of the problem of dependency
98
can be boiled down to motivation. If you are going to get dropped
from public assistance unless you work, you go out and get a job; this
assertion, if it were to stand alone, presumes that current welfare
recipients have some set of skills commensurate with the demand for
labor, that no overriding personal or familial obligations compel
them to stay at home, and that jobs are available. In short, this
94

See infra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Jeff Madrick, Let’s Hear From
Those Who Feel Government Has a Role in Stabilizing the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2002, at C2 (describing the importance of the federal government’s use of
“automatic stabilizers” to steward the economy).
95
See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 276 (1998) (suggesting that the size and
scope of the modern political economy “so disrupted the preceding local and
regional economies” that it became necessary to rely on the federal government to
engage in meaningful economic policymaking).
96
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
97
An analogy can, briefly, be drawn to welfare policy in the European Union.
Under the Maastricht Treaty, Brussels controls monetary and trade policy for the
entire membership—and limits the size of a nation-state’s fiscal deficit to a negligible
sum. Social welfare policy remains localized at the nation-state level. With strict
limitations on fiscal and monetary policy, the nation-state is hamstrung in
effectuating a coherent social welfare agenda—since it may not necessarily be able to
coordinate its programs with those of the Union’s. See, e.g., MARK KLEINMAN, A
EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE? (2002); Denis Bouget, The Maastricht Treaty and Social
Quality: A Divorce?, in THE SOCIAL QUALITY OF EUROPE 35 (Wolfgang Beck et al. eds.,
1997); Ray Hudson & Allan M. Williams, Re-shaping Europe, The Challenge of New
Divisions Within a Homogenized Political-Economic Space, in RETHINKING EUROPEAN
WELFARE 33, 46 (Janet Fink et al. eds., 2001); Daniele Meulders & Robert Plasman,
European Economic Policies and Social Quality, in THE SOCIAL QUALITY OF EUROPE, supra,
at 16, 32.
98
See MURRAY, supra note 16 (arguing that patterns of dependency and social
pathologies more generally are heavily shaped by motivational incentives).
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presumes too much: If this were all that were required to end
dependency, there would be no institutional distortion in states and
cities administering welfare policy.
But, indeed, dependency is not simply a function of a lack of
99
motivation. Thus, a second category of obstacles relates to a lack of
skills, baseline support (such as child care and health care), and
know-how on the part of the welfare recipient. Even if threatened
with the prospect of being cut-off from assistance if you do not work,
you still might need business preparation classes or possibly skills or
educational training to command economic remuneration in the
100
labor market. Or, you may have family obligations. You may have a
child and the high cost of child care effectively makes working in a
low-wage job an untenable option. This second set of hurdles, too,
may be overcome with the assistance of state government programs.
States have the capacity and earmarked resources to train workers to
reintegrate them into the workforce—and, of course, to offer child101
care services.
But what America’s cities and states do not have as much of,
however, is the ability to shape structural dynamics in the economy,
for a major part of the problem for those out of work is that there are
not any jobs. This is the third hurdle: a lack of demand for workers

99

It is worth quoting Professor Bezdek at length:
A wealth of social science data indicates that, in important respects, a
significant portion of the welfare-reliant population may not be “able”
to take the job to which they are directed by the local welfare office.
This inability stems not only from a lack of “skills,” but also from
deficiencies that the simple language of “work ethic” fails to
capture . . . .
Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1572. But see Sewell Chan, Working Hard To Create Hard
Workers, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2001, at T08 (describing the program STRIVE, a bootcamp style job-training program that focuses heavily on attitude adjustments); see also
144 Cong. Rec. 512686 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft)
(asserting that faith is the missing element to improving the lives of America’s poor);
MARVIN OLASKY, RENEWING AMERICAN COMPASSION 138 (1996) (declaring that the
absence of spiritual instruction contributed to the ineffectiveness of the War on
Poverty).
100
See, e.g., Michael M. Weinstein, When Work is Not Enough; Without Training,
Success of Welfare Overhaul May Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at C1.
101
Indeed, Professor Bezdek also recognizes that
parent[s] also must face significant factors outside of [their] personal
control. Insufficient analysis has been trained on these externalities.
The employment infrastructure entails existing labor market
opportunities, including job availability . . . the availability of day care
services, the availability of transit options between home/job/
childcare, access to welfare benefits, and neighborhood resources.
Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1572-73.
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102

in the aggregate labor market. States and municipalities often lack
103
the economic and political power to create new jobs.
Given their
limited ability to stimulate aggregate demand, states often focus their
energy and resources, instead, on attracting jobs by enticing
businesses to move from one part of the country to theirs. This
movement does not actually create new jobs; it just shifts them from
104
one state to another.
We must remember that welfare reform emerged at a time of
105
unprecedented economic growth in America.
But, even when
unemployment was quite low, jobs for poor, unskilled Americans
106
were hardly abundant. While the mismatch between loci of welfare
policy and of national economic policy might not have posed
problems in the booming 1990s, the troubles stemming from that
mismatch may be increasingly acute when the economy is less
107
robust.
Moreover, the jobs that are available are often beyond the
102

See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 17; WILSON, supra note 19; WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996).
103
The dynamics of interstate commerce, the realities of managing a national
political economy, and the legal strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
interstate compact jurisprudence all limit state power over the macroeconomy. See,
e.g., Schreiber, supra note 38, at 259-60 (describing the centralization of the modern
American economy through regulations, laws, constitutional interpretations, and the
realities of commercial patterns and practices). Thus, often states’ economic impact
is of a smaller (and possibly zero-sum) scale, displacing jobs from another region by
enticing businesses to relocate or expand in a given area based on subsidies or other
incentives. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Stock Exchange On Wall Street Offered a Home in New
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at B1 (describing state competition over the same jobs
and taxable industry); Brett Pulley, Exchange Delays Vote to Move as New York Adds
Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B5 (describing similar pitched battle between
New Jersey and New York over the Stock Exchange). For discussions on how the
national economy can better regulate (even local) economies, see, for example,
Richard Munson, Is Government Shortchanging the Sun Belt?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1987,
at C2; Jay Rockefeller & Richard D. Lamm, Editorial, Balanced U.S. Growth, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1981, at A2.
104
For insight into the legal-constitutional limits on state policies on economic
growth, see, for example, Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998).
105
See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
106
See NEWMAN, supra note 17.
107
See, e.g., Daniel Altman, 308,000 Jobs Lost in February, the Most Since Post-9/11
Period, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003, at A1; Lynette Clemetson, More Americans in Poverty in
2002, Census Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at A1; Sam Dillon, Report Finds
Deep Poverty Is on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at A18; Peter T. Kilborn, Jobs Are
Scarce in the Newest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A14; David Leonhardt, Payroll
Drops as Economy Seems To Be at Standstill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at C1; David
Leonhardt, Unemployment Rate Rises to a 9-year High of 6.1%, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003,
at A1; see also More People on Welfare After Years of Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at
A16.
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boundaries of the inner cities where many dependent poor reside.
Myopic state and municipal policies may confine the scope of formal
job search initiatives within the geographic bounds of their political
jurisdiction. But more importantly, even when individuals are aware
of available but physically remote jobs, transportation difficulties may
make those opportunities all but unattainable.
The lack of
comprehensive public transportation networks, especially in suburbs,
makes it difficult for job-aspirants who live in central cities to get to
and from work.
The problem of limited coverage of suburban transit routes is
only exacerbated, for welfare-to-work purposes, in an era of devolved
and sub-devolved welfare when each county is focused on winnowing
down its own welfare rolls. Why would a suburban county spend
money on expanding public transportation to ease the commute of
city dwellers seeking jobs in the county when it must devote its
energies and resources to facilitate work for its own clientele—more
of whom might have access to private vehicles in the first place
109
(simply as a function of living in the suburbs)?
Consider, for example, the State of Colorado’s welfare reform
experience. Colorado has devolved the authority to administer TANF
to each of its sixty-three counties. In effect, each of those sixty-three
110
counties can design individual, discrete programs.
Imagine the
overlap of services, the loss of economies of scale, and the overall
myopia of administering sixty-three county transportation programs
and sixty-three county job programs! What effect could one tiny
111
county have on job growth and economic stimuli? How many lost
108

See WILSON, supra note 102, at 18-50 (describing the geographic mismatch
between where many poor live and where decent jobs exist); Nicole Stelle Garnett,
The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 173, 177-86 (2001) (characterizing the spatial and transportation mismatch
between those in need of jobs and the location of available jobs); Jane Gross, Poor
Without Cars Find Trek to Work Is Now a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A1
(describing inadequate public transportation in suburban areas where low-skilled
jobs exist); see also Alice Reid, For Many New Hires, Getting There Is Half the Battle, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 1996, at B1.
109
See, e.g., Robyn Meredith, Jobs Out of Reach for Detroiters Without Wheels, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1998, at A12 (describing immense difficulty for city dwelling poor to
get to jobs in the suburbs in part because the city and suburban transportation
authorities are not linked and do not act cooperatively).
110
See Cimini, supra note 10, at 262-63. Moreover, Professor Cimini notes that
more than half of those counties operate welfare programs without written rules or
guidelines to govern the decisionmaking process of caseworkers. See id.
111
Indeed, Professor Cimini reports that of the sixty-three counties, thirty-four of
them operate totally without written rules or regulations to govern caseworker
decisionmaking. Not only does such an egregious breach of due process and
democratic transparency redound in concerns of arbitrary behavior toward
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job opportunities exist when the horizon of opportunities does not
extend pass the county borders? Indeed, as Professor Bezdek has
aptly noted:
Labor markets do not begin and end at jurisdictional boundaries,
and most of the growth in economic activity is regional, not
merely local. Yet the structures adopted by states and counties to
implement the [welfare reform] [a]ct are so bound. Public job
training and workforce development programs are fragmented by
jurisdiction. . . . This territorial character shreds what otherwise
might stitch together a patchwork of family-support services for
poor women transitioning from welfare reliance to workplace
reliance by imposing still more hurdles as a condition of reaching
112
opportunities outside their neighborhoods.

Not surprisingly, the federal government is better equipped and
more responsible for internalizing the costs of cross-border
113
employment searches.
***
The social contract implicit in PRWORA creates a new bargain:
transitional assistance by the government in exchange for
114
endeavoring to find work on the part of recipients. Thus, for those
seeking work, there should be a credible belief that jobs exist—or
else the guarantor should not expect or demand work when and
where jobs are unavailable. For instance, America’s governors—chief
proponents of devolved welfare reform—have been at loggerheads
with the Bush administration’s call for more stringent work
requirements. President Bush has recently proposed mandating that
seventy percent of a state’s welfare population engage in at least thirty
hours of work (or work-related activities) per week. The original goal
set by PRWORA required only a fifty percent work-participation rate
115
by 2002. The states, justifiably, have argued that they cannot create
the necessary number of jobs required to place the recipients in
116
work.
Thus, here is an instance when the goals of federal welfare
individual recipients, but it also complicates considerably efforts to coordinate tasks
among the counties. See id.
112
Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1576-77 (footnotes omitted).
113
Judith Evans, HUD Grants to Pay For City-to-Suburbs Work Transportation, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at A23 (describing the imperative for HUD to intervene to
internalize these costs by offering pilot grants providing vouchers for welfare
recipients in the inner-cities to seek employment opportunities in the suburbs).
114
This point has been referenced throughout the Article. See supra Part II; see
also, e.g., Cimini, supra note 10, at 266-68.
115
See Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Republicans Rally Behind Welfare Proposals That
States Oppose, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A29.
116
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 66; Robert Pear, Governors Want Congress To Ease
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policy may not be able to be met by the state and municipal
administrators.
Having control over certain aspects of welfare reform policy (the
supply side of labor), but not others (such as demand for labor), state
and county welfare officers may, in turn, be devoting too many
resources to job training (because states and counties can offer
training sessions), when in fact those funds should be going toward
117
economic development projects on a larger scale.
Consider, as a
representative example, Milwaukee County, where welfare recipients
are repeatedly told there are no impediments to work. There are no
child-care impediments, no training impediments, no transportation
118
impediments. Nothing should stand in the way of work.
Yet
Milwaukee County cannot ensure the aggregate creation of new
jobs—especially in a region of the country relatively hard-hit by the
119
federal government’s economic trade liberalization policies.
This mismatch between federal policy and state administration is
not simply a design flaw in the legislation, but rather a larger,
120
structural axiom in federal-state relations.
Part of the ethos of
Welfare Work Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at A27; Robert Pear, Study by Governors
Calls Bush Welfare Plan Unworkable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A18.
117
See The Muddled Maths of Welfare-to-Work, ECONOMIST (U.S. Ed.), Mar. 8, 1997,
at 25 (noting that considerable economic growth would have to take place on a
national level to generate sufficient labor demand to absorb America’s welfare
recipients).
118
NewsHour: The State of Workfare (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 2, 1997)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/welfare/julydec97/workfare_9-2.html) (describing Milwaukee County welfare recipients as being
told there are no impediments to work because job-training, transportation, and
child care is being subsidized by the state and county) [hereinafter NewsHour]; see
also Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform: Our
Policymakers Must Face the Reality that Failures of Employment Law Policies Are a Major
Reason for Welfare Dependency, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 53-55 (1998) (recognizing
that significant barriers to work need to be overcome to achieve the objectives of
PRWORA).
119
See, e.g., David E. Bonior, Editorial, I Told You So, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997, at
D17 (decrying the economic trade liberalization policies of the 1990s as harming
American jobs and workers); John Holusha, Squeezing the Textile Workers: Trade and
Technology Force a New Wave of Job Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at D1
(characterizing the job-loss effects associated with lowering international trade
barriers); James Sterngold, NAFTA Trade-Off: Some Jobs Lost, Others Gained, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1995, at A1 (describing the regional differences in terms of the impact felt
from greater economic liberalization); see also Adam Nagourney, Democrats Largely
Endorse Labor’s Views, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A14 (describing the 2004
Democratic presidential candidates’ support for restrictions on free trade policies);
Editorial, Trading Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, at A28 (describing Democratic
presidential candidates backing away from their earlier support for free trade and
NAFTA).
120
See Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE
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welfare reform is to raise expectations among welfare recipients that
work is indeed attainable and that, ultimately, those on assistance will
121
be integrated into the national economy.
While states can secure
job training and provide child care, they are comparatively ill122
equipped to create new jobs. The fact that the economy has been
so strong and the labor market so tight during the first four or five
years of welfare reform has taken pressure off of states to do the
123
heavy lifting.
Yet as the economy has cooled considerably, states
have again been required to bear the burden of responsibility—and
their current array of workfare tools may be insufficient to meet the
124
task at hand.
Finally, it bears mentioning that states can simply disagree with
federal aims—and frustrate them. Sovereign states are not just
125
administrative branch offices, and states have a good deal of ability
to undermine aims, or selectively enforce federal imperatives. A state
that finds some federal mandates unwise or unproductive can work

REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY 111, 116-18 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984)
(describing how one cannot necessarily expect states generally to be entirely
desirous, or even capable, of effectuating the substantive and rhetorical goals of
federal policy).
121
T
See Robert Pear, Most States Meet Work Requirement of Welfare Law, N.Y.
, Dec.
T
,
30, 1998, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye, Recipients of Welfare Are Fewest Since 1969, N.Y.
Apr. 11, 1999, at A22; Michael M. Weinstein, Welfare to Work Partnerships: Promises that
Might Be Kept, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 26, 1998, at C1; NewsHour, supra note 118.
122
New York City’s and New York State’s recent request for billions in aid to
redevelop lower Manhattan and revitalize the regional economy is, fortunately, an
extreme example, but illustrates the limited taxing and bond-raising power of local
government relative to the federal government, with its huge revenue intakes, ability
to raise money, and its ability to spread costs and benefits over a much greater and
more diverse population and geography. See James C. McKinley Jr., Pataki Defends
$54 Billon Aid Request, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at D5; see generally Robert Pear,
Governors Get Sympathy from Bush but No More Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at A22
(describing states’ frustration at their inability to stimulate their economies without
federal assistance).
123
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Uncertainties Loom As New Yorkers Hit Welfare Time
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A1 (describing how the booming economy of the
late 1990s was central in easing the transition from welfare to work).
124
See Stephanie Flanders, Influential Connecticut Welfare Plan Is Tested in Hard
Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at B1 (suggesting that since the economy was so
strong during the initial years of TANF, the real work of welfare reform only has
begun); William Julius Wilson & Andrew J. Cherlin, Editorial, The Real Test of Welfare
Reform Still Lies Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at A21 (describing the work of state
welfare agencies that lies ahead); see also supra note 107.
125
See Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (recognizing the
sovereign identities of state legislatures that impeded any effort by Congress to make
them functionaries of the federal government).
IMES

IMES
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around them. If a state objects, for example, to requirements that
single, teenage mothers must live with their parents to be eligible for
welfare, state administrators may simply choose not to ask questions
pertaining to that matter. Or, on the other hand, they could
completely impoverish welfare programs by failing to provide any
affirmative assistance in the form of training and educational
126
opportunities. States can simply raise eligibility standards and end
dependency by minimizing services. These disparate realities are
institutional incidents of state sovereignty.
2.

Managerial Harms

In this Subsection, I locate three related sets of managerial, or
bureaucratic harms, which stem from a mismatch between federal
and state incentives. First, there is the potential for prisoners’
dilemmas: States race-to-the-bottom to provide minimal welfare
benefits to discourage would-be new residents from entering as well
as to encourage current residents to seek greener pastures elsewhere.
This practice leads to a reduction of overall benefits presumably
below that envisioned by the federal government, if only because the
level of generosity by a given state has to be objectively low in order to
create credible disincentives for recipients to remain in residence.
Thus, unlike the federal government, states may try to displace the
poor to other states—so they can lower their administrative costs and
dispense with their welfare obligations, without actually reducing
127
dependency in America.
Second, states have a political and economic incentive to
reallocate federal welfare funding to other public projects. They may
use their legally granted discretion to free up federal dollars
ostensibly earmarked for welfare provisions to support more popular
128
projects.
This prioritization of other state interests indicates a
126

See Joshua Green, Holding Out, in MAKING WORK PAY 38, 38-39 (Robert Kuttner
ed., 2002) (describing Idaho as having spent only twenty percent of its total federal
allocation for welfare programs and provisions); Karen Czapanskiy, Editorial, Welfare
on the Cheap, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1999, at B8 (describing Maryland’s re-allocation of
federal welfare moneys into the general state coffers); see also infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
127
See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1562-63.
128
Professor Cashin is especially attuned to this phenomenon. She speaks to a
particularly fiercely pitched battle between the lower classes and the middle class
fought in state capitals across the nation. See Cashin, supra note 3, at 562. Moreover,
[g]iven the competition engendered by the [welfare reform a]ct
between welfare recipients and middle income voters, and the
conflictual nature of redistributive politics, there are considerable risks
to the poor of submitting such broad discretion to state majoritarian
politics. . . . [S]tate governors and legislatures will be hard-pressed to
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shrinking of public responsibilities and commitments to the poor.
Thus, this “Us versus Them” (when it is, say, New York versus
Connecticut) prisoners’ dilemma paradigm is only one aspect of the
dislocation of the concern for the poor. There is also the “Us versus
Them” (when we are the middle class, and they are the poor) that
129
makes it financially attractive to under-provide for the poor.
Third, states may take advantage of the federal work
requirements and create workfare projects that help serve state
interests, but do little to facilitate the actual transition from welfare to
work.
a. Diversion to Other States
130

I begin by discussing the prisoners’ dilemma scenario. Moving
a family from Wisconsin to Minnesota is easier than moving an
American family to Canada. America, conceived of as a singular
community, cannot fully evade its commitment to the poor that
discrete communities and regions within the United States could
readily shirk. The federal government, by design, internalizes all of
these concerns—and blame. A state, in contrast, can (and often
131
does) let others do the heavy lifting.
resist the full rigors of state budgetary and cultural politics.
Id. at 564-65.
Cashin takes the strong view that states are inherently more likely to exploit
lower-class Americans than the federal government, especially if there is a racial
dimension added to the mix. Id. at 568. Lacking overwhelming empirical support
for that assertion, I personally adopt a weaker version of the Cashin thesis and simply
recognize that states, like any other political body given too much discretion and
lacking real oversight, spend unearmarked money in ways that will most support
their respective political agendas. Often, generosity to the poor does not make the
short list.
129
For an appreciation of the latter dynamic at the state level, see id. at 554-57.
Recently, a Mississippi director of social services affirmed the existence of this latter,
inter-class tension when he said his responsibilities are to the Mississippi taxpayers,
not just those on the dole. Governor Fordice appointed Colonel Don Taylor, who
said his “clients” were the “taxpayers he was dedicated to protecting from those who
were attempting to exploit them and their hard earned money.” See David. A. Breaux
et al., To Privatization and Back: Welfare Reform Implementation in Mississippi, in
MANAGING WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVOLUTION 43, 51
(Sarah F. Liebschutz ed., 2000).
130
See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Jonathan
Bender, In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI.
531 (1987).
131
See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Rogue State: The Case Against Delaware, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 19, 2002, at 20 (describing the “selfish” me-first policies of Delaware, which
enrich its citizens by imposing an array of financial burdens on non-residents).
Economist and columnist Paul Krugman describes recent short-sighted, selfish
political decisions by states that have caused economic troubles. Only the backing of

2004

DEFORMING WELFARE

615

Conceptually, states try to farm their problems out, in the
132
classical free-rider, prisoners’ dilemma way. Professors Mashaw and
Rose-Ackerman highlight the problems with the states acting in lieu
of the federal government when externalities are present. They
argue: “when interjurisdictional externalities or prisoner’s dilemmas
[such as the welfare magnet effect] are present, the possibly greater
administrative capacity of low-level governments must be balanced
against the danger that the federal purpose may be undermined if
133
too much authority is delegated.”
Their discussion of regulatory
policy maps neatly onto the present inquiry. Devolution creates the
134
very real threat of the “welfare magnet.”
No state, anxious to
reduce its welfare rolls, wants to attract citizens of other states to
establish residency in order to take advantage of more generous
135
welfare packages; thus, there is a virtual race-to-the-bottom, with
each state and municipality low-balling one another so as to seem less
attractive both to poor people looking to relocate to the place with
136
the best welfare package and to its own impoverished. Though this

the U.S. government, to smooth over those bumps, prevents, in Krugman’s words,
Tennessee from looking like Argentina. See Paul Krugman, Editorial, Our Banana
Republics, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at A19.
132
Professors Mashaw and Rose-Ackerman describe states as competing against
each other to entice businesses by offering lower levels of taxes and environmental
regulations. See Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 120, at 117. Judge (then
Professor) Michael McConnell signals out the race-to-the-bottom incentives in
federalized welfare policy as “the most important example” of the downsides to
interstate competition, which he otherwise endorses as promoting innovation. He
argues:
In most cases, immigration of investment and of middle-to-upper
income persons is perceived as desirable, while immigration of persons
dependent on public assistance is viewed as a drain on a community’s
finances. Yet generous welfare benefits paid by higher taxes will lead
the rich to leave and the poor to come. This creates an incentive,
other things being equal, against redistributive policies. Indeed, it can
be shown that the level of redistribution in a decentralized system is
likely to be lower even if there is virtually unanimous agreement among
the citizens that higher levels would be desirable. Where redistribution
is the objective, therefore, advocates should and do press for federal
programs, or at least for minimum federal standards.
McConnell, supra note 35, at 1499-1500 (footnotes omitted).
133
Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 120, at 118.
134
See PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR
NATIONAL STANDARDS 47-49 (1990); Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 37, at 757.
135
See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 6-8 (1972) (describing the
competition among states that leads to a lower overall provision of social welfare
services); PETERSON, supra note 8 (describing race-to-the-bottom potentialities).
136
There are notable cases in which states have tried to dissuade newcomers
from receiving what they perceived to be generous benefits. See Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999) (characterizing a state as trying to limit benefits to newcomers under
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race-to-the-bottom mentality may seem to comport with the general
spirit of getting tough on dependency, it quite possibly could lead to
more excessive and short-sighted cutbacks than Congress
contemplated.
Moreover, not only do states signal they do not want new
entrants, but they also encourage the departure of those on their
rolls. At the extreme, some public welfare offices have boldly
advertised their willingness to buy recipients “one-way tickets” out-oftown. For example, in Tulare County, California, the county welfare
agency has paid more than 750 welfare-receiving families an average
137
of $1600, essentially just to leave the state.
And, as of 2001,
Kentucky has paid $1.5 million in moving expenses to 2000 families
to leave the state; the state pays for a moving truck and/or the cost of
138
one month’s rent in the new locale.
b. Shifting Resources from Welfare to General Coffers
Second, the opportunity to implement welfare reform gives

PRWORA); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (describing a state’s efforts to
deter out-of-state poor people from moving in by requiring a full year of residency
before authorizing their eligiblity for welfare). But see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism
and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001)
(offering empirical and conceptual counterarguments to the proposition that states
inevitably look to free-ride and slack).
Indeed, there is a growing body of empirical research that seeks to downplay this
race-to-the-bottom concern. Studies have shown that most welfare recipients do not
relocate across state lines to reap the marginal benefits from more generous welfare
assistance in another state. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare
Magnets: The Race to the Top, 5 S. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (1997); Phillip B. Levine & David
Zimmerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY 20-33
(Institute for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wis.-Madison Discussion Paper No. 109896, 1996); see also Shauhin A. Talush, Note, Welfare Migration To Capture Higher
Benefits: Fact or Fiction?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 675, 696-97 (2000). But this revised
appreciation of the strength of the race-to-the-bottom may not influence
decisionmakers, who may cling to their beliefs that welfare magnets still exist. See,
e.g., Jason DeParle, What About Mississippi?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at A1
(describing Mississippi’s desire to lower services so as not to attract welfare seekers
from neighboring states); Judith Havemann, District Could Become Welfare Oasis as
Neighbors’ Benefits Dry Up, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1996, at A13 (describing worries that
Washington, D.C. will turn “itself into the welfare magnet of the mid-Atlantic” and
citing general concerns of races-to-the-bottom across the country); Robert Pear, Judge
Rules States Can’t Cut Welfare for New Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A1
(describing Pennsylvania’s attempt to provide lower levels of assistance to new
residents as grounded in the state’s desire not to become a welfare magnet).
137
Evelyn Nieves, A Fertile Farm Region Pays Its Jobless To Quit California, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2001, at A1; see also Havemann & Vobjeda, supra note 71 (citing the
fear of states reducing their rolls by exporting their poor).
138
See Roger Alford, State Programs Pay To Relocate Job Seekers on Welfare, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2001, at A10.

2004

DEFORMING WELFARE

617

states the discretion to shift funds to alternative programs, possibly
altogether unrelated to the provision of social welfare services. In
1998, Wisconsin spent $98 million less than it was given that year by
the federal government. It kept the money and dispersed it around
the state for, inter alia, drug-treatment programs, education, and tax
139
relief.
Other states have decided to keep that unspent federal
140
money in savings for a rainy day.
For a variety of reasons, only one of which is cost-savings, states
141
notoriously engage in tactics known as diversion.
They try to
discourage would-be welfare recipients from obtaining assistance by
making it difficult to schedule appointments; thus fewer would-be
recipients actually have the tenacity (and resources) to follow
142
through and successfully enroll. As they return to the pre-Goldberg
world without federal entitlements, states possess greater discretion in
decisionmaking and can easily reject an individual applying for
benefits, or effectively make it nearly impossible for that individual to
143
maintain her eligibility.
For example, states can deny benefits to
144
those who arrive at the welfare office after 11 a.m., conduct invasive
145
home visits,
move their offices beyond the reach of public
139

Thomas Kaplan, Wisconsin Works, in MANAGING WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE
STATES 103, 108 (Sarah F. Liebshutz ed., 2000).
140
Robert Pear, States Declining to Draw Billions in Welfare Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 1999, at A1 (“States see the [windfall] money as a reserve for future economic
downturns.”).
141
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 249-50; see Rebecca Gordon, Cruel and Usual: How
Welfare
“Reform”
Punishes
Poor
People
26
(2001),
available
at
http://www.arc.org/downloads/arc010201.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003); Super,
supra note 77.
142
Diversionary tactics are widespread. See, e.g., Breaux, supra note 129, at 43
(describing the stages of eligibility and casework interviews built into the system);
DeParle, supra note 78 (describing diversionary practices in New York); Peter
Edelman, Editorial, Making Welfare Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1997, at A27 (describing
diversion tactics).
143
See Cimini, supra note 10, at 250.
144
See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, New York City Admits Turning Away Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1999, at B3.
145
PRWORA relaxed many of cash-based welfare’s legal-procedural
requirements and thus created new opportunities for state and county welfare
agencies not only to reduce benefits to deter welfare seekers, but also to become
more broadly intrusive in the lives of the poor. Punitive welfare policing has been
reported, among other places, in the State of Utah. There, intrusive home visits
revealed egregious examples of arbitrary discretionary power.
During an
unannounced home visit, a welfare agent removed children from one home because
she caught the family in the middle of piling up their clothes for the mother to take
to the laundromat. Her report indicated that there was a pile of dirty clothes beside
the front door. Another woman, who had left a violent domestic situation, was
similarly sanctioned for “permitting her children to watch her get beat up.” Gordon,
supra note 141.
This broad, unprincipled discretion seems beyond the
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146

transportation, use disabled children’s SSI payments as proof that
147
the family is not poor, or require weeks of job searches before
148
In this environment,
allowing individuals to apply for welfare.
welfare is intended to be understood as a last resort. This situation
may work to motivate individuals to wake up early, secure day care,
perhaps marry, and otherwise remain diligent with job searches. But
it also represents the danger of diversion qua moneymaking—a
windfall for states.
Of course, diversion, as suggested above, comports moderately
149
well with congressional intent; but states may take it too far. There
is a high—possibly exceedingly high—state interest in diversion
because states may want to reallocate the resources they save on
welfare to other projects. While the financial incentive to divert
would-be clients is built into the system, there are many cases in
which diversion takes on an overwhelming passion, which may not
150
reflect, again, the intent of the federal government.
Diversion, from an idealized federal perspective, is a stick to
encourage those most able to go to work—freeing up money to invest
contemplation of many of those in Congress supporting tougher work requirements.
146
See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 290 (describing the practice of relocating
welfare offices further from public transportation routes); see also Barbara
Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor into Gold: How Corporations Seek To Profit from Welfare
Reform, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1997, at 44.
147
See Michael Janofsky, West Virginia Pares Welfare, But Poor Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1999, at A20.
148
See Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, States’ Welfare Shift: Stop It Before It
Starts, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1998, at A1 (describing Florida’s policy). In Missouri,
the application process required candidates for TANF to contact ten prospective
employers each week for four weeks. Only then, if unsuccessful in securing
employment, an applicant may be deemed eligible. Id.
149
See, e.g., Editorial, Deflecting Welfare Applicants, WASH POST, Aug. 17, 1998, at
A17 (“The question is whether the deflections are a good thing or bad. They’re
good if the families being turned away were really not that needy, bad if the
genuinely needy are being denied. The answer, which seems likely to blur and
plague evaluations of welfare ‘reform’ generally in the years ahead, is that no one
knows. The families turned away aren’t generally tracked. Some doubtless do all
right; that has to be particularly true in an economy that continues to expand.
Others don’t but, at least in the short run, disappear from official view.”); see also
Super, supra note 77.
150
It might be counterintuitive for transitional assistance not to be continued for
those who are completing their educational training. See Karen Houppert, You’re Not
Entitled!: Welfare Reform is Leading to Government Lawlessness, NATION, Oct. 25, 1999, at
11 (describing egregious examples of state diversion tactics and asserting that
“whether out of willful disregard or real misunderstanding, states are failing to fulfill
their . . . obligations to the poor”). Yet refusing to offer waivers from work for
college students allows states to save money in the short term, even though it comes
at the cost of losing future, highly skilled labor participants who now may have to
quit school and find jobs immediately. See infra notes 164-66.
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in those harder-to-move cases. Yet the fact that there are insufficient
requirements to ensure welfare grant money is spent on moving
individuals into work opportunities suggests diversion may be used by
some states, for instance, to help improve highways and stem beach
151
erosion.
c. Putting Recipients to Work—for States
Sometimes, states use federal mandates for self-serving ends,
such as to create a workfare system that helps the states themselves,
but does little to facilitate the transition to actual work. Typically of
course, states and cities create public sector workfare jobs in order to
give those outside of the labor market work experience (since the
market demand for low-skilled labor is not sufficient to absorb the
152
numbers required all at once). Abstractly, these workfare programs
reflect the best traditions of the New Deal’s WPA (Works Progress
Administration) and CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) that instilled
in participants a sense of self-worth and an attachment to the labor
153
force in troubling times.
Similarly, modern workfare’s intended
151

For a recent example of states violating the spirit of congressional funding
allocations by diverting resources away from their intended destination, see, for
example, Joshua Green, The Welfare Shell Game, in MAKING WORK PAY 46, 46-47
(Robert Kuttner ed., 2002), describing Texas’s aim to substitute federal funds for
states’ funds and thus “launder[] federal welfare dollars to finance more politically
popular programs,” and Robert Pear, A Study Finds Children’s Aid Goes to Adults, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at A1. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE
REFORM: CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING A FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL PARTNERSHIP (GAO-01828 Aug. 10, 2001); Sewell Chan, D.C. Welfare Funds To Go To Children; Critics Say $12
Million Shift Irresponsible, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2000, at B1 (describing the reallocation of TANF funds to less specifically targeted children’s programs); Jim
McLean & Chris Grenz, Use of Welfare Grant Debated, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Aug. 30, 2000,
at A7 (characterizing Kansas’s re-direction of nearly half its TANF money to foster
care programs); supra note 126.
152
See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 17; Alan Finder, Welfare Clients Outnumber Jobs
They Might Fill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1; Mickey Kaus, Editorial, Welfare Reform
Made Difficult; President Clinton and Congress Can’t Possibly Reduce Dependency Without
Funding Public Jobs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 5, 1995, at A9.
153
See, e.g., Editorial, Pact Keeps Workfare on Right Track, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug.
11, 1997, at 22 (referring to WEP as the “most successful welfare-to-work program in
the nation”); Editorial, Job Link to Welfare Reform, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 1996, at 46
(referring to the great success in transforming welfare recipients into workers).
For discussions of those New Deal programs mentioned in the text, see
PATTERSON, supra note 21. The Civilian Conservation Corps employed young men in
a variety of forestry and conservation projects. Id. at 57. The Works Progress
Administration employed manual and professional labor in a host of government
projects. Id. at 63. These programs conserved the human spirit by allowing family
heads to “earn” their relief. Id. at 59 (citing New Dealer Harry Hopkins as saying
“Give a man a dole, and you save his body and destroy his spirit. Give him a job and
pay him an assured wage and you save both the body and the spirit”).
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purpose is to create an ethos of work and to acculturate individuals
154
into mainstream society.
Yet there is a more problematic side to welfare-to-work, and I will
rely on New York City’s Work Experience Program (WEP) in the late
1990s and early years of this decade as a case study. My purpose here
is not to levy any global criticism so much as it is to indicate ways in
which even cosmopolitan local governments might distort welfare
policy to suit their own needs. Welfare-to-work programs may, in
such circumstances, re-create the rigid class boundaries that have
always existed between the working class and non-working poor.
The City of New York employs many municipal workers who are
unionized, decently compensated civil servants. It also “employs”
workfare participants, many of whom work side-by-side these civil
servants, doing the same job without the benefits, job security, union
155
protection, or a living wage.
Despite the occupational similarities
between some civil service and workfare jobs, there is surprisingly
little upward mobility from workfare to regular civil service jobs; this
immobility widens not only the economic gap, but also the
psychological and sociological gaps between “real” workers and WEP
workers that make it difficult for the latter to make the transition to
156
gainful employment.
Indeed, this dual-class system of labor, this reification of class
within the workfare system, runs counter to the goals and ideals of
157
moving people from welfare to work.
Stigmatizing workfare
participants, by denying them protective equipment and uniforms,
health coverage, and economic security, signals a failure on the part

154

Former Wisconsin and New York City welfare administrator Jason Turner
considers workfare to be better than any other training program. He has stated:
“[t]he best preparation for work is working.” And, when asked about those who
cannot speak English, he responded: “The best way to learn English is to interact
with English-speaking people in the workplace.” DeParle, supra note 78.
155
Havemann, supra note 61; see also Matthew Diller, The Social Message of the New
Workfare: Work Programs Are Deliberately Structured so that They Are Virtually Never
Comparable to Holding an Actual Job, 9 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 19 (1998); Mary J.
O’Connell, Municipal Labor Perspectives on the Public Sector Welfare Workforce in New York
City, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 805, 805-06 (1999).
156
See David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tensions Regarding the
Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1997); Nina Bernstein, City Fires 35,000
Former Welfare Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at B3.
157
Havemann, supra note 61 (“If welfare recipients are doing the work for the
city . . . shouldn’t they be able to work their way onto the city payroll and receive
employee benefits and protections like any other municipal worker?”). For a broad
philosophical critique of New York’s WEP program, see Anthony Bertelli,
Impoverished Liberalism: Does the New York Workfare Program Violate Human Rights?, 5
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175 (1999).
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of government to take seriously its charge of promoting welfare to
158
work.
The WEP worker’s hourly wage is below the federal
minimum and, alone, will not permit her family to climb out of
159
poverty. To stigmatize workers who are poor, but who work, seems
antithetical to the spirit of the program designed to link work with
160
dignity, self-respect, and improvement. To do so for the purposes,
perhaps, of reducing the city payroll and appeasing the public sector
161
unions contravenes the spirit of welfare reform.
Hence, here an
incentive-based, managerial harm produces civic-citizenship harms as
well. It is demoralizing to create this second (or third?) class of
worker-citizens, who are not afforded basic respect at the workplace
and are forced to accept substandard equipment and facilities.
Nothing dramatizes this antithetical vision of workfare as welfare
reform more than New York City’s early policy on welfare recipients
who attended college. Prior to PRWORA, only three states did not
allow welfare recipients to satisfy their work requirements through
158

See Mark Greenberg, Bush’s Blunder, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 2002, at A2
(describing New York City’s workfare program as an initiative that displaces other
workers, “requires people to work without the dignity of a paycheck or the rights of
other workers,” and that has been shown to be largely ineffective in transitioning
welfare recipients into unsubsidized employment). I have attempted to avoid
discussing the more sensational tidbits about New York City workfare. See, e.g., Tara
George, Workfare Blamed for Heart Death, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), June 25, 1997, at 1
(describing the conditions under which an older woman with a known heart
condition was sent out to a manual labor, outdoor work assignment); Jessica
Graham, Workfare Women Rip Harassment, N.Y. POST, Oct. 1, 1999, at 24 (describing a
number of sexual harassment instances by supervisors that have gone unpunished).
159
A WEP worker gets “none of the perks . . . of her unionized colleagues. She
doesn’t get sick leave or vacations . . . and she doesn’t have automatic access to the
federal labor, civil rights, disability and sexual harassment protections of other
workers.” Havemann, supra note 61.
160
See Annette Fuentes, Slaves of New York, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 14
(describing the caste hierarchy among public laborers). Fuentes describes WEP in
the following way:
WEP creates a pool of contingent workers, doing the same work as city
employees and often working shoulder to shoulder with them, but for a
fraction of their pay. With no sick leave, no vacations, no pensions or
other benefits, WEP workers are a constant and not-so-subtle threat by
management to workplace standards. . . . For example, WEP workers
doing street cleaning get no gloves or uniforms or footwear, and have
no locker facilities to change clothing so they must go home wearing
whatever filth the day brings. In the parks, WEP workers are forced to
climb higher than union contracts allow in pruning trees. . . . At the
sanitation depot in Brooklyn where they meet before being driven by
van to work sites, union workers wrote on the bathroom door, “No
WEP workers.”
Id.
161
See id.; Havemann, supra note 61; Editorial, Welfare, Workfare and Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at A32.
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162

post-secondary education. After passage, more than half the states
163
refused to count college education as work participation. New York
City, for example, did not give “work experience credit” to those
public assistance recipients attending college. Twenty-one thousand
students from the City University of New York alone had to withdraw
from classes in the wake of welfare reform because the terms of
welfare required them to pick up trash in the city streets and parks
for up to thirty hours a week. The WEP program’s insistence on
manual labor, even for these college students, is economically
164
shortsighted.
Research has shown that within two years of getting
into college, seventy-five percent of those students receiving public
assistance during their schooling move off welfare; and, eighty-seven
percent of women on welfare who then earn a college degree move
into jobs that pay a living wage—and never to return to the welfare
165
rolls. This myopic policy decision not to excuse these students from
work assignments illustrates how local agents can distort the message
166
of independence and self-sufficiency.

162

See Andrew S. Gruber, Comment, Promoting Long-Term Self-Sufficiency for Welfare
Recipients: Post-Secondary Education and the Welfare Work Requirement, 93 NW. L. REV.
247, 256 (1998).
163
See id.
164
See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Workfare Rules Cause Enrollment to Fall, CUNY Says,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996, at A1; David Firestone, Mayor Defends Workfare for Students,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at B3.
165
Applied Research Center, Worthwhile Welfare Reforms 1 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.arc.org/downloads/worthwhilepolicies.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003);
see also Gruber, supra note 162, at 275-76, 281-83 (describing the increased likelihood
of success and self-sufficiency as a result of post-secondary education). Other studies
have shown that “postsecondary education increases wages enough to radically
decrease the need for families to rely on welfare.” Indeed, women who finish high
school or pursue post-secondary education are much less likely to return to the
welfare rolls. See Rebekah J. Smith et al., The Miseducation of Welfare Reform: Denying
the Promise of Postsecondary Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211, 220-22 (2003).
Of note, the New York State Legislature modified its policy and allowed students
to count college internships or work-study toward their TANF work requirements.
See Raymond Hernandez, Legislature Passes Bill Letting Internships Count Toward
Workfare, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at B9.
166
In fairness, President Bush recently decried a bill originating in the Senate
that would allow a certain number of welfare recipients to remain enrolled in
college, exempt from work requirements. President Bush said: “Some welfare
recipients . . . could spend five years going to college, not holding a job. Now that’s
not my view of helping people become independent.” Thus, states and cities are not
alone in believing education is an unacceptable substitute for work. See Elisabeth
Bumiller, Bush Criticizes Senate’s Version of Welfare Bill as Harmful, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2002, at A14.
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Civic Harms

Though not a major problem given the political legitimacy and
responsiveness of state government vis-à-vis the federal government, I
do pause here to flag one civic concern: the legacy of oppression and
discrimination that particular minority communities associate with
their state governments has not yet, unfortunately, been relegated to
the annals of ancient history. Not only do segregationist policies,
denial of the franchise, and ruthless state-sponsored violence come to
mind for many poor black southerners when they think about their
relationship to the state government; they may also have salient
memories of King v. Smith types of intrusive, humiliating home visits
167
related directly to welfare administration.
In light of PRWORA’s
abandonment of federal welfare entitlements, the oppressive and
discriminatory policies and attitudes of the 1950s and 1960s, which
had been reined in by the federal protections afforded by way of
Goldberg and King, may potentially be revived.
Indeed, institutional racism at the state and local level is
alarmingly enduring. Professor Cashin, for one, devotes considerable
attention to how states profoundly discriminate against their African168
American welfare populations.
And another, Professor Susan
Gooden, presents a particularly salient case study of Virginia welfare
services.
In her study, she documents and contrasts state
administrators’ disparaging and ungenerous treatment of black
welfare recipients with their treatment of similarly situated white
clients who were always given first notice of new jobs, offered the
169
“newest” work clothes, and given access to automobiles.
Understanding discrimination is not just an academic exercise,
but also a visceral part of the welfare experience. The civic harms
associated with returning power to the states cannot be disregarded
as historically contingent. Such harms persist today.
4.

Summary

In the above discussions, I traced a few important ways that states
167

See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (describing the practice of
caseworkers’ midnight “raid” inspections aimed at ascertaining whether any
employable men were residing in the home of welfare recipients).
168
Indeed, Professor Cashin makes this concern a focal point of her critique of
PRWORA. Her analysis of systematic discrimination by state governments leads her
to conclude that state-administered welfare policy is quite threatening to already
highly disadvantaged, minority communities. See Cashin, supra note 3.
169
See Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworker
Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. OF AFR. AM. PUB. POL’Y 23
(1998).
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can—and (both deliberately and unwittingly) have—threatened to
undermine a true model of welfare reform. Specifically, because of
the limitations of state governments to effectuate macroeconomic
growth, it may be difficult for states to design policies to achieve
federal goals. Moreover, the scope of state power aside, states may
lack the incentives to comply fully with the federal directive. There
may be reasons to let other states bear a disproportionate burden in
terms of servicing the American welfare population, there may be
opportunities to use welfare reform to achieve alternative state
objectives (possibly completely outside of the social welfare context),
and there may be a general reluctance to take ownership over the
problems of dependency. In all, the current legal model of
devolution allows states to reshape welfare policy in ways that may
depart considerably from Congress’s substantive objectives.
IV. ONE STEP FURTHER I:
STATE EXPERIMENTATION WITH FOR-PROFIT CORPORATE
CONTRACTORS
The attenuation of the line connecting federal objectives to state
policy initiatives described in Section III.B merits concern. But our
discussion of the federal-state mismatch reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. Once we recognize that states, themselves, can and have
turned around and sub-devolved and privatized welfare design and
implementation, our concerns about maintaining fidelity to federal
objectives should mature into full-blown fears. In enacting PRWORA,
Congress lifted the prohibition against wholesale privatization, which
170
had existed under AFDC. But, as I have suggested earlier, there was
no preternatural link between privatization and the actual substantive
agenda of welfare reform; the narratives may have followed common
trajectories, i.e., two sides of the anti-big government coin, but they
did not necessarily speak to one another. Whether specific welfare
goals would be distorted by privatization was, most likely, an ancillary
consideration of those whose primary agenda was reducing the size
and scope of the government while enlarging that of the private
171
sector.
PRWORA gave for-profit corporations unparalleled and
previously uncontemplated opportunities to participate in social
172
service programs.
Prior to 1996, for-profit entities had been
170

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See Havemann & Vobjeda, supra note 71.
172
Of course, opportunities were also extended to private non-profits. I choose
not to devote an entire section to non-profits because all of their traits, both positive
171
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involved in social service provision; but that provision had been
173
largely confined to information management and data processing.
Notably, for instance, the early success of Ross Perot’s Electronic Data
Systems in the 1960s came by way of designing and implementing the
computer networking programs for the State of Texas’s Medicaid
174
system. Private corporations, however, had not been allowed to bid
to administer interpersonal, policymaking aspects of welfare, such as
175
eligibility determination and case management.
Then, PRWORA
176
opened the proverbial floodgates. As Professor Bezdek notes: “for
the first time the Act authorizes states to employ private entities to
conduct intake and make eligibility determinations—traditional gateand deleterious, are exemplified by way of my discussions of state actors, private
corporate actors, and private sectarian actors.
173
See Gilman, supra note 40, at 591.
174
Bill Berkowitz, Prospecting Among the Poor: Welfare Privatization 4 (2001),
available at http://www.arc.org/downloads/prospecting.pdf (last visited Dec. 28,
2003).
175
See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE 236-37 (1995)
(describing the rise in for for-profit social service provision since the 1960s).
176
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 257-58. Forty-nine states have already introduced
some level of privatization into their welfare social service provision. Mark Dunlea,
The Poverty Profiteers Privatize Welfare, 59 COVERT ACTION Q. 6 (Winter 1996-1997).
Private corporations have embraced the opportunity to compete for welfare
contracts. Their enthusiasm alone signals an awareness of the new, lucrative
opportunities that heretofore have been unavailable. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note
146 (describing the frenzy of activity among private corporations to take advantage
of the privatized welfare regime); Merill Goozner, Welfare’s Gold Rush, CHI. TRIB.,
June 29, 1997, at C1 (recounting a similar tale of private activity).
One has to look no further than the business announcements of some of the
corporate providers. Corporations and their investment bankers proudly proclaim
that privatized welfare has translated into $28 billion in annual contracts. See
Dunlea, supra. Commentators, for instance, estimate the winning bid to privatize
welfare in the State of Texas would be $2-3 billion. See William D. Hartung &
Jennifer Washburn, Lockheed Martin: From Warfare to Welfare, NATION, Mar. 2, 1998, at
11.
From these and future contracts, corporations expect financial windfalls.
Maximus, a leading private provider of welfare services, witnessed its stock rise fifty
percent in 1997, its first year public and the first full year of American welfare
governed by PRWORA. Its chief executive officer made, in that first year, $18.8
million in cash and received stock worth $110 million. Adam Cohen, When Wall Street
Runs Welfare, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at 64; see also Hartung & Washburn, supra.
Corporations are, furthermore, hiring talented public administrators to help
them with contract procurement. Lockheed hired Gerald Miller, the head of
Michigan’s welfare agency and architect of Governor Engler’s welfare-to-work
program. Maximus, in turn, attracted George Leutermann, who had formerly run
Milwaukee’s public job placement center, to run its Milwaukee operation. See
Goozner, supra (“It’s the welfare system’s equivalent of the Pentagon’s revolving
door, where procurement officials fly out the door to make big bucks with the
contractors, while denuding the government of the management talent needed to
monitor what’s going on.”).
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keeping functions [that are] . . . most often identified with the legal
177
[Goldberg] protections under AFDC.”
A. Introduction
How does privatization work? A state, county, or municipality
contracts out some or all of its welfare responsibilities. It may
contract out simply the billing and accounting work, which raise few
welfare-specific concerns; or, it may request bids for vendors to
provide aspects of job training and job search responsibilities. More
dramatically, states may contract out all the social services, including
178
casework and eligibility determinations.
Effectively, then, welfare
seekers or recipients might never see the inside of a government
179
building or interact with actual, bona fide civil servants.
180
Opportunities to reap efficiency gains motivate privatization.
States, counties, and municipalities can reduce the size (and payroll)
181
of government and allow the market to function in its stead.
The
private sector claims the experience, flexibility, and profit motives to
make welfare provisions less wasteful. Indeed, its claims are so
persuasive that state and local governments are willing to allow
corporate providers to walk away with excess rents in order to
182
promote streamlined welfare governance. The lure of slashing the
size of government and the seduction of efficiency gains through
private-sector competition supply the one-two combination that the

177

Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1566.
See, e.g., Breaux et al., supra note 129, at 46-47 (describing Mississippi’s
experimentation with the privatization of most social welfare services); Jonathan
Walters, The Welfare Bonanza, GOVERNING, Jan. 2000, at 34. For a broader
examination of state welfare privatization initiatives, see Gilman, supra note 40; and
Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 83 (2003).
179
See Welfare, Inc, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 55 (“Texans who claim statefinanced income support, health care and food coupons, or who take part in jobtraining, drug rehabilitation and pregnancy-prevention [programs], may never see a
civil servant.”).
180
See SALAMON, supra note 175, at 223-25; SAVAS, supra note 42, at 118-20;
Richard W. Bauman, Public Perspectives on Privatization: Foreword, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 3 (2000); Minow, supra note 7; Schuck, supra note 38, at 6.
181
Cohen, supra note 176 (suggesting that hiring private contractors to run state
welfare programs is believed to hold the promise of unleashing the efficiency and
flexibility of the market on dysfunctional state bureaucracies).
182
For discussions of this compromise whereby rent-seeking is permitted because
the efficiency gains are so considerable, see Thomas Kaplan, supra note 139, at 108;
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 259; Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run
State Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at A1; and Walters, supra note 178,
at 36.
178
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183

cost-conscious legislator finds so attractive.
Corporations often can outperform state and municipal
government through savings in labor costs; they can employ a lowerwage, more flexible (i.e., less secure) labor force that can be
augmented or reduced with an ease the public sector could not begin
184
to approach.
Of course, corporations may also possess
sophisticated delivery and monitoring technologies that give firms
such as Andersen Consulting and Lockheed Martin comparative
185
advantages in bidding for contracts.
But it also should be
appreciated that further cost-savings gains, unrelated to efficiency per
se, can be accrued because corporations serve shareholders, not
welfare clients, and thus decisions that boil down to a question of
serving the shareholders or the clients will be resolved in a manner
186
consistent with the fiduciary duty to the former.
Before commencing this Section’s inquiry, I would like to offer a
few brief notes. First, any policy distortions that may occur under the
framework of state administration apply in instances of privatization,
too (and, later, under Charitable Choice). Certainly, a corporation
lacks the tools, mandate, and wherewithal to affect the demand side
of the labor market. Also, corporations’ interests, too, may diverge
from the federal objectives (and to a much greater extent).
Moreover, concerns regarding the corporation’s legitimacy and
accountability may affect how individuals and communities of
recipients feel about themselves and their relationship to government
187
and society.
Stipulating to these similarities between state
183

See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 180, at 3 (describing legislators who support
privatization initiatives as frequently extolling the virtues of efficiency and privatesector competition).
184
See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF
MARKETS 98 (1997) (noting the lower wages and benefits offered in the private sector
as reasons why governments outsource); SAVAS, supra note 42, at 34-35, 287
(suggesting the degree to which non-executive civil servants are paid significantly
more than similarly situated workers in the private sector); Kennedy, supra note 1, at
264 (describing the transition from public to private sector as one in which
unionized, secure jobs with pensions are replaced by nonunionized, often part-time
or casual labor); Minow, supra note 1, at 500 (describing the expectation of costsaving gains from harnessing the resources and flexibility of the private sector).
185
See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
186
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 302 (“[B]ecause a publicly traded company has a
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profits, the private provider will seek to
maximize profits even if it means harming the needy.”). For a detailed discussion on
fiduciary duties in the government contracting context, see Michele Estrin Gilman,
Charitable Choice and the Accountability Challenge, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 826-27, 837-39
(2002), in which for-profit corporate fiduciary duties are discussed, and id., at 837-39,
in which religious corporations’ fiduciary duties are discussed.
187
Professor Minow notes:
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188

devolution and privatization, I will move quickly to discuss the
distorting qualities unique to for-profit provision. Issues regarding a
corporation’s distinct and disparate interest in welfare reform as well
as those regarding its status as a non-state entity will be discussed in
turn.
***
Privatization’s distortions fall into the categories of harm
established at the beginning of this Article, but are replete with
spillovers across categories. Some of the institutional harms reach
into the civic realm as do some of the incentive-based, managerial
harms. In what follows, I describe the three categories of harm in
order. First, the institutional harms take a number of forms. The
corporate enterprise itself creates prima facie concerns. Important
institutional concerns include the fiduciary duty to promote
shareholder wealth, which goes well beyond a state or city’s incentive
to under-provide services. Another institutional concern is that
corporate enterprises are not equipped to resolve due process
concerns, conduct APA-like hearings, or hold notice and comment
fora. Second, managerial concerns include the possibility that
corporate providers have incentives to provide selectively to those
they can help most inexpensively, as well as, counterintuitively, to be
less flexible vehicles of welfare policy and to be less local than
otherwise contemplated. I note here that it is somewhat ironic that
though states and municipalities lobbied so fervently to take over the
reins of welfare policy, a good number of them quickly turned those
Privatization of public services [has] soared precisely when major
corporations engaged in unfettered private self-dealing and one major
religious group reeled from scandals, cover-ups, and mounting distrust
among the faithful. This coincidence in timing should be all the
reminder anyone needs of the vital role of public oversight and checks
and balances.
Minow, supra note 7, at 1259-60 (footnote omitted).
The extent of the public distrust of corporate America, today, in the wake of
high profile scandals, cannot be overstated. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Oversight; The
Biggest Casualty of Enron’s Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at D1; David Callahan,
Editorial, Private Sector, Public Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A21 (suggesting the
Enron scandal may mark a turning point in America’s trust in deregulated corporate
enterprise); Janny Scott, Once Bitten, Twice Shy: A World of Eroding Trust, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2002, at D5 (describing the public’s waning trust in American business).
Note, further, that the distrust of corporate America coincides with a rising
distrust of organized religion in light of the sexual abuse scandals “roiling the Roman
Catholic Church.” Scott, supra. This, of course, will be relevant in the subsequent
Part. See infra Part V.
188
It is, in part, due to these similarities that I also skip over private non-profits
altogether, for they have attributes that are fully discernible from a study that spans
public and private, for-profit actors.

2004

DEFORMING WELFARE

629

189

reins over to private corporations.
Finally, civic harms can be
recorded in the form of recipients feeling as if their concerns are not
important enough for government to handle itself and in the form of
recipients feeling that the loci of provision are unaccountable and
undemocratic.
B. Privatization’s Distortions
1.

Institutional Harms

Besides having even less of an impact on national economic
policy than sovereign states possess, corporations are constituted in
ways that inevitably and inescapably engender actual harms.
Corporations have a preexisting fiduciary commitment to
shareholders that they are duty-bound to prioritize over any
190
commitment to government service. As Nina Bernstein of the New
York Times notes: “[n]o company can be expected to protect the
interests of the needy at the expense of its bottom line, least of all a
publicly traded company with a fiduciary duty to maximize
191
shareholder profits.”
This core institutional characteristic far exceeds any
discretionary motivation among public bureaucrats to cut costs. It is
the raison d’etre of the corporate enterprise. A private-sector
caseworker and her directors employed by private firms thus operate
under an entirely different system of responsibilities than would a
public outfit. Most obviously, a civil servant is charged with fulfilling
the mandate to serve the designated clientele. Her secure position
and her organization’s (i.e., the state’s) ability, if so inclined, to bend
192
and flex a budget to ensure adequate support for recipients simply
cannot be replicated easily in the private sector. Indeed, a private
sector caseworker has a contrary obligation to the shareholders—and
193
to the terms of the contract.
Professor Diller highlights this
189

Kennedy, supra note 1, at 232 (“After fighting so hard for greater authority
over the welfare system, states seem strangely eager to pass the prize to private
corporations.”); Ehrenreich, supra note 146.
190
See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 302.
191
Bernstein, supra note 182.
192
See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, U.S. Welfare Limit May Put Thousands in Albany’s
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at A1 (describing New York’s sense of obligation to
support with its own funds those welfare recipients summarily dropped from TANF
due to the stringent time limits).
193
One is reminded of the economic argument regarding the winner’s curse.
The winning firm in a bidding proceeding inevitably outbids all other firms, thus
suggesting that there is a good chance the firm mistakenly overvalued and
miscalculated the contract’s worth. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE:
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caseworker distinction succinctly: Professional civil servants “are
accorded trust because they are viewed as part of a social institution
that operates according to a larger set of norms and principles.” For
those working for private firms, in contrast, that larger set of norms
194
and principles boils down to profits.
Private firms are also institutionally ill-equipped to be
transparent institutions of public policy. First, it is difficult to fathom
the corporate form proving hospitable to public input either in the
process of the corporation designing its bid or once that bid has been
accepted.
A notice-and-comment paradigm too would be
institutionally anathema. Indeed, the design and development of a
competitive bid, of course, would need to be afforded at least a
195
modicum of secrecy.
And, in the absence of competitive bidding,
there is no institutional corporate ethos regarding soliciting public
opinion—outside, perhaps, the use of focus groups to maximize
196
profits. In truth, these institutional opacities spill over greatly into
the civic-citizenship column; but I discuss them here because they are
inescapably a function of the corporation.

PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-51 (1992). But in the welfare
context, a private firm (assuming competitive bidding) may win a contract only if it
underestimates its costs of provision, and thus the winner will have to cut services
below that which the contract may specify. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying
text.
194
Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1194-95. It is further asserted that
[y]ou really need the individuals who are making decisions about who
receives government benefits to be held accountable to the taxpayers,
not to some private company whose main concern is its profit margin.
A public employee is more likely to be concerned about moving a
welfare participant into a long-term employment situation. . . . A
worker for a private company is going to focus on how to get
individuals off welfare in the shortest time . . . since that is what
increases their company’s profits and keeps the worker employed.
Dunlea, supra note 176, at 7 (quoting a representative of the Texas State Employees
Union); see also Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1606 (expressing concern that “private
vendors may lack the norms of public service and of professionalism, which
characterize many public bureaucracies”).
195
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000) (excluding trade secrets and other
proprietary information from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act).
196
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (forthcoming
2004) (describing the heavy reliance in contemporary America on focus group
research and its adverse effect on the quality of democratic debate and
.
policymaking)
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Managerial Harms
a. Profits over Service

Corporations have incentives to underprovide services. The
incentive for state welfare agencies to divert recipients for the sake of
padding the general coffers is not to be understated; yet it does not
rise to the level we would customarily associate with rent-seeking
private corporations. Corporations can and do actually design their
contract proposals with this aim in mind. Again, I consider corporate
provision as a more extreme version of a managerial distortion via
devolution because most of the “diverted” money under stateadministered PRWORA at least ends up being used either indirectly
for the benefit of the state’s poor or, at the very least, to support the
general good of the state, which represents a distinctly broader
segment of the population than equity investors in a private
corporation. With corporations, the incentive is to pocket the
change.
Corporations can tender bids with payments based on (1) how
many individuals are “serviced” by the vendor, (2) how many
individuals are placed in jobs, or simply, (3) a flat fee. In different
contexts, each of these three schemes may make most sense (either
for the corporation or for the government agency). However, for a
corporation, there is great incentive to churn or divert clients in the
first instance (and offer few substantive services), and to dump them
in the third. If one gets paid for “servicing” a client, the less effort
(cost) that is expended in the process, the greater the marginal
return. Moreover, if the only incentive is to place people in jobs, a
skimming effect will occur whereby firms will devote much of their
resources to those (already) likely to get jobs, while cutting its losses
on those harder to place. This, of course, is no different than the
incentives facing state agencies under conditions of federal work
mandates, but once again a corporation’s institutional and
motivational disposition represents a more acute example—once the
197
possibility of profits are infused into the equation. For those flat fee
197

In its contracts, the private welfare firm, America Works, gets between $6 and
$9 for its placements. The dual fear with this system is that, first, America Works will
only devote resources to those it can actually place; and second, with those it tries to
place, it will view a good match as less important than an immediate match. Getting
the job is all that counts in terms of collecting a bonus. Berkowitz, supra note 174. A
Lockheed contract in which the government gives Lockheed a bonus for placing a
welfare recipient in a job for six months reduces the incidence of the latter problem
(haphazard placements), but possibly at the expense of exacerbating the former. If
it is estimated that only a quarter of all recipients can probably hold jobs for six
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contracts, it makes sense for the corporation to lie low and turn away
198
as many as possible.
These corporations, after all, boast not how
many people they have helped over the past year, but how much
199
profit they have made.
One might suggest I am prematurely marching out the parade of
horribles; but a shocking number of contracts already have been
subject to abuse of discretion by corporations that have managed to
achieve these super-profitable ends—under the noses of government
contracting agents. For example, in New York, Wisconsin, and
California, judges and investigators have voided welfare contracts
with private vendors for reasons ranging from a failure to comply
with the terms of the contract, the violation of federal laws, or the
200
finding of corrupt bidding processes.
Moreover, in Connecticut,
Maximus failed miserably to comply with the terms of its welfare
201
Professor
contract; yet, inexplicably, its contract was renewed.
months, the remainder may be offered de minimis services. See Hartung &
Washburn, supra note 176. Some advocates fear that if a company’s profits are tied
to reducing the number of people on welfare, the firms will work to manipulate the
system to keep poor women from signing up in the first place and force recipients
into jobs lasting long enough so that the firms can collect their money (for successful
placement). See Judith Havemann, Welfare Reform Incorporated, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
1997, at A1.
198
This is the incentive structure for one of Wisconsin’s early privatization efforts
as part of its Wisconsin Works (W-2) program. Private welfare leader Maximus was
given $58 million to operate a welfare program in Milwaukee. It gets to keep
whatever it does not spend. Thus, “Maximus makes money only if it saves some of
the $58 million it has been given by the state to run TANF for two and a half years[;]
the Milwaukee County setup would arguably be a textbook case of a for-profit having
every incentive in the world to find as few clients and provide as little service as it
could get away with.” Walters, supra note 178, at 36.
199
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Squabble Puts Welfare Deals Under Spotlight in New York,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at B1 (describing Maximus as employing “more ‘greeters’
and others promoting the company than case managers, who were floundering
under large caseloads that violated its contract” with Wisconsin). The for-profit
provider websites are revealing. See, e.g., http://www.maximus.com (last visited Dec.
28, 2003); http://www.lockheedmartin.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2003). Their profits
are impressive. See Lorraine Woellert, Maximus Inc., BUS. WK., May 31, 1999, at 96
(describing that between 1996 and 1999, Maximus sales grew an average of 60.4% a
year, its earnings grew at an average of 21.3% a year, and its stock prices soared sixty
percent); see also Cohen, supra note 176.
200
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Federal Agency Finds Workfare Contractor Violated Wage
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at B6; Christopher Drew, Wisconsin To Audit Welfare
Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at B14; David S. Hilzenrath, NY Judge Shelves
Welfare Contracts Won by Maximus, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2000, at D13; Cindy Loose,
Disputes Snarl D.C. Welfare Plan; City Revokes Contract of Job Placement Firm, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 1999, at B1; Caitlin Rother, Judge Orders Privatized Welfare Contracts Ended, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9, 2000, at B5.
201
See Liz Halloran, State Delays Contractor Payment, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 9,
1997, at A3; Liz Halloran, State Privatized Program Without Analyzing the Cost, HARTFORD
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Bezdek has chronicled some of these contracts without effective
oversight in Baltimore, Maryland:
The [Baltimore] contracts provide a discouraging portrait of the
city’s commitments to its neediest citizens’ employment needs,
and raise large questions about the value added by the vendor
contracts. The contracts [often] propose service for too few, aim
for quite limited employment outcomes, and . . . engage in
creaming. . . . Thus, most of Baltimore’s expenditures for welfareto-work services is made without the apparent expectation that
referral to vendors will lead most welfare recipients to
202
employment success and independence from welfare.

Professor Bezdek further describes a series of private vendor
contracts that secured the right to manage social services without
203
specifying what they will provide.
One provider in particular
promised to offer a selection of training programs, but did not
204
disclose which ones.
Another successful bidder only vaguely
“pledged to help recipients conduct meaningful career planning and
205
job search . . . in a field that could provide employment.” Providers
also can be quite selective in who they decide to cover and are
especially motivated to be selective if their contracts are performance
based. A “good” program may only accept those recipients who can
attest to having no child-care needs, who have a high school diploma,
and/or who can pass a physical endurance test. Essentially, providers
206
may be able to service only those least needy.
These favorable (or unfavorable, depending on one’s vantage
point) contracts are not incidents of an institutional harm, because
there is nothing intrinsic about the corporate form that enables it to
elude effective government monitoring. Rather, their incentives to
elude oversight may, on occasion, simply exceed those of
procurement officers to rein in contractors.
b. Local Authenticity at Odds with Corporate Efficiency
We must also remember, as we proceed, that there is a
COURANT, Mar. 6, 1998, at A1.
202
See Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1598. Professor Bezdek further notes that
surveying all of Baltimore’s welfare agreements, “[d]espite the modest promise of the
RFPs [requests for proposals], the contracts themselves reveal no meaningful
benchmarks, outcomes, or central mechanisms . . . [and] [t]here were no control
provisions whatsoever in any of the contracts.” Id. at 1603.
203
See id. at 1600-01.
204
See id. One might also, in fairness, blame municipal officials for accepting
such vague promises.
205
Id. at 1601.
206
See id.
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difference between decentralized design of programs and full-out
devolution of authority. This distinction has been described in
earlier parts and will be a focal point of discussion again in Part VI.
But for now, it is important to understand that the narrative of local
implementation and experimentation is a salient feature of PRWORA
and welfare reform more generally. Ironically the unbounded
discretion co-opted by the states via the narrative of devolution has
actually created incentives to frustrate the localism that appeared so
important to welfare reform. Corporate providers have great
incentives not to be truly local agents of policy development and
implementation. Many of the most successful bidders are national, if
not multinational corporate providers—and thus hardly embody the
207
localism that welfare reform sought to harness.
The reason these
national or global firms are comparatively successful is that their
competitive edge is directly connected to (1) an efficiency that only
arises from the economies of scale associated with producing (and
replicating) generic welfare programs across the country and to (2) a
proven track record that, too, only experienced providers can boast.
Thus, instead of promoting locally tailored solutions that fit within
the federal framework, corporations may end up creating
208
McWelfare.
For instance, some of the biggest providers include
Lockheed Martin, Andersen Consulting (Accenture), and Maximus,
Inc., a giant social service corporation also known for building and
209
managing prisons.
These major, multinational corporations may
have little particular, let alone intimate, knowledge of a given
community’s needs (and every incentive to keep it that way).
c. Walling Off the Laboratories of Democracy
Another hallmark tradition of decentralization is that, over time,
one can safely anticipate that good ideas that develop out of
individual laboratories of democracy will rise to prominence and,
then, be shared with other locales. But unlike states, corporations
have incentives to horde information. Whatever I may argue about

207

See, e.g., Diller, supra note 9; Gilman, supra note 40, at 599 (describing the
most successful bidders for government contracts as some of the biggest in the
industry and suggesting that this outcome is “inconsistent with privatization’s goal of
returning control over welfare policies to communities”). I am indebted to Josh
Civin for our discussions on this point.
208
Cf. Elizabeth Kolbert, Unchartered Territory, NEW YORKER, Oct. 9, 2000, at 34
(describing pre-packaged, for-profit education centers in terms evocative of a
McDonald’s franchising manual).
209
See
Maximus’s Internet website details its many projects.
http://www.maximus.com/corporate/pages/index (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
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the paradox of devolution, I have not argued that decentralization is
not important in achieving a flexible innovative approach to welfare
reform. Corporations will not share their innovations with other
institutions—public or private—because that reduces their
competitive advantage; at the same time, however, the hording of
good ideas elongates the learning curve and undermines the
constructive dynamics undergirding a decentralized vision of welfare
reform.
d. Flexibility at Odds with Corporate Efficiency
Corporate providers, moreover, have great incentives to insist on
long-term contracts, creating a tradeoff for government procurement
agencies between more flexible, short-term contracts and less
210
flexible, long-term contracts.
All things being equal, government
might prefer the former.
But, short-term contracts create
uncertainties for bidders, and thus firms vying for those contracts will
ask for more money (to compensate them for the uncertainty factor).
By contrast, corporations take comfort in the stability and security of
a long-term contract and can thus bid a lower price for the vending
rights. Thus, surprisingly, privatization may produce a procurement
dilemma between flexibility and efficiency, the core values motivating
211
desires to outsource in the first place. In many geographic regions
and in some social service fields that have never before been open to
market competition for government services, private corporations
have minimal existing infrastructure or, possibly, institutional
knowledge. In these areas, the fixed, start-up costs of establishing a
212
welfare system may be quite high. Corporations encouraged to bid

210

Cf. David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1999) (raising concerns in general about the binding qualities of
government contracts that frustrate opportunities for democratic input and policy
modifications); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the
Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996) (describing the
economic efficiencies associated with long-term contracts). The Dana/Koniak and
Logue articles represent part of a richer debate on the tradeoffs between more
responsive, democratic control-retaining contracts and the economic cost efficiencies
associated with locking-in contracts that provide long-term stability for the
government and contractor alike.
211
The intuitive, conventional wisdom, of course, suggests privatization
enhances organizational flexibility. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS,
MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 45 (1990) (describing the market efficiencies that
privatization can introduce). My intent is not to refute this position, but rather, it is
to acknowledge some problems with that model.
212
Though any more elaborate discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, we
should recognize that the conventional wisdom that private is always more efficient
may not hold up in all circumstances.
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might seek (or insist on) long-term contracts to ensure their initial
investment and outlay pays off. Corporations may not, for instance,
want to build a facility, design programs, research local economic
213
patterns, and hire and train employees, for a one-year trial run. If
privatization were to promise efficiency gains in the long-run (and
thus a corporation would only agree to enter as a provider if it were
guaranteed a long-term deal), there are serious accountability and
monitoring concerns that would arise. Once a state or county
commits itself to a long-term contract, it is essentially limited in its
214
ability to hold those providers accountable.
These corporate
providers may be less likely or able to shift policy abruptly than might
a government agency (less concerned about making profits). Thus,
though the private sector is heralded as being dynamic, there are
distinct possibilities that long-term contracts may encourage
performance behavior that is quite the opposite of dynamic;
accordingly, inflexibility poses direct harms to service provision in the
form of more staid, less innovative administration and services.
3.

Civic Harms

The nature of private contracting does not necessarily sit well
with our conceptions of public governance. In many cases and
contexts, however, we have come to accept the benefits of privatized
outsourcing.
But, while corporations may be designated as
acceptable welfare provision providers, there is something truly
disruptive about this move, which neither our desire to enhance
efficiency or to reduce the size of government fully captures. Indeed,
while many other social service provisions have gone the way of
215
corporate outsourcing, there is something particularly troubling
about taking welfare in that direction. We have fewer problems with
a Laidlaw Bus Company taking our children to public schools or a

213

See DONAHUE, supra note 41.
In fairness, some private social service providers have been fired, but this
usually happens only in cases of abject failure or malfeasance. See supra note 200.
Maryland canceled a Lockheed Martin contract for failure to meet child support
collection objectives, and California cancelled a contract with Lockheed Martin when
the company’s cost expenditures suddenly tripled. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 40, at
572-73; Greg Garland, Collections of Child Aid Questioned, BALT. SUN, Jan. 10, 1999, at
1B; Greg Garland, Lockheed Called Failure on Child Support Goals, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4,
1999, at 1B.
215
See DONAHUE, supra note 41; Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition:
Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465 (2003); Steven Lee Myers,
Giuliani Moves on “Privatization” Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at A33; Rachel L.
Swarns, Giuliani Will Put Foster Care to Bid, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A1; see also
supra note 43.
214
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Waste Management removing our garbage. But we measure—or
should measure—(and value) welfare reform in ways much more
complicated than how we determine whether a bus driver is
competent or trash is removed punctually.
From the outset, we must resist a natural trend. Once we place
welfare provision in the hands of private corporations, entrusted to
act as vendors precisely because we want to maximize efficiency, we
inevitably bind ourselves to evaluating welfare reform on efficiency’s
terms: the lingua franca of the corporate paradigm. In the process of
assessing the costs and benefits of the privatization decision, we may
deprive ourselves of a richer analytical framework within which to
measure our commitment to the poor and our humane, respectful,
and dignified treatment of them.
These concerns of non-economic harm center precisely on a
private corporation’s lack of public accountability and
responsiveness.
It is a source of concern that the lines of
accountability between the government and the private welfare
provider may be seriously attenuated. Once we establish that welfare
reform should be guided, in part, by local influences, we are after all
privileging the know-how of communities.
While I do not want to overstate or conflate the discrete
concepts of localism and democracy, it must be conceded that often
the forces pushing for localism tend to base their arguments on a
216
desire for more democracy. If a national corporation is running a
local welfare program, concerns should be raised regarding how local
(and locally tailored) the policy really is and how accountable its
217
administrators are to that local polity.
Indeed, Professor Diller argues that this new privatization
regime has the potential to render existing mechanisms for
establishing public accountability largely ineffective or irrelevant.
[Privatization engenders a] system that, when fully operative,
largely may be closed to outside input and oversight and in which
key decisions may be made through obscure processes of which
218
the public is largely unaware.

216

See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 95; McConnell, supra note 35; Andrzej
Rapacznsk, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985
SUP. CT. REV. 341; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-15 (1998) (describing the
“federalist revival” endorsing greater political autonomy at the state level).
217
Indeed, corporate providers need not abide by APA guidelines or offer a
notice and comment proceeding. See Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1569; Cimini, supra
note 10, at 263; Gilman, supra note 186, at 818-19.
218
Diller, Revolution, supra note 1, at 1187.
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Instead, if the administration of policy resides in corporate
headquarters, which may sit thousands of miles away from the locus
of actual implementation, we are faced with a direct affront to the
logic of experimental tinkering; this kind of privatized service closes
the door to constructive dialogue among community members,
welfare recipients, and policymakers. The Vice President of Social
Services for Maximus is less likely than a state legislator or city
alderman to run into welfare recipients—or ordinary taxpayers, for
219
that matter—in the local supermarket and get an earful.
The theory of privatized welfare is a theory of efficiency. But
more troubling, it is also a theory of abandonment. Essentially, in
devolving to the states, and the states turning around and themselves
outsourcing, government has demonstrated an inability and an
unwillingness to deal with the problems of welfare policy; and, by
extension, it has signaled a faltering commitment to the social
220
contract known as federal welfare reform.
With private
corporations as the ersatz guarantor, the poor just become one
strand of a web of interrelated sources of profits.
Privatization, moreover, alters the symbolic and “contractual”
terms of welfare among those in the beneficiary population.
Essentially, corporate control may blur the avenues of legislative and
judicial access. Without the central presence of, say, a city agency,
without a defined set of transparent political actors and
administrative proceedings, welfare recipients may be at (more of) a
221
loss. Given the end of entitlements, and the federal protection that
219

Large-scale government contractors simply contradict the stylized belief that
privatization is a “democratizing force that returns power from the government to
local communities and their mediating institutions.” Gilman, supra note 40, at 596
(describing what many conservative supporters of privatization consider to be a
considerable asset of the movement away from government provision).
220
But see Cimini, supra note 10, at 259-60. Professor Cimini points to a number
of states that have individual responsibility plans that are “entered into” by
caseworkers and clients. Thirty-five states require responsibility contracts, “which
prescribe conduct in both employment and other matters such as child school
attendance, child immunization, child support enforcement cooperation, parent
training, and agreements to achieve self-sufficiency.” Id. at 259. Cimini contends a
new contractarian infrastructure—a shift to mutual obligations—has replaced the
Goldberg entitlements, but the evidence she offers indicates that although contractual
relations exist, they are highly privatized. No longer is a state committed to a
community of poor families, but a caseworker may be committed to a particular
individual. This commitment, I should hasten to add, may have little, if any, legal
import. See Kennedy, supra note 1.
221
See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985)
(describing the dignitary values associated with individuals having the opportunity to
voice their legal grievances and believing those grievances are taken seriously).
Professor Cimini, however, argues that welfare reform creates a new paradigm of
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had accompanied those entitlements, there should be, it would seem,
a premium on ensuring channels of communication remain open
222
and clear when procedural problems arise.
Barbara Ehrenreich
captures this sense of exacerbated helplessness when individuals are
left alone to comprehend and navigate the web of welfare service
provisions and providers. In characterizing her own, personal
confusion with the new privatized system, she anticipates the
difficulty that lies ahead for welfare recipients: “[If] diffused
responsibilities are frustrating to journalists, imagine their effect on a
welfare recipient . . . when she goes to her Lockheed-operated ATM,
presents a fingertip for identification, and finds herself rejected.
223
Whom is she going to call?”
And, even if she happened to know
whom to call, it is not entirely clear what obligations private providers
224
have to the client population in the form of due process.
private rights that are readily enforceable. As suggested, she describes the welfare
reform movement as ushering in a new era of social contractarian rhetoric and
responsibility. See Cimini, supra note 10, at 257-58 (describing politicians at both the
national and state levels as having clearly used contractual rhetoric when discussing
welfare reform). More concretely, she contends that states and other providers have
created thousands of agreements with individual welfare recipients that “are legally
cognizable contracts between government and each recipient. As such, these
contracts constitute ‘property’ requiring the application of procedural due process
protections pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 253.
222
See, e.g., Hartung & Washburn, supra note 176 (“Contracting out garbage
collection, computer upgrades and other routine public functions is one thing. But
what Lockheed is proposing would allow private companies to run entire
government programs; in the case of welfare and Medicaid, moreover, these are
essential government services, affecting the most disfranchised members of the
population, who are least able to defend their rights.”).
223
See Ehrenreich, supra note 146. But see Kennedy, supra note 1, at 283-84.
Professor Kennedy argues that there may be greater due process protection afforded
under privatization, because the state interest in efficient governance, as articulated
as one of the prongs in the Mathews v. Eldridge test, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), has declined
considerably. Compelling state interests in government keeping costs and burdens
low have decreased in an “era of privatization.” “Where most states have chosen to
privatize their welfare systems, the countervailing interest must be measured in terms
of the burden on a private corporation. In most cases, the cost of due process will
come out of the private company’s profit margin.” Kennedy, supra note 1, at 284; see
also Cimini, supra note 10, at 282-83 (describing common-law rights to due process
even in private contractual proceedings).
224
The Supreme Court recently rejected the extension of Bivens protections to
beneficiaries of privatized government programs. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61 (2001). As for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, the test to measure whether a
private actor is acting under color of state law is one of assessing how traditionally
“public” that function is. See Gilman, supra note 186, at 816. The paradigm example
is private prisons, where employees have been held to be operating under the color
of state law and thus subject to § 1983 suits. See Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age
of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1192 (1995); Gilman, supra note 40, at 573
(“[I]t is questionable whether a private entity such as Lockheed Martin will be
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C. Summary
Ultimately, I contend that the architecture of privatization in
toto may be less conducive to flexibility, political accountability, and
responsiveness—and hence, may run contrary to the purposes of
experimentation, localism, and innovation that are at the heart of the
decentralization goals. Efficiency may run up against democratic
accountability and responsiveness in this respect.
Accordingly, privatization narrows not only the size and scope of
the public sphere, but also the range of our public consciousness.
Our national commitment to the poor did not hinge historically on
cost-cutting decisions of a private bidder. No longer can we talk
broadly about normative ideals and non-measurable aspirations. The
language of private, for-profit provision is the language of efficiency,
which does not necessarily understand the vocabulary of justice and
fairness.
V. ONE STEP FURTHER II:
CHARITABLE CHOICE AND FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES
Along with the market-centered privatization agenda, another
strong current in American politics and policy is the faith-based
movement, ardently championed by President Bush and his newly
225
fashioned White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives.
Faithbased social welfare initiatives, however, antedate the Bush
administration and the 2000 campaign more generally (where
226
candidate Al Gore also strongly endorsed faith-based initiatives)

deemed a state actor to whom constitutional guarantees apply.”) (footnote omitted);
id. at 611. Incarceration, of course, is held to be a much more “public” function than
welfare; in fact, with the passage of PRWORA in 1996, the federal government has
argued it has dispensed with welfare entitlements, ostensibly indicating that welfare
may not be as core a state function as are prisons. Thus, while private welfare
services would probably be covered under § 1983, the attenuated connection is worth
noting. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1006-09 (1982) (suggesting that though
Medicaid paid most of the nursing home expenses, private nursing home providers
are not state actors); see also David J. DelFiandra, The Growth of Prison Privatization and
the Threat Posed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 591 (2000); supra note 43.
225
Bush on the Creation of a White House Office Tied to Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2001, at A18 (reprinting the president’s remarks).
226
See, e.g., Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 265 (describing Bush’s
campaign pledge); Sara Mosle, The Vanity of Volunteerism, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at
F22 (describing the support of both Gore and Bush for faith-based social services);
Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Sacred?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at F40 (“Bush and Gore
have enthusiastically endorsed a provision of the 1996 welfare-reform bill called
charitable choice, which allows faith-based organizations to administer welfare
programs with public funds.”); Kevin Sack, Gore Backs Federal Money for Church Social
Service Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A23.

2004

DEFORMING WELFARE

641

and were explicitly included as part of the 1996 welfare reform
227
legislation.
“Charitable Choice,” as it is called, permits religious,
sectarian organizations to bid for welfare service contracts at no
228
disadvantage relative to private, secular contractors. To suggest that
the genesis of church-state social service partnerships can only be
traced back to the summer of 1996, however, is quite misleading.
Since the early years of the Republic, faith-based organizations have
played an active and central role in social services, both in private,
charitable capacities and working within the framework of
229
government grants.
But when entering partnerships with the
government, these religious organizations, at least since the advent of
230
the modern Establishment Clause doctrine,
were required to
separate—and totally wall-off—their sectarian philosophy from their
231
government-funded, social service activities.
Today, however, these religious organizations need not abandon
227

42 U.S.C. § 604 (2000).
See id. For discussions of the legality of faith-based social services, see Minow,
supra note 1; Elbert Lin, Jon D. Michaels, Rajesh Nayak, Katherine Tang Newberger,
Nikhil Shanbhag, & Jake Sullivan, Note, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political
Future of Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 188
(2002). See also Ehrenreich, supra note 146.
229
See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 1-28 (1996).
230
In truth, I am talking mostly about the post-World War II period. See infra
note 231.
231
See MONSMA, supra note 229, at 1-28; Gilman, supra note 186, at 811; see also
Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 266-68 (describing America’s increasing
willingness to lower the wall between church and state); Jonathan Friedman, Student
Research, Charitable Choice and the Establishment Clause, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY
103, 104 (1997); Lin et al., supra note 228, at 188.
A series of recent Supreme Court cases has increasingly permitted this lowering
of the wall between church and state. In Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1
(1947), the Court offered what became gospel in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence for decades to come. It held that the “First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach.” Id. at 18; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962). The Court reaffirmed that sentiment in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), when it struck down a state law providing salary supplements to teachers in
sectarian schools. The Court barred the public financing of programs that advance
or involve religion. Id. at 612-13; see also Aguliar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(affirming this line of cases). Yet a new set of cases, beginning in 1988, has effectively
permitted the breaching of the Everson wall. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988) (permitting government to award grants to sectarian organizations if the
requirements set out for awarding the grant are neutral with respect to religion); see
also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Most recently, the Court upheld school
vouchers that awarded a disproportionate number of state dollars to students
intending to use the funds at parochial schools. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002).
228
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their core spiritual messages as a condition of eligibility to bid for and
232
administer social services.
Under Charitable Choice, faith-based
providers can retain control over how they define and express their
religious beliefs. They do not have to alter their internal form of
governance as a condition of bidding for or receiving a government
contract. This means these organizations cannot be required to
change or tone down their message of faith or open up their
personnel hiring practices to fit some secular, neutral conception of
233
government-like propriety.
A. Introduction
In tangible ways, Charitable Choice—as compared simply to
market privatization of the kind discussed in Part IV—represents a
truer departure from government provision. Though they ostensibly
operate just like private corporations bidding for contracts to supply
state and local welfare services, Charitable Choice organizations do
not simply offer, as an advantage, market-based efficiencies; rather,
they promise an altogether different model or methodology to
234
promote personal success and improvement. Faith is trumpeted as
235
the missing element in the welfare reform puzzle. Underlying the
impetus for Charitable Choice is the belief that a spiritual awakening
can give individuals the moral impetus to succeed in ways that job
236
training and employment preparation alone simply cannot.
232

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 604a(d)(1), 604a(d)(2)(A), 604a(d)(2)(B) (2000); David
Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (2003).
233
42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000); see Peter Edelman, Poverty & Welfare: Does
Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2001); Center
for
Public
Justice,
A
Guide
to
Charitable
Choice, available
at
http://www.cpjustice.org/charitablechoice/guide/analysis (last visited Dec. 28,
2003) [hereinafter A Guide To Charitable Choice]; see also CHARLES L. GLENN, THE
AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE 107-08 (2000). Importantly, though, faith-based providers
cannot discriminate against clients based on their religious allegiances or lack of
such allegiances. A Guide To Charitable Choice, supra.
234
Michael J. Joyce, Gotta Have Faith?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 17, 2001, at
1J. For discussions of non-economic motivations behind decisions to privatize, see
Michaels, supra note 45.
235
Some have directly blamed the government’s insistence on secular neutrality
for the lack of progress in the War on Poverty. See, e.g., OLASKY, supra note 99, at 138
(suggesting that welfare programs in the past “declared a war on poverty that was
actually a war on God, since the Bible was excluded . . . from governmental
antipoverty work”); Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 267.
236
See DiIulio, supra note 41; see also Minow, supra note 1, at 505 (describing the
Charitable Choice lobby as offering the spiritual renewal that can be more important
than meeting material need); Rick Santorum, A Compassionate Conservative Agenda:
Addressing Poverty for the Next Millennium, 26 J. LEGIS. 93 (2000) (outlining the
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Charitable Choice’s conceptual framework, which has morphed into
the larger ideological and political framework popularly known today
as “Compassionate Conservatism,” was formulated in part by Marvin
Olasky, who has for years written that religious groups outperform
the government precisely because the former serve the spiritual and
237
moral needs of individuals.
President Bush, of course, warmly
238
embraced Olasky’s platform in his 2000 campaign.
In its best light, religion can break through the procedural
sterility of the post-King v. Smith, post-Goldberg world of entitlements
and offer warmth and neighborly authenticity to assist those in
239
need.
Since Tocqueville’s famous visit, religious institutions in
America have been seen as essential mediating social institutions
connecting individuals and communities, often in apolitical—but
240
culturally and morally thick—ways.
Thus, without having these
mediating social institutions “integrated into the political to make
policy more meaningful, the political order becomes detached from
senator’s support for religiously oriented welfare services).
237
See, e.g., OLASKY, supra note 99; MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN
COMPASSION 204-33 (1992).
238
See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Bush Draws Campaign Theme from More Than “the
Heart,” N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at A1; Frank Rich, Editorial, Everybody into the
Mudfight!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A15; William Safire, Editorial, Political “God’s
World,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A29 (describing Olasky as “the revered
intellectual guru of Governor [George W.] Bush”).
239
See Martin Davis, Faith, Hope, and Charity, 33 NAT’L J. 1228 (2001)
(characterizing the spiritual passion among faith-based workers as an advantage
Charitable Choice may have over secular alternatives); Faith-Based Social Work: With
Help from a Hidden Hand, ECONOMIST (U.S. Ed.), Feb. 12, 2000, at 28 (describing
some early studies pointing to the higher success rate among faith-based social
service providers than their secular counterparts); Joyce, supra note 234 (“[The
recipient] gets help—not from top-down government, but from a neighbor who
knows his name. . . . Such an approach will restore the human link between the
recipient and the giver, meeting the needs of the soul, as well as the immediate social
concern.”); cf. Simon, supra note 87 (recognizing the modern, pre-PRWORA era of
welfare administration eschewed the social worker model of case management).
240
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1835) (“Religion, which never
intervenes directly in the government of American society, should . . . be considered
as the first of their political institutions . . . .”). Indeed, Solomon & Vlissides report
that the rise in support for faith-based social services is not wholly related to the
evangelization of America and American politics. They argue that the
[p]ublic interest in [faith-based organizations] is not a product of
heightened religiosity, rather, it is derivative of the public discrediting
of government social service provision. . . . [T]he public is willing to
accept some level of religious involvement in heretofore-secular
government programs because there is a general belief that they work.
Solomon & Vlissides, supra note 13, at 267-68; see also Eyal Press, Lead Us Not unto
Temptation, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 9, 2001, at 20 (describing the critical importance of
churches and ministers in inner-city communities).
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the values and realities of . . . life. Deprived of its moral foundation,
241
the political order is delegitimized.” Concomitantly, however, with
that level of intimacy comes the possibility (or opportunity) to judge
242
Faith-based providers can decry a practice or
and degrade.
behavior as immoral. As another architect of Compassionate
Conservatism recently asserted:
government should stop doing all the things it currently does to
normalize illegitimacy. It should stop setting up nurseries in high
schools, which give the message that having babies is perfectly
normal for unmarried teens. It should give married couples
preference in allocating scarce public housing units, and it
shouldn’t penalize them by taxing them more heavily than if they
243
remained cohabitating singles.

Charitable Choice is more than government-funded supplemental
service provisions with a religious or sectarian characteristic. Its goals
are more expansive as it seeks, explicitly, to provide services in lieu of
244
the government.
Charitable Choice in America already includes
alcohol treatment centers, prison rehabilitation services, job training,
GED classes, money management classes, domestic abuse clinics,
245
child-care provisions, and family support;
supporters of
Compassionate Conservatism argue that their programs outperform
246
secular counterparts. Though the successes of these programs are
247
doubts regarding the accuracy of any empirical
celebrated,
241

GLENN, supra note 233, at 3.
See id. at 17-19 (raising concerns with service providers’ ambitions to impose
perfectionist models of improvement on susceptible client populations).
243
Myron Magnet, Editorial, “Compassionate Conservatism” Will Guide Domestic
Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 21, 2001, at G1.
244
The legislation does require governments to offer secular alternatives to
religious welfare provisions. Yet cities, counties, and municipalities are only required
to provide them upon request. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e)(1) (2000); see also Gilman,
supra note 186, at 808; Julie A. Segal, Welfare for Churches: Buyers and Beneficiaries
Beware, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 71, 71-73 (1997); Kenneth Roe, Editorial,
Faith-Based Groups Need Safeguards, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 2001, at 29A.
245
A 2002 survey found Charitable Choice providing more than forty services in
over fifteen states. Amy L. Sherman, Collaborations Catalogue: A Report on Charitable
Choice Implementation in 15 States (2002); see also Davis, supra note 239; Press, supra
note 240.
246
See Davis, supra note 239; Ronald J. Sider, Editorial, Can Faith Help Solve Our
Tough Social Problems?, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2001, at A11; Governor’s Advisory
Task Force on Faith-Based Community Service Groups, Faith in Action . . . A New
Vision for Church-State Cooperation in Texas 16 (Dec. 1996), available at
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/svcs/charchoice/faithful.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Governor’s Advisory Task Force].
247
Commentator Stephen Monsma has noted: “My wide examination of the
relevant literature has yet to reveal a single study that has shown secular programs
outperforming similar or parallel faith-based programs.” See Stephen V. Monsma, Are
242
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evaluations linger since it is almost universally conceded that those
who have availed themselves of sectarian services tend to be a selfselecting group more likely to be willing to be helped and
248
reformed.
But, as mentioned throughout this discussion, my
argument is not conditioned on the relative successes of devolved or
privatized welfare. My inquiry is confined to an exploration of how
the institutional and motivational characteristics of the service
providers affect the promulgation of the substantive and rhetorical
objectives of federal welfare reform.
It may be worthwhile to offer some brief thoughts on the advent
249
of faith-based initiatives, which admittedly are still in their nascency.
Disclaiming any attempt at comprehensiveness, I offer merely some
description and analysis of faith-based social service provision. For
starters, it may be helpful to focus on Texas, which has embraced
Charitable Choice more extensively and enthusiastically than have
250
most other states.
As Governor of Texas, President Bush
commissioned a major study focusing on the impact of Charitable
Choice in Texas. The Governor’s Advisory Task Force recommended
embracing Charitable Choice opportunities because they, uniquely,
Faith-Based Programs More Effective?, PUB. JUST. REP., 2d Quarter 2001, available at
http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$545 (last visited Dec. 28, 2003).
248
The methodological evaluations are very difficult to test. The problem of selfselection complicates the process by which one goes about measuring the success of
faith-based providers versus government programs. “People who turn to faith-based
charities are likely to be particularly receptive to the message they deliver.” Jacob S.
Hacker, Should Churches Take Over Social Policy?, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 1999, at 16;
see Press, supra note 240.
249
See Laurie Goodstein, Religious Groups Slow to Accept Government Money to Help
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at A22; Laurie Goodstein, States Steer Religious
Charities Toward Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A1 (suggesting states had just
begun, in the summer of 2001, to develop offices to cultivate religious-based social
service partners) [hereinafter Goodstein, States]; Abraham McLaughlin, Few Recruits
for the “Armies of Compassion,” CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27, 2001, at 2 (suggesting
the “vast battalions of faith-inspired workers Mr. Bush envisions may turn out to be
more like a few scattered squadrons”).
250
While Texas may be an outlier in its extremely warm embrace of Charitable
Choice, it remains the most significant state to study in the wake of welfare reform
given both its advanced faith-based programs and that its then-governor is now
president of the United States and quite desirous of extending faith-based initiatives.
See, e.g., Goodstein, States, supra note 249 (“[Until the 2000 presidential election,]
most states had virtually ignored the charitable-choice laws. . . . Mr. Bush, one of few
governors who actively directed state agencies to finance religious programs, made
expanding charitable choice a priority.”); Hanna Rosin, George W. Bush: The Record in
Texas; Putting Faith in a Social Service Role; Church-based Providers Freed from Many Rules,
WASH. POST, May 5, 2000, at A1; see also Carolyn Barta, Texas Tops List for Faith-Based
Aid Efforts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 1A (noting that the Center for
Public Justice gave Texas the highest grade among states for its Charitable Choice
initiatives).
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can instill values, alter behavior, and “assert the essential connection
between responsibility and human dignity by requiring changed
251
behavior in return for help.”
***
Faith-based providers, quite frankly, could at times be superior
agents of welfare reform. It is often argued that churches and
communities of faith can better meet the policy goals and objectives
of welfare reform than the government itself could. This thickening of
the connection between the stated goals of welfare and their on-theground implementation should not be overlooked.
The argument in favor of Charitable Choice is three-fold. First,
those who work for religious organizations may be ultra-motivated in
their work by a “higher calling.” Their commitment as caseworkers,
contra those doing the work in the private sector, may more likely
seem to them an act of faith; these religiously affiliated caseworkers
often serve without the political and fiscal guile found among those
operating in the ranks of government and corporate employment.
Thus, the religious component may lead caseworkers to go that extra
252
mile for those in need.
Second, the packaging of Charitable Choice provisions is more
spiritual and thus may offer those attempting to make the transition
the requisite boost of faith or inspiration needed to persevere in the
job search and/or reform pathological behavior—especially if the job
market is less than accommodating. The added spirituality may
provide the proper complement to material benefits and training
programs necessary to transform lives. Transforming lives, after all, is
253
the goal of welfare reform.
Indeed, it has been argued that “no
bureaucracy, and no amount of money, can buy the reformation of
251

Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at vii; see also id. at i. Notably,
the Report decidedly recommends moving beyond “devolution,” and instead
encouraging Texans to embrace “genuine reform.” Id. at viii.
252
See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 233, at 186-89 (describing instances in which the
greater passion and commitment among church-based providers is apparent); Joseph
P. Shapiro & Andrea R. Wright, Can Churches Save America?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 9, 1996, at 46 (describing Mississippi church groups as “adopting” needy
families by not just assisting them financially, but offering them friendship and
community); see also Davis, supra note 239 (emphasizing the importance of a
religiously committed and driven community of welfare administrators and social
service providers).
253
Professor James Q. Wilson has held up Alcoholics Anonymous as the “single
most important organized example of personal transformation we have.” James Q.
Wilson, Religion and Public Life, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1999, at 36. Building on that
model, Wilson understands the potential for faith to spark the personal
transformation necessary for success. He thus advocates Charitable Choice to
combat an array of social ills. See id.
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morals that is desperately needed by many of those served by social
service agencies. Religiously motivated organizations can press the
demand for such reformation in ways that government agencies . . .
254
cannot.”
The Governor’s Advisory Task Force in Texas echoed this point:
“Religious ministries aim for inner conversion and inject spiritual and
255
moral resources that are beyond government’s know-how.”
The Task
Force questioned the secular sector’s ability to achieve the stated
goals of welfare reform. “[C]ivil society needs guardrails, some moral
consensus that dissuades deviant behavior.
Religion, unlike
government transfer payments, provides it. Transforming people
256
from the inside out . . . [r]eligion fills man’s moral vacuum.”
Third, the church as an institution may resonate more with atrisk communities than would the city social service department that is
perceived to have failed them for years. The church may be able to
provide a more comfortable, less adversarial setting for caseworker257
client contact, thus satisfying a key aim of the federal legislation.
Professor John DiIulio, the first director of President Bush’s Office of
258
Faith-Based Initiatives, has emphasized these pragmatic benefits of
using church providers. Spirituality notwithstanding, DiIulio sees
church organizations as the most important social structure in many
254

GLENN, supra note 233, at 34 (footnote and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting OLASKY, supra note 237, at 24). It should not be too surprising
that faith-based institutions, bolstered by a religious American polity, speak about a
cultural impediment to personal success and independence in ways more salient
than those who previously guised similar calls for reformation in class and even racial
terms. The most notable sociological description of a community in need of
reformation—that spoke outside the boundaries of an economic empowerment
vocabulary—was Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s. See Moynihan, The Negro Family, supra
note 26, at 39, 43, 51-60. For a more direct “critique” of the underclass’s “culture of
poverty,” see Lewis, supra note 26, at 188. Moynihan was criticized and some even
labeled him a racist for suggesting that there is something morally deficient about a
particular segment of America’s underclass. Though today’s calls for moral
transformation are ostensibly race-neutral, they nevertheless smack of a similar
paternalistic repudiation of contemporary behavioral patterns among America’s
poor.
255
Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at ix (emphasis omitted and
added).
256
Id. at 21.
257
See GLENN, supra note 233, at 187-88.
258
See Frank Bruni & Laurie Goodstein, New Bush Office Seeks Closer Ties to Church
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at A1 (announcing the creation of the Office and
the appointment of DiIulio as its head). Professor DiIulio resigned before the end of
a year in office. See Elizabeth Becker, Head of Religion-Based Initiative Resigns, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at A17 (describing his resignation); see also Towey Leads “Faith –
Based” Effort, ASSOC. PRESS, May 3, 2002 (describing the nomination of Jim Towey to
replace DiIulio).
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blighted communities and, as such, should be acknowledged as an
259
institutional standard bearer dedicated to the public good. Thus, it
simply makes good common sense to subsidize the work these
260
In some inner cities, the black ministry
churches already do.
remains one of the few standing social institutions of support and
connection:
Day-by-day, clergy, volunteers, and people of faith monitor,
mentor, and minister to the daily needs of the inner-city black
children, who, through absolutely no fault of their own, live in
neighborhoods where opportunities are few and drugs, crime,
and failed public schools are common. There, faith-driven
community activists strive against the odds to help these children
. . . avoid physical violence, achieve literacy, gain jobs, and
otherwise reach adulthood physically, educationally, and
261
economically whole.

From this perspective, churches may be seen as a better
guarantor of promoting the objectives of the federal legislation than
the bureaucracy itself could be. And, they may be a better center for
262
civic engagement. Whereas the public, as I argued in Part IV, does
not have opportunities to engage in meaningful dialogue with
privatized providers, church-group welfare organizations may provide
extensive opportunities for the general public to get involved in the
shape and direction of welfare provisions—more so than, perhaps, in
263
the case of government providers.
Given my explicit criticism of
private providers for their role in sharpening the separation between
the general public and the work of helping low-income people, it is
only fair for me to recognize this countervailing trend here.
259

See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Supporting Black Churches, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1999,
at 42; see also Shapiro & Wright, supra note 252.
260
See DiIulio, supra note 259. For illustrations of inner-city ministries working to
keep impoverished neighborhoods together, see, for example, Jodie T. Allen,
Ministers Test the Limits of Faith, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 3, 2000, at 20; John
Leland with Claudia Kalb, Savior of the Streets, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1998, at 20; and
Robert Worth, Amazing Grace, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 11, 1998, at 28.
261
DiIulio, supra note 259, at 42.
262
See Benjamin R. Barber, Editorial, Where We Learn Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1986, at G15 (recognizing black churches as traditional loci of civic and political
community); Richard L. Berke, At Church, Sermon Is Often How You Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1994, at B9 (noting the political activism among church congregations); see
also Eric Lipton, In Churches, Candidates Call for Black Voters To Respond, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2001, at B3.
263
One key factor militating against the fostering of inter-class community
between church providers and welfare recipients is that, often, the target group to
assist is demographically quite distinct from the provider population. Hence, the
existence of paternalism and the sense of noblesse oblige may dampen efforts to bring
recipients and providers closer together. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
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***
On the flip side, however, whereas governments and
corporations lack the potential intimacy that a faith provider might
enjoy with its clients, they are also less likely to alienate (because the
governmental and corporate agendas do not include spiritual
264
reformation).
Spiritual messages are desirable only insofar as the
clients are receptive to such “callings.” If a client hews to a different
creed than his provider, the church provider—intent on combining a
message of faith and self-help—could become a much less effective
(if not altogether deleterious) partner in welfare reform. In what
follows, I describe how faith-based welfare reform can distort the
federal welfare message on three fronts.
First, institutionally, Charitable Choice providers as religious
institutions might confuse and conflate their spiritual mission with
the goals of federal welfare reform. Accordingly, they would serve as
inherently exclusionary administrative bodies, implicitly defining
boundaries of eligibility not just in terms of financial status or
residential geography, but also in terms of adherence and conformity
to a particular creed. Moreover, faith-based organizations are also
inherently non-neutral. Unlike the government or even private,
market providers, there is a conception of the good and moral life
265
that communities of faith propound. This affirmative moral ethos,
too, may create obstacles standing in the way of effective service
266
provision.
Second, and related on the managerial level, Charitable Choice
providers might stigmatize or ill-serve those that do not share their
267
religious ethos of reform and reformation. They may focus on the
wrong package of services and training, i.e., more attention to
spiritual and emotional well-being than material security and jobreadiness.
And, third, there are civic harms. A legal and political regime
too heavily focused on faith-based provision will erode trust in the
ability of government, as a neutral, inclusive provider, to service
needs; instead, individuals (recipients and general members of the
civic community alike) will feel compelled to define their community
more narrowly and focus attention and allegiance in the direction of

264

See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1371.
See, e.g., OLASKY, supra note 99; OLASKY, supra note 237; Magnet, supra note
243; see also infra Section V.B.
266
See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1361 (describing the providers’ “political
and ideological concerns beyond the desire to help the poor”).
267
See Segal, supra note 244, at 71-72.
265
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church groups, which may be exclusionary and discriminatory.
Again, my aim is not to discredit faith-based provisions. I
recognize the long and meritorious history of religious providers. My
goal, and thus I lay emphasis on it, is to identify some of the more
problematic elements of Charitable Choice. For centuries, churches
and synagogues worked closely with government to provide services.
What is different today is that some groups are much more inclined
to participate because they do not have to subordinate their
particular message of faith. Thus, I focus particular emphasis on
these new Charitable Choice providers, which jumped into the TANF
world precisely because they could promote their messages of faith
and redemption. These groups, which are largely Evangelical
Protestant outfits, may be distinguished from Catholic Charities or
268
Lutheran Social Services,
because, to borrow Saperstein’s
terminology, they are “pervasively sectarian” rather than simply
269
religiously affiliated organizations. Catholic Charities and Lutheran
Social Services have long been involved in government service
provision and appear less likely to test the waters of heavily sectarian
270
social service administration.
B. Charitable Choice’s Distortions
1.

Institutional Harms

First, the religious and spiritual raison d’etre of religious providers
may conflict or get confused with the overarching goals of welfare
reform. Spiritual salvation may override the commitment to work—
for a successfully “rehabilitated” person may be pious, but still
271
272
jobless.
As suggested, to date not many of the most prominent
268

Indeed, prior to Charitable Choice, sixty-two percent of Catholic Charities’
funding came from the government, and thirty-nine percent of Lutheran Social
Services’ funding came from the government. See Gilman, supra note 186. At the
risk of privileging the “mainstream,” these organizations may be viewed as too wellrespected to risk deviating too far outside the line they have carefully towed since the
advent of the modern Establishment Clause doctrine.
269
See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1361.
270
See Laurie Goodstein, Bush’s Call to Church Groups To Get Untraditional Replies,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at A1 (noting that the biggest enthusiasts in the faith-based
community to administer PRWORA and other social service initiatives are the less
traditional religious outfits); Laurie Goodstein, Bush’s Charity Plan Is Raising Concerns
for Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A1; see also Diller, supra note 9, at 1764
(describing the high participation rate of less well-established churches in faithbased, government initiatives).
271
Success, after all, is defined in terms of spiritual, not material gain. See, e.g.,
Marci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 871 (2001) (“We need
to be absolutely clear here: the but-for reason proffered for the success of these
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churches in America have become seriously or aggressively involved
273
in this wave of welfare reform,
so we must focus on the
performance of those private religious providers that have emerged
as candidates for the first sets of Charitable Choice contracts.
Some notable providers who have demonstrated considerable
interest in Charitable Choice are exclusionary by virtue of their
274
institutional constitution.
What I raise presently is admittedly
anecdotal, but it is nevertheless evidence that confirms there can be
distortions in welfare policy. Consider Teen Challenge, a group
275
publicly lauded by then- Governor George W. Bush as early as 1995.
It is considered a highly successful and rapidly expanding evangelical
Protestant group that believes drug and alcohol addiction is the
result of spiritual troubles and can only be cured by moral teaching,
276
or more specifically, through the process of being “born again.”
The Governor’s Advisory Task Force, not some skeptical liberal
watchgroup, described Teen Challenge’s methodology as
277
rehabilitation through salvation.
The specific policies and aims of
Teen Challenge were discussed quite frankly before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Alarmed observers noted that “Teen Challenge
based their assessment of Jewish patients’ success on their willingness
to convert to Christianity—Jewish beneficiaries were labeled either
‘uncompleted’ or ‘completed’ Jews based on whether they had fully
278
converted.”
This success criterion was, apparently, evaluated

religious welfare service programs is the presence of God, or religion, in the
program. They claim they work better because God is integrally incorporated
throughout the program.”).
272
See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
273
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
274
See Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1361, 1371; Segal, supra note 244, at 71-72.
275
See GLENN, supra note 233, at 63; David Gramm, Where W. Got Compassion, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1999, at F62 (describing then-Governor Bush’s efforts to promote
Teen Challenge’s message and programs).
276
See Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Church Leaders Find a Pillar in Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at A16; Gramm, supra note 275 (characterizing Bush’s and
Olasky’s strident support for Charitable Choice social services as deriving from their
own evangelical faith).
277
Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at 18. Charles Glenn devotes
an entire chapter to Teen Challenge. GLENN, supra note 233, at 62-73.
278
Lin et al., supra note 228, at 195; see also Faith-Based Solutions: What are the Legal
Issues?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony
of Richard T. Foltin, Legislative Director and Counsel, the American Jewish
Committee Office of Government and International Affairs); GLENN, supra note 233,
at 62 (“When one does not have a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, that
person has a great emptiness inside.”) (quoting from the “Philosophy of Teen
Challenge”). Glenn recounts the major tenets of Teen Challenge.
There is hope.
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independently of whether or not the client actually overcame her
addiction.
Lest we dismiss the rhetoric of Teen Challenge as aptly localized
to heavily Protestant, rural Texas, it is important to recognize that
Teen Challenge has a noticeable presence in border towns in Texas,
as well as in more cosmopolitan locations including San Antonio, Los
279
Angeles, and New York City.
In all these communities there are
quite large non-Protestant populations, who potentially could be
assigned to its services as a condition of receiving welfare under
TANF. And lest we dismiss Teen Challenge as a fringe provider with
which no county or municipality would formally contract, its success
280
rate has been widely heralded.
Another program endorsed by the Governor’s Advisory Task
Force is Lands Victory Fellowship. Its methodology, too, is quite
simple:
We don’t use drugs or psychiatrists or any of that, only Bible
study. We believe that sin is the reason why people take drugs. . . .
The drug addict is a slave to sin, not to drugs. We believe that
drug addiction is a spiritual problem, and that Jesus Christ is the
281
solution.

Finally, one last active social service provider seeking state
funding is Victory Home, which also centers its drug and alcohol
rehabilitation curriculum on instilling Christian values.
The
Drugs are not the major root problem.
Sin is the major root problem.
Drugs are not sin; they are a symptom of the problem.
The only cure for sin is Jesus Christ.
Jesus Christ died on the cross to save a man from his sin.
Through faith in Jesus Christ you can be forgiven and cleansed from
the power of sin . . . .
GLENN, supra note 233, at 67 (citing the group’s central creed).
279
Id. at 64-69. After all, there must have been a sufficient number of Jews
involved in the program to make such discussion relevant to their congressional
testimony.
280
See, e.g., Nat’l Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse at Columbia Univ., So
Help Me God: Substance Abuse, Religion and Spirituality 26 (2001), available at
http://www.casalibrary.org/CASAPublications/Spirituality.pdf (last visited Dec. 28,
2003) (noting Teen Challenge’s eighty-five percent rehabilitation rate); see also
GLENN, supra note 233, at 62-73.
Indeed, praise for religiously oriented substance abuse programs is hardly
monopolized by the Right. Joseph Califano, an architect of Lyndon Johnson’s Great
Society and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under President Carter, has
said: “I don’t see anything wrong with public funding for a drug-treatment program
that provides for spiritual needs . . . if that’s what an individual needs to shake
cocaine, to shake alcohol, to shake heroin.” Shapiro & Wright, supra note 252.
281
See Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at 17 (quoting Lands
Victory’s founder).
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program, though also praised for its success rate, recognizes it is not
for everyone. Its founder has suggested that Victory Home “is geared
to a particular modality—which is accept Jesus and accepting Jesus
will drive out the addiction—and that’s not going to work for
282
everyone.”
As a program “not for everyone,” Victory Home, like
Victory Fellowship and Teen Challenge, may fill a particularly gaping
hole in the broad tapestry of private service provision. The founder
of Victory Home, testifying before Congress, remarked that “we teach
283
But when it
Jesus in the morning, Jesus at noon, Jesus at night.”
stands in for the state—and seeks government contracts—and is given
the state’s imprimatur, it cannot help but alienate individuals who
want personal and professional assistance but not salvation, and may
fail, quite possibly, to provide the proper medical care necessary for
those whose addiction is more physiological than these groups are
284
willing to concede.
***
In such instances, faith-based provision is, accordingly,
institutionally ill-equipped (and structurally ill-disposed) to handle all
clients. In those cases, it may not realistically treat individuals on
their own, or at least neutral, terms. The traditional norms of
eligibility for service provision are geographic, jurisdictional, and
economic: If you are poor and can claim a local residency, you are
likely to be eligible for service. But, faith-based provisions create an
additional barrier: a religious litmus test. Though one does not, by
law, need to ascribe to the faith messages associated with the service
provider to remain eligible, the programs are obviously geared
toward promoting particular perspectives. It would be a false analogy
to say that litmus tests exist in the public sector. Indeed, the
government’s “litmus test,” a willingness to work, is a decidedly
neutral one. Thus, it is problematic that the sectarian providers
could effectively divide communities according to the message
proffered and its receptiveness.
Justice O’Connor, in a pair of Establishment Clause cases,
articulates the concerns raised above more eloquently. In Wallace v.
Jaffree, she opines that government endorsement of a particular
religious grouping may make people’s religious beliefs or their
282

Karen Branch-Brioso, Faith-Based Drug Rehabilitation Program Offers Only One
Treatment: Jesus Christ, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1.
283
GLENN, supra note 233, at 70.
284
See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Antidrug Program Lauded by Bush Is More Ministry
than Treatment Center, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at A18; Marvin Olasky, Editorial,
Bush’s GOP Critics Miss His Point, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 17, 1999, at A11
(celebrating the fact that faith-based centers “break bureaucratic rules”).
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membership in a religious grouping determinative of their political
285
standing in the community.
Elsewhere, Justice O’Connor has
written that when government has the purpose of endorsing religion,
it sends a message to some that they are favored insiders. And, for
those who adhere to different sets of beliefs, they are not “full
286
members of the political community.”
Under PRWORA, there
287
must be a secular alternative; but the existence of an alternative
does not fully render acceptable that which is a de facto endorsement
of a particular religion. Even if that religious institution does not
fully stand in place of the government, it does—at the very least—
stand along side it in an undeniably privileged place that should
make observers mindful of Justice O’Connor’s writings.
Moreover, the laws on Charitable Choice do not say that such a
secular alternative has to be remotely comparable to the principal
provider in scope or funding. Indeed, if a religious provider has the
main contract with the city or county, inevitably we can envisage any
secular alternative as being a makeshift, ersatz set-up for the few
288
dissenters in town. Their choice, then, (if one actually is aware that
289
she has a choice) becomes one of whether to swallow the religious
message as a necessary by-product of the main social service
provider—that may likely be better funded and have better
connections for purposes of job placement—or take one’s chances
with the ostensibly less well-situated, but neutral provider. To provide
services in an uncomfortable environment is antithetical to the spirit
of improvement. It is one thing to use diversion tactics to encourage
self-help and to use workfare to instill an ethos of employment; it is,

285

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). A
federal judge in Wisconsin recently voided a state contract with a faith-based
provider on similar grounds. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F.
Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Laurie Goodstein, Judge in Wisconsin Voids A ReligionBased Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A22.
287
See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Filter Aid to Poor Through Churches, Bush Urges, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 1999, at A1. As suggested above, supra note 244, the secular
alternative provision is a weak one, for providers do not have to alert clients of their
right to seek this alternative.
288
One might be reminded of the makeshift law school education provided to
blacks in the South in the 1940s and 1950s and how this system of alternative
schooling was ultimately declared separate—but not equal. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that a makeshift law school for blacks could not
provide an education equal to that offered by the University of Texas Law School).
289
See Segal, supra note 244, at 71-72 (“Charitable choice does not provide
adequate protection for the religious liberties of welfare beneficiaries. . . .
[B]eneficiaries may assume that they have no option but to go to a religious
institution or forgo their benefits altogether.”).
286
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however, quite another, to deter people based on sectarian
differences of opinion. The former set (ideally) promotes selfsufficiency whereas the latter simply serves no work-related goal.
Moreover, institutionally does welfare reform sit well with the
possibility of religious messages? One might say, welfare reform is an
act of Congress throwing up its hands and letting communities do
what they think will work well. But, as I have been arguing, that
conventional line of reasoning must be refined. Does separating
members of a community along religious lines further a goal, and if
so, does that goal outweigh the cost imposed on those who are
290
discomforted and alienated in the process?
Recall Justice Breyer’s
gloss on the virtues of a strong Establishment Clause in Zelman. He
suggested the Warren Court protected the Establishment Clause in
part because it recognized the “anguish, hardship and bitter strife
that could come when zealous religious groups struggle with one
291
another to obtain the government’s stamp of approval.”
Indeed, perhaps the Governor’s Advisory Task Force provides us
with an honest look at how Charitable Choice might map onto the
welfare scene in a divisive manner. In lieu of offering the governor
an objective, policy-wonkish plan to reduce dependency, it concludes
with a sectarian parable:
When a lame beggar asked for a handout, Peter didn’t do the
kindhearted (but weak-minded) thing and give him money. Nor
. . . did he proffer a job, ‘the secular conservative solution’ (work
alone cannot redeem, either). Instead he addressed the deeper
292
problem and told the man to arise and walk in Jesus’s name.

It would seem as if workfare might not be the governing theme
of Charitable Choice. If federal welfare reform shifted the welfare
eligibility standards from “being poor” to “being poor and actively
seeking work,” then the Charitable Choice dimension adds a third
component: some commitment to a life of faith.
2.

Managerial Harms

It is not a far leap for us to consider that these heavily sectarian
organizations may ill-serve or alienate potential clients. From the
institutional distortion, the managerial harms follow closely on its
290

See, e.g., Salim Muwakkil, Editorial, Need for Secular Public Square, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
7, 2002, at N15 (recognizing the dangers of retreating into religious enclaves and
noting religious programs’ likelihood to polarize members of a multicultural
society).
291
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 659 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962)).
292
See Governor’s Advisory Task Force, supra note 246, at A-16.
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heels. Religious service is infused with messages that may distort the
ideals of welfare reform and may push people away from social
service assistance altogether.
a. Message of Patriarchy
Religion in the United States can be a force of patriarchy and
Occidentalism, perhaps condemning of those who do not fit the
mold. The messages offered on the respective sabbaths in people’s
respective private services may not map well onto the messages
offered seven days a week to a diverse (but highly dependent by
virtue of their poverty) American population. For instance, “[t]he
interests of the faith-based crowd in ‘repairing’ the family [may]
mean[] restoring the male head, crafting legal obstacles to divorce,
293
and deepening the stigma attached to female-headed households.”
Presumably, messages regarding abortion play a role, as well. Indeed,
in religious contexts, women may often stand to lose more than they
294
would in civic space. To some extent, secular welfare social policy is
already moving toward promoting marriage and traditional family
295
values, which implies welfare reform notwithstanding Charitable
Choice may itself be patriarchal and implicitly linked to the
Protestant Work Ethic; this realization takes some of the force out of
the argument that religious organizations are unique in this respect.
So to this extent, it would seem as if religious providers comport well
with the government’s message of self-sufficiency not only through
work, but also through an affirmation of the traditional nuclear
family.

293

Rickie Solinger, But No Faith in the People, SOC. JUST., Mar. 22, 2001, at 11.
Id. (“Women stand to lose full access to citizenship status when the faithbased crowd prevails. . . . Faith-based initiatives . . . would strengthen the antiabortion work by involving religious institutions in changing the culture of the
United States.”); see also McClain, supra note 92, at 1722 (acknowledging the concern
that some religious organizations would use social service organizations to promote
their messages of male authority and female submission).
295
See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 427-28 (1999) (describing
PRWORA’s pro-marriage rhetoric as well as state implementation of “Bridefare”
proposals that offer economic incentives for poor single mothers to marry); Backer,
supra note 4, at 45 (characterizing sections 101(1)-(10) of PRWORA as expressing
Congress’s unabashed promotion of marriage); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual
Regulation Dimensions of Contemporary Welfare Laws: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 121, 124 (2002) (“[PRWORA’s] policies have led directly to an
intensive, widespread, and arbitrary invasion of poor women’s private lives and bodily
integrity . . . .”); Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush Urges Work and Marriage Programs
in Welfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18.
294
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b. Focus on Spirituality over Tangible Services
However, there remain religious distortions. Leaving aside the
potential proselytizing impact, which I focused on above as a source
of institutional exclusion, the thrust of the provider’s message—for
any and all would-be clients—may not focus enough on the welfareto-work agenda. Recall above the methodology of some faith-based
providers. They focused exclusively on personal salvation and such
efforts might have to come at the expense of emphasizing job
training, job-search skills, and physical well-being. The potential
managerial harm, therefore, may take the form of a relatively
inflexible and possibly unhelpful package of service provisions.
c. Religiosity of Providers
Finally, but related, it should be noted that part of the religious
freedom of church providers is not just permission to sermonize, but
also to hire those who will reflect the teachings of the particular faith.
Church providers are exempt from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
296
Act anti-discrimination provisions and thus may have a staff of
caseworkers who do not have much of a demographic connection
with the client population. One of the goals of welfare reform was
297
more intimate client-caseworker relationships.
If the caseworkers
are somehow vastly different than the clients with respect to sex, class,
298
ethnicity, and even race, this process might be impeded. The
combination of a demographically distinct and moralizing
caseworker may impede the process of mainstream integration. One
of the goals of localism is to foster stronger ties between members of
the larger community and the client population. It might be helpful
if some of the individuals assisting the poor actually looked like (and
299
had shared experiences with) the poor, a suggestion one also hears
296

See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress intended the
explicit exemptions to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and
maintain communities composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal
practices.”); Miller v. Bay View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174,
1183 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (non-ministerial officers are exempt from Title VII); EEOC v.
Presbyterian Ministries, 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that a
Christian retirement home can ask a Muslim receptionist to take off her religious
head covering). For a discussion of anti-discrimination and faith-based provision, see
Lin et al., supra note 228, at 196-97, 214-16.
297
See Diller, Localism, supra note 1; Simon, supra note 87.
298
See Wendy Kaminer, The Joy of Sects, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 32
(positing that anti-discrimination Title VII exemptions on religious grounds may
affect the racial composition of employment patterns).
299
See, e.g., Shapiro & Wright, supra note 252 (describing Mississippi Governor
Fordice’s call to, presumably, white churches to each adopt a needy black family).
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raised in the context of community policing reform.
3.

Civic Harms

Here, I briefly describe the potential undermining of “faith” in
government; like privatization, Charitable Choice signals an erosion
of trust in the public sector. Charitable Choice posits a great civic
300
harm: that government is (only) next to godliness. With individuals
and communities turning (most optimistically) inward to focus on
help via their religious organizations, a local sense of engagement in
a particular religious community may engender a concomitant
301
withering of the public domain.
God, not government, helps
people—parishioners, not citizens—and the collective action of a
community is sacrificed for the collection action of a congregation.
Leaving aside these organizations’ structural limitations in promoting
work opportunities, this metaphorical insularity will segregate rather
than connect people. As we retreat to our respective altars, we lose
our sense of pluralism and our links to the American experience and
her people. The threat this poses is considerable, for it spawns great
302
divisions.
Moreover, will every faith-based organization have
opportunities to provide? Probably not, even assuming there is no
303
prima facie discrimination against non-Western religious providers.
Some faith communities will not have the resources to compete with
the more established church providers. Their messages of salvation
will never be accorded the same prominence in public discourse
because they do not have the financial means or popular sway to bid
competitively to manage a segment of the welfare infrastructure. All
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See Muwakkil, supra note 290; cf. Michaels, supra note 45 (characterizing
privatization initiatives not motivated by economic efficiency as posing unique
problems vis-à-vis public governance).
301
See Mike Allen, “Faith-Based” Backup Plan; Agencies Look To Lower Barriers to
Social Service Contracts, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2001, at A2 (describing concerns and
reservations among government officials unsure of the degree to which religion can
pervade social service administration); Muwakkil, supra note 290; Peter Steinfels,
Hiring for Faith-based Programs, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, at B6 (describing the public’s
discomfort with discriminatory hiring practices).
302
See Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 536 U.S. 639, 717-19 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Saperstein, supra note 232, at 1371; Muwakkil, supra note 290.
303
Many erstwhile supporters of faith-based provision balked at the idea of
including non-Western faiths within the Charitable Choice tent. Reverend Pat
Robertson has said the Unification Church, the Hare Krishnas, and the Scientologists
should not be funded. Pat Robertson, Editorial, Bush Faith-based Plan Requires an
Overhaul, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2001, at 15A. Reverend Jerry Falwell has insisted on
the exclusion of all Muslim groups—even before September 11, 2001—on the basis
that “the religion of Islam ‘teaches hate.’” Jane Lampman, Faith in Government?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2001, at 11.
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of this also suggests that religious provision,
provision, may be alienating to individuals and
there be, for instance, internal struggles with
another religion happens to emerge as the
provision and material and spiritual comfort?
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especially sectarian
communities. Will
one’s own faith as
source of welfare

C. Summary
Parts III, IV, and V of this study focused on the possible
distortions that can occur when the federal government leaves policy
implementation decisions to local, for-profit, and religious service
providers. But a study of welfare devolution and privatization stands
out from examinations of devolution and privatization in other
domestic policy areas for two reasons. First, the target population
being served is, by definition, one of the weakest, most marginalized
in society. Those resorting to public assistance, by and large, have
few socio-economic resources, civic or political ties, or alternative
304
means of support or subsistence.
Second, welfare reform is a particularly subjective business.
Unlike a host of other policy programs that Washington has punted
to the states, welfare policy is difficult to assess—except in absolute
numbers in roll reduction. And even with absolute numbers, it is
hard to keep track of those who do not succeed in welfare reform
programs, and it is difficult to evaluate what percentage of workfare
305
failures will land on their feet versus those who will fall flat. Success
stories may be fatuous as well, for it is difficult to determine whether
improvements should be attributed to extrinsic factors (the
economy) or to the hard work of innovative local administrators.
Indeed, the federal government has left itself with limited access to
gauge how well the program is working, let alone to revise and
recalibrate the programs accordingly. Those federal officials serious
about making welfare reform work have an attenuated connection to
the programs, data, and families themselves—that limits their ability
to continue to improve the lives of poor Americans. In short,
Congress’s concessions to the narrative of devolution sparked a
304

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976) (discussing how an
individual on SSI disability, unlike someone on welfare, can always find alternative
sources of funding—including welfare—to survive).
305
See, e.g., Laura Cohn, From Welfare to Worsefare?, BUS. WK., Oct. 9, 2000, at 103
(“Sadly, no national surveys track welfare mothers after they leave the dole.”);
Raymond Hernandez, McCall Urges Better Tracking of Those Leaving Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1999, at B4; Leslie Kaufman, Are Those Leaving Welfare Better Off Now? Yes and
No, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, at B1 (noting the difficulty of tracking former welfare
recipients).
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seismic shift in the federal-state balance that left it without any
principal control over the direction of welfare reform. Its failure to
strike the proper federalism note left it without the opportunity to
guide reform as only the federal government can.
VI. REDESIGNING WELFARE REFORM:
PROMOTING INDEPENDENCE THROUGH BALANCED FEDERALISM
In this final Part, I briefly outline a possible alternative, processbased approach to achieving the substantive goals of federal welfare
reform. My aim is to build a policy framework that can serve as the
foundation of a new legal paradigm—and to rekindle an important
conversation. The federal goals should, by now, be clear: to end
dependency by promoting an ethic of work and personal
responsibility. The federal government’s intended methodology
should be equally clear: to end the federal entitlement to cash
assistance and to enlist the help of local and private actors with the
design and implementation of innovative strategies to transform
welfare recipients into self-sufficient workers. Thus, we want to end
dependency and want to rely on local actors to experiment with
different approaches to help us arrive at our collective goal. Yet in
the course of its legislative process, devolution seemed to be
privileged above all else—even the substantive objectives of welfare
reform, objectives which themselves were compromised by the forces
of devolution. Simply put, a legal regime focused exclusively on local
autonomy may sound appealing and play well on the campaign trail.
But, it is a fundamentally impoverished (and counterproductive)
conception of welfare reform—and of federalism. States and their
subsidiaries lack the requisite tools (notably, large-scale economic
policymaking) and, at times, the proper motivation to promote fully
the substantive and rhetorical aims of welfare reform as designed by
Congress.
The avowed procedural reforms in welfare policy—flexibility,
localism, discretion, efficiency, and faith—all have the potential to be
taken too far, suggesting devolution is better swallowed in
moderation. We need to develop a strategy to rein in devolution and
embark on a new course relying on a more balanced version of
federalism. This more balanced federalism retains the dynamic
benefits of localism while enlarging opportunities for greater federal
participation, coordination, and oversight. Unpopular as this shift
back toward the center may seem, such a shift is not only necessary to
carry out the substantive aims of welfare reform, but it also represents
a more faithful effort to maintain the delicate balance of American
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federalism. Realistically, the current, dominant narrative of protest
against greater federal involvement will not be quieted by a simple,
dispassionate lesson on the virtues of a more balanced approach to
federalism. But, reformers may be able to appease the states if
Congress is willing to compensate them (with added funding) for
loosening their vice-grip on welfare policy authority.
This Part proceeds in two stages. In the first section, I offer an
alternative legal architecture for welfare reform, one perhaps better
able to promote its substantive and rhetorical aims. Yet power
politics may make it difficult to disturb the status quo. Thus, the
second section posits a political solution for Congress to wrest back
some control it too readily abdicated in 1996. Congress needs to
reassert some authority and build partnerships that combine the local
virtues of experimentalism and dynamism with the federal virtues of
306
being able to set national standards,
to coordinate national
economic policy, and to internalize the state-level externalities that
encourage races-to-the-bottom. Thus, Section A and Section B lay a
cursory groundwork for reconceptualized welfare reform.
A. Re-federalizing Devolved Welfare Policy
There is strong and persuasive evidence that states and localities
can do a better job of crafting welfare programs than can
Washington, if it were to set policy by fiat. But there is a third legal
regime that, I argue, can outperform either a totally centralized or
completely localized and atomized model of reform.
Reforming welfare may require recalibrating Congress’s (and
the states’) view of federalism. This approach is hardly novel.
Imagine a return to a more balanced, cooperative system in which
the states continue to craft and shape policy, but with more federal
oversight that includes advice, rewards, and punishments: a
decentralized regime in which state and federal excesses can both be
mitigated by the coercive power each level of government has over
307
308
the other. This system might be structured in the following way.
States would be required to design welfare programs in exchange for
federal funds. States would then submit their proposals to HHS for

306

See Cashin, supra note 3, at 620-24 (highlighting the desirability of imposing
minimum national standards and stronger federal oversight over local programs).
307
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
308
What follows is merely a cursory sketch of an alternative legal structure for
welfare reform. It is intended to be understood as merely a start of a larger
conversation about reforming welfare reform.
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309

stringent review.
HHS would have the ability (and obligation) to
negotiate with states over the design of those experimental
innovations it finds troublesome. The political consensus favoring
localism and devolution would, in turn, keep the federal authorities
310
deferential to the states in most circumstances.
But, federal
oversight would still help policymakers anticipate problems or, in the
alternative, quickly correct them.
Presently, I posit three foundational tenets for a revised welfare
strategy. First, as a condition of approving a state’s plans that may
have fewer safeguards than HHS might otherwise want, the federal
government could insist on retaining greater oversight involvement
in that state’s program. Congress and HHS might exact promises
that states file periodic research reports attesting to the success of the
program; that a federal officer (or a welfare recipient, or both) would
be allowed to sit ex officio on any private welfare vendor’s board of
311
directors; or, that the state add statutory protection for fair hearings
and, perhaps, receive a good-faith bonus from the federal
government to subsidize these legal expenses. Thus, some of the
more innovative programs that the states devise might be subject to
federal-state negotiations over safeguards.
All of these measures might be derided by proponents of
devolution as more of the same “red tape” they successfully fought to
eliminate in 1996. Yet we should see these heightened administrative
costs as actually offering a boon to democracy and innovative
policymaking as these partnerships between federal and local officials
create a climate conducive to thoughtful reform and greater political
312
collaboration among governmental entities. And, in the long run,
this more rigorous collaborative process may produce more effective,
309

In fairness, states currently need to report to the federal government
periodically on their programs. But this reporting is often understood to be merely
pro forma. See 42 U.S.C. § 617 (2000) (“No officer or employee of the Federal
Government may regulate the conduct of States . . . or enforce any provision . . .
except to the extent expressly provided . . . .”); see also Mary Jo Bane & Richard
Weissbourd, Welfare Reform and Children: Welfare Reform Is Likely To Result in More
Children in Struggling Low Wage Working Families, and More Children in Families Without
Either Employment or Other Means of Support, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 131, 131 (1998);
Cimini, supra note 10, at 256-57.
310
One need only recall the popularity of the Midwestern governors, especially
Governor Thompson and Governor Engler, during the AFDC waiver efforts of the
mid 1990s, taking on the HHS bureaucracy. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Aid from an
Enemy of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at D1; Gary Wills, The War Between
the States . . . and Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, at F26.
311
See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 9, at 1609.
312
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 95, at 314-39 (outlining “deliberative polyarchy,”
their innovative model of cooperative federalism).
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enduring welfare programs.
Second, the federal government can place a minimum standards
floor to forestall pernicious races-to-the-bottom.
The federal
government need not mandate a rigid floor uniform across the fifty
states. Instead, in keeping with the desire for flexibility while fending
off races-to-the-bottom, the federal government may create minimum
standards for certain state clusters, neighboring, comparable states
that have similar economic climates and high incentives to divert
their poor across state lines.
It can, moreover, work to offer advice and support. For
example, HHS can compare proposals from states in a given region
and recommend those states work together to realize some
economies of scale. There is no reason why the Dakotas or, for that
matter, New York and New Jersey might not want to coordinate
welfare policy to achieve economies of scale, collaborate on job
search and transportation needs, and minimize fears of cross-border
313
welfare magnets. The federal government can play a central role in
identifying and encouraging opportunities for such collaboration and
314
coordination.
Third, a movement back toward the old federal-state contracting
system allows the federal government to always be in the know. It can
request updates and reports and ask the states to conduct studies in
exchange for increasingly lenient waivers.
Transparency and
disclosure on the part of states could be rewarded by HHS with less
313

For discussions of interstate compacting and their applications in the context
of modern policy contexts, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE RELATIONS: THE
NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF FEDERALISM (1996); Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685
(1925); Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in Democratic Society: The Problem of
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997); and Jon D. Michaels, The Compacting Renaissance
(working draft, on file with author). See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (describing the contours of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management
Act and the compacts that the federal legislation spawned).
314
See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 483, 498 (1991). He has contended:
Many of the common clichés about the benefits of “federalism” actually
have little to do with the idea of federalism, strictly speaking. States
can indeed “experiment” by passing different laws whose results can be
monitored and assessed. But a centralized government could run the
same kind of experiments among geographically defined “provinces”
whose governments hold office at the pleasure of the center. Indeed, if
experimentation is our chief desideratum, a purely pyramidic
government structure may well be preferable, enabling central
planners to shape and reshape government boundaries and policies for
more carefully controlled experiments.
Id.
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intrusive oversight. This framework of more robust communication
enables Congress to be more readily informed and better prepared to
step in to correct problems. For example, the states might work with
the federal government in determining how much job growth is
needed (and whether or not stimulus programs are forthcoming). It
is important to make those decisions before programs are designed
315
and work targets are set.
Thus, if the federal government and a
state develop a plan with these factors in mind, more realistic goals
could be established and met. In this process, states, too, can extract
demands of the federal government. A state may expand its
education vouchers for the poor on the condition the federal
government invests in job growth in the area.
Professors Dorf’s and Sabel’s scholarship on federal-state
316
relations in the policymaking context might be applicable here.
Dorf and Sabel endorse a more dynamic model of consultation and
evaluation in cooperative policymaking—as opposed to a rigid,
periodic review system. Their proposals contemplate a need to create
a primary information clearinghouse to pool and evaluate findings
around the country.
Thus, Wisconsin can be informed that
Minnesota had numerous problems starting up a rural job center, or
that Tennessee had troubles contracting with a particular
corporation. Moreover, Dorf and Sabel endorse a system of central
“benchmarking,” which enables the federal government to set
317
standards that, again, limit the likelihood of a race-to-the-bottom
effect and require the states to make gains—but only those gains that
have already been proven to be feasible. This benchmarking based on
empirical results stands in contrast to the current approach in which a
new work-requirement standard is (rather arbitrarily) established,
even though it may not be rationally or empirically pegged to the
318
contours of economic growth or labor demand.
In short, we need to reverse the default position. No longer
should states be allowed to design welfare reform policies with little
federal oversight. A deferential, but still rigorous, review of state
policies by Congress and HHS should be made a necessary precursor
319
to federal funding.
The single biggest obstacle to this reform
315

See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 95, at 288 (envisioning the role of Congress vis-àvis domestic social policy as authorizing, coordinating, and financing state
experimental reform).
317
See id. at 287, 298-302.
318
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 66; Editorial, supra note 66.
319
While effectively allaying some of the concerns raised in Section III.B, this
proposed reorganization of authority and autonomy between the federal
316

2004

DEFORMING WELFARE

665

proposal, of course, is the political opposition from the states.
address this directly in Section B.

I

B. Paying an Efficiency Wage:
Inducing the States toward Specific Performance
Ultimately this policy will require state acquiescence. States may
be more likely to accept these reforms if the federal funding structure
were amended to (1) compensate states for this loss in discretion and
to (2) reward them with carrots for complying with federal objectives.
Without including these compensatory measures, reclaiming state
authority and discretion is politically problematic, if not altogether
untenable. But, if packaged as part of an effort to overhaul the
incentive structure of the grants, the states may prove more receptive.
Let me begin with a brief digression. An elementary concept in
economics is that the marginal cost for labor (the wage) is set equal
to the laborer’s marginal product of labor. Similarly, of course, if the
federal government wants to give the states $100 million in aid, say, to
increase the number of teachers, it writes a check for that amount.
But, in practice, many firms (with principal-agent problems) do not
adhere to the rigors of orthodox economic theory in structuring their

government and the states does not, prima facie, do anything vis-à-vis problems
introduced into the welfare system via privatization. Given the federal government’s
enthusiastic reliance on private actors for all sorts of provisions, it is highly unlikely
that Congress would scale back its extensive outsourcing agenda. See supra note 42
and accompanying text.
That said, the federal government’s larger presence in the world of welfare will
provide an extra layer of government oversight, and an extra layer of governmental
influence to keep contractors in check; it is, after all, understood that contractors
such as Lockheed, Andersen, and Maximus also have considerable business dealings
with the federal government. While it is doubtful that greater centralization and
federal-state cooperation will turn the tide on privatization and deregulation per se,
the federal government’s potential to resist corporate capture and negotiate better
deals (because of its larger purchasing power) might create the right set of
disincentives to keep private actors from overstepping their bounds. See, e.g.,
Freeman, supra note 42, at 1317. Professor Freeman suggests:
Congress could, therefore, tailor privatization experiments to extend
federal goals not only to the state and local government grantees that
directly receive the funds, but also to private contractors charged with
service delivery. Congress might minimize the discretion of private
contractors by specifying performance criteria or dictating substantive
contractual terms, including requirements for regular and detailed
reporting.
Congress might demand closer or more extensive
monitoring of private contractors by federal agencies, not only for cost
control and fraud prevention purposes, but also for quality control,
which these agencies charged with oversight have traditionally not
done very effectively.
Id.
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own payrolls. Instead, many offer employees an “efficiency wage.” A
firm pays a worker more than the value of her marginal product of
labor in order to reduce her incentive to slack or, perhaps worse, take
another job with another firm. Thus, the firm spends a little more on
the worker, but reduces its long-term costs associated with turnover
(hiring and training new employees). An efficiency wage, moreover,
also encourages workers to be more affirmatively gung-ho about their
jobs. Satisfied with their generous compensation, they may go the
320
extra mile for the boss.
Perhaps we should think about funding state initiatives mindful
of the applicability and utility of efficiency wages. The welfare
recipient population is such a vulnerable community in America that
it is imperative for the federal government to ensure fair and humane
treatment of those undergoing the transition from welfare to work. A
more comprehensively and sensitively structured funding system may
go a long way in increasing state compliance with federal objectives
(and in reducing incentives to deviate).
Currently, largely
undifferentiated state block grants are given with relatively few strings
attached. States’ grants are largely open-ended. It might make more
sense, however, to give more generous grants, but with greater
321
conditions attached. Thus, give the bitter with the sweet.
Under the proposed system primitively sketched out in the
previous section, a state could still be given an undifferentiated block
grant and continue to operate as it presently has been. Or, it could
take advantage of a federal bonus scheme. A modest bonus might be
offered to states in exchange for comprehensive monitoring and
reporting of welfare-to-work programs and their successes. To
receive this modest bonus, states would be required to investigate,
analyze, and report on the status of its programs to HHS.
Additionally, a more generous bonus could be offered in exchange
for successful job placements. An “unsuccessful” roll reduction, in
contrast, would take the form of diverting an individual from welfare
and losing track of her. That person may have a job, but he also may
320

For an analysis of the efficiency wage, see WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE,
MACROECONOMICS AND THE WAGE BARGAIN 401-07 (1990).
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This criticism of current welfare reform as underutilizing incentive bonuses
could be extended to the design and administration of AFDC. The cooperative
federal-state relationship under AFDC could be characterized as having sticks, but
few carrots. States could lose grant money for failing to serve the community, but
they were not eligible for bonuses if they did a particularly good job at alleviating
poverty and dependency. Current welfare reform does build into its funding the
opportunity for states to “pocket” unspent money, but that bonus is too loosely tied
to the objective of empowerment (for the federal government does not condition
that surplus on any showing of “success” other than roll slashing).
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be on the streets. A report attesting to the successful (employed)
transition, on the other hand, would result in extra funding. If the
tracking attests to successful long-term placements, perhaps six
months or a year, then, again, the states could be given additional
322
moneys.
Federal spending on welfare provisions is surprisingly small.
And, the bonuses contemplated would only be a fraction of aggregate
spending, yet may mean a great deal to states. It may be worthwhile
for them to track and report, to be diligent in placements, and to be
extra-diligent in making good placements. The additional money
could be invested back into social welfare (to get even larger bonuses
by getting more clients into jobs) or could be used for any other state
endeavor. States do not have to go along with this system, but the
offer and opportunity is there for them to work just a little harder to
323
see welfare reform succeed. Who says government service provision
has to be indifferent to forces of market incentives?
Efficiency funding greases the wheels of political compliance
and in turn improves the overall operation of welfare reform. We
can retain the benefits of decentralization, so long as we are willing to
invest a little more money to establish the requisite amount of
oversight. All of this, of course, applies equally in the context of subdevolution and privatization.
***
Implicit in a movement away from wholesale devolution is either
a return to central authority or an effort to balance the two extremes.
I endorse the latter alternative and thus underscore the need to
cultivate federal-state partnerships, not only to regulate state
behavior, but also to get public officials and civil servants at all levels
of government thinking and talking about policy. I earlier noted that
Colorado’s welfare reform is administered individually by each of its
sixty-three counties; nearly half of those sixty-three counties lacked
324
formal, written regulations for administering welfare.
The
importance of federal oversight is obviously central to my desire to
strike a better balance vis-à-vis federalism; but having each of those
counties convene meetings, hash out ideas, and issue referenda is
also a worthy end insofar as it is democracy-enhancing. Federal
322
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welfare reform.
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For an extensive discussion of the structuring of welfare incentives, see David
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involvement does not need to be reduced to fiats from HHS, just as
federalism does not mean a complete abdication of national
oversight. It should, alternatively, contemplate federal partnerships
with cities, corporations, and faith institutions to coordinate efforts,
highlight efficiency gains, and promote the substantive and rhetorical
aims of welfare reform. In all, reining in devolution does not mark
the death of autonomy, localism, or efficiency; it marks a new
movement to more creative policymaking and civic participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a counterintuitive proposition:
Devolution does not go hand-in-hand with welfare reform. I took
that proposition further and challenged the argument that
privatization and Charitable Choice actually promote the substantive
and rhetorical aims of welfare reform. These private actors, like their
local governmental counterparts, are structurally limited in their
ability to achieve the ostensible federal objectives of welfare reform.
They do not have all the tools, incentives, and, possibly, allegiances
necessary to devote themselves fully to the imperatives of federal
welfare reform.
Even without a booming economy, there is no reason why these
providers could not reduce the welfare rolls by engaging in diversion
tactics and by conditioning payments on unreasonable demands.
Ostensibly, then, these providers would be furthering the objectives
of welfare reform, but only ostensibly. It is more difficult, however, to
demonstrate affirmative results: actual self-sufficiency. While federal
mandates on work requirements put pressure on states to find jobs
for clients (or simply divert them from the rolls), there is no corollary
commitment to making sure these clients become self-sufficient.
Congress can demand reductions in dependency, but cannot
similarly mandate improvements in families’ socioeconomic status
under the present formulation of PRWORA. Without greater federal
oversight, states have few incentives to work toward that latter end. In
fact, current funding practices suggest states and private firms may
have incentives to under-provide services aimed at promoting
socioeconomic advancement.
In criticizing devolution and privatization as potentially at odds
with the substantive goals of welfare reform, I do not reject localism
or experimentation. Rather, I seek to distinguish the ideology of
devolution from the pragmatic understanding of federalism that
balances the forces of devolution with those of decentralization.
Moving away from devolution toward decentralization, the federal
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government should take a firmer grip of the reins of welfare policy
and require states to submit proposals as a condition of funding.
Though remaining deferential, Congress and HHS may reserve the
right to ask states for additional safeguards to be put in place if their
proposed programs seem particularly risky. Moreover, I suggest
restructuring the federal grant appropriation system. The federal
government should offer a series of bonuses to states that specifically
comply with more detailed federal welfare goals. The federal
government should not simply require a certain percentage of
welfare roll reduction. Instead, it should give bonuses to states that
can demonstrate that their welfare “graduates” remain gainfully
employed. Finally, the (more) generous bonus structure lessens the
political opposition states might otherwise mount in the face of a
proposed shift in power back to Washington. I have argued that
Congress subverted its own substantive and rhetorical aims when it
decided to abdicate nearly complete authority over welfare reform,
and thus I recommend the need to reconceptualize welfare policy
(and federalism) to correct those distortions.

